

503

SOCIOLOGY

14/17

MORRIS GINSBERG

SOCIOLOGY is here defined as the study of human interactions and inter-relations, having for its field the whole life of man in society. Dr. Ginsberg is one of the foremost sociologists of our time and his book is a notable contribution to a branch of learning which has become increasingly important.


10s. 6d. net
(IN U.K. ONLY)

803 (2877)
Q

12/46.

12/47





*THE HOME UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE*

174

SOCIOLOGY



out that Mill did not realize sufficiently the implications of what with Comte he called the social consensus. It may well be that the different factors of social life are so intimately interwoven that the laws which govern them are not reducible to the laws of biology and psychology, and that there may exist sociological laws *sui generis*. Thus, while agreeing that the method of sociology is in essentials that called by Mill the inverse deductive, that is to say, a combination of inductive generalization obtained by means of the comparative method or by statistical methods with deduction from more ultimate laws, we need not commit ourselves to the view that sociology is in the long run nothing but applied psychology, and we can leave open the appeal to biological laws and possibly to laws governing the life and evolution of human societies as such.

Sociology and social philosophy. Historically, sociology has its main roots in politics and the philosophy of history. Among the Greek thinkers politics and ethics were not separate disciplines but rather two divisions of the wider study of man as a social being, and this in turn was subordinate to a more general theory of nature and man's place in it. In modern times political science has come to be concerned essentially with three problems, partly philosophical and partly

scientific. Firstly, it is a study of the actual forms of government and the conditions of their rise, persistence or change ; secondly, it deals with the nature of the ends which governments should serve and with the moral basis of authority ; thirdly, it is an investigation of the technique or art of governmental administration. Sociology may be said to have arisen as an extension of the field of political inquiry to cover other institutions than the state, for example, the family, or the forms of property and other elements of culture and civilization such as morals, religion and art, regarded as social products and seen in their relations to each other. As in the case of politics, however, the relation between the study of the actual forms of institutions and the ideals or ends of human endeavour is not always clearly defined. The second root of sociology is the philosophy of history, which in modern times has generally been an attempt in the grand manner to interpret the whole course of human history as part of a wider philosophical world view. From this sociology may be said to have arisen by way of reaction against sweeping generalizations unsupported by detailed inductive inquiry. In recent work it has become customary to distinguish between sociology and social philosophy. I propose now briefly to discuss their relations.

SOCIOLOGY

Social philosophy consists of two parts, critical or logical, and constructive or synthetic. The former is concerned with the logic of the social sciences and with the validity of the methods and principles which they employ. It discusses such problems as whether law in the sense of necessary connection can be said to hold in the field of human endeavour, and how such regularities are related to the human will; or whether the element of individuality introduces a factor of uncertainty fatal to any serious sociological generalization. On its constructive side, social philosophy is concerned with the validity of social ideals. From this angle it is an application of the results of ethics to the problems of social organization and social development. The problem of progress, for example, is one which involves both sociology and social philosophy, since in dealing with it we require to know not only what changes are occurring in point of fact, but also how far they are in accord with our ethical standards or criteria of value. Limitations of space prevent me from dealing here with the critical or logical side of social philosophy, and I shall confine attention to the problems which arise out of the relations between the study of facts and their interconnections which falls within the domain of social science, and the study of values which by general

consent forms part of the philosophical disciplines.

At first sight the distinction seems clear and in recent work in the social sciences much has been made of the importance of keeping the scientific side free from any problem of valuation. This insistence on ethical neutrality is partly inspired by the laudable desire for scientific detachment in matters in which human passions and prejudices are involved, and partly by the questionable assumption that value-judgments are subjective and do not lend themselves to examination by the ordinary procedure of science. The problem may be approached from two points of view. We may ask in the first place whether the study of values is not itself a study of certain types of fact, namely, acts or processes of valuing, whether, for example, ethics is not ultimately a branch of sociology, that is, a study of the ways in which human beings come as members of society to approve certain classes of acts and to condemn others, and of the conditions, psychological and sociological, in which moral beliefs and practices have evolved. We may ask in the second place, whether in dealing with social facts we can leave out of consideration all reference to human purposes, ideals and aspirations. Are not ends and strivings the very stuff out of which social happenings are made? Is it

The Editors of the *Home University Library*
since its foundation in 1911 have included

GILBERT MURRAY, O.M., F.B.A.

THE RT. HON. H. A. L. FISHER, O.M., F.R.S.

SIR ARTHUR THOMSON

SIR JULIAN HUXLEY, F.R.S.

SIR GEORGE CLARK, F.B.A.

SIR HENRY TIZARD, F.R.S.

AND

SIR GAVIN DE BEER, F.R.S.

The present Editors are
MICHAEL ABERCROMBIE, F.R.S.

AND

A. D. WOZLEY

Sociology

MORRIS GINSBERG

M.A., D.LIT.



LONDON

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

NEW YORK TORONTO

Oxford University Press, Amen House, London E.C.4

GLASGOW NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON

BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI LAHORE DACCA

CAPE TOWN SALISBURY NAIROBI IBADAN ACCRA

KUALA LUMPUR HONG KONG

First edition 1934

*Reprinted 1937, 1947, 1949, 1950,
1953, 1955, 1959, 1961, and 1963*


JUL 11 1955
11.7.05
11542

JUL 11 1955
11542

Printed in Great Britain

CONTENTS

| | | |
|-------|--|-----|
| I. | SCOPE AND METHOD OF SOCIOLOGY | 7 |
| II. | SOCIETY, CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION | 38 |
| III. | RACE AND ENVIRONMENT | 54 |
| IV. | THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIAL LIFE | 98 |
| V. | THE GROWTH OF SOCIETIES | 129 |
| VI. | SOCIAL CLASSES AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION | 159 |
| VII. | ASPECTS OF MENTAL DEVELOPMENT | 196 |
| VIII. | CONCLUSION | 234 |
| | BIBLIOGRAPHY | 247 |
| | INDEX | 251 |



I

SCOPE AND METHOD OF SOCIOLOGY

In this chapter I propose to say something, firstly about the scope of sociology and its methods, secondly about its relation to other social sciences and to social philosophy.

In the broadest sense, sociology is the study of human interactions and interrelations, their conditions and consequences. Ideally, it has for its field the whole life of man in society, all the activities whereby men maintain themselves in the struggle for existence, the rules and regulations which define their relations to each other, the systems of knowledge and belief, art and morals, and any other capacities and habits acquired and developed in the course of their activities as members of society.

But this ideal is clearly too generously conceived. It is obvious that no science could make any headway if it attempted to deal with the whole tissue of human relationships in their infinite ramifications. How then is the delimitation of the field to be achieved?

SOCIOLOGY

Two types of answer have been given by sociologists to this question, and they have given rise to two somewhat different conceptions of the scope of sociology. One group of writers, best exemplified by the German sociologist Simmel and his followers, is inspired by the desire to mark sociology off very clearly from other branches of social study, to free it from the charge of overweening ambition and to confine it to the inquiry into certain defined aspects of human relationships. The other group recognizes clearly that the field of social investigation is too wide for any one discipline, and that if any progress is to be made there must be specialization and division of labour; but insists that, in addition to the special social sciences, such as economics, anthropology, comparative religion, comparative jurisprudence, etc., there is need also of a general social science, sociology, whose function it would be to bring the results of the special disciplines into relation with each other, to deal with the general conditions of social life, which, because of their very generality, are often ignored by the specialists, in short, to view social life as a whole. The conception of sociology as a clearly defined specialism, and the view of it as a synthesis of all social studies, have both of them strong adherents, and it is important at the outset to indicate

clearly the attitude which will be taken in this book.

The first point of view has been developed in a variety of ways, but only the more important can here be mentioned. Simmel's sociology is based on the distinction between the forms of social relationships and their content and matter. Such relationships, for example, as competition, subordination, hierarchical organization, division of labour, are exemplified in different spheres of social life, such as the economic, the political and even the religious, moral or artistic. The business of general sociology is to disentangle these forms of social relationships and to study them in abstraction from the varying matter or content within which they are manifested. On this view the relation between sociology and the special social sciences is that it deals with the same topics as they, but from a different angle—namely, the angle of the different modes of social relationships.

In a somewhat similar manner, Vierkandt regards sociology as a specialism concerned with the ultimate forms of the psychical bonds which link men to one another in society. Actual historical societies, for example, the French society of the eighteenth century, or the Chinese family, are of interest only as illustrative of particular types of relationships, for instance, of power, or of

degree of community. But sociology, if it is to be freed from the charge of vagueness and indefiniteness, must not attempt any detailed historical or inductive study of concrete societies. Its aim is, according to Vierkandt, to obtain by direct introspective analysis an account of the irreducible categories of social relationships, such as the attitude of respect, shame, love and hate, submission, the need we experience for the approval of others, the bond that ties individuals into a group. Similarly, in dealing with culture, sociology should not, according to him, compete with the historian by dealing with the actual contents of cultural evolution. It should not for example seek to formulate such laws as Comte's law of the three stages, but should confine itself to the discovery of the fundamental forces of change and persistence. Only by such methods could a definite field be marked out for sociological investigation.

A more concrete and historically-minded treatment of sociology is that of Max Weber, though he too is concerned to mark out a distinctive field for sociology. The aim of sociology is to interpret or 'understand' social behaviour. Social behaviour does not cover the whole field of human relations. It is defined as activity which, in the intention of the agent, has reference to, and is determined by, the behaviour of others. An act

initiated by the anticipated behaviour of a material object is not social. Indeed, not all human interactions are social. For instance, a collision between two cyclists is in itself merely a natural phenomenon when there is no intentional reference by each to the behaviour of the other, but their efforts to avoid each other, or the language they use after the event, constitute true social behaviour. Sociology is concerned essentially with the probability or chance of the occurrence of types of social behaviour as thus defined. Sociological laws are empirically established probabilities or statistical generalizations of the course of social behaviour of which an interpretation can be given, that is, which can be understood. By "understanding" is meant a grasp of the intention or sense of the agent or agents sufficient to make it intelligible in terms of normal habits of thought and feeling and what is known of the deviations from such normal habits. Entities, such as the state or the church, are defined by Max Weber in harmony with this general method in terms of social relationships, that is, of the probability of certain types of social behaviour. There is a state, for example, when there is a reasonable probability that certain types of behaviour will be enforced by a defined authority in given circumstances. Max Weber attaches

great importance to definitions of this type, on the ground that they avoid the personification of social groupings which is the besetting sin of sociologists.

These and other similar conceptions of sociology as a specialism clearly contain much of value. The analysis and classification of types of social relationship must, on any view, form part of sociological inquiry. It may, however, be questioned whether they solve, as is maintained by their upholders, the problem of the relation between sociology and the special social sciences. For a study of social relationships must remain barren, if it is conducted in the abstract without full knowledge of the terms which in concrete life they relate. For example, the study of competition will yield little of profit unless its manifestations can be followed in detail in economic life, or the world of art and knowledge; it may even turn out that social relations depend upon very different factors in different spheres of life, that, for example, subordination has a different explanation in the family, the church and the state. Whether this is the case or not cannot be ascertained without a detailed knowledge of these institutions. We should thus be led to enlarge our view of sociology as a study of social relationships in general by adding various special sociologies concerned with

SCOPE AND METHOD OF SOCIOLOGY

these relationships as embodied in each of the great spheres of culture, for example, the sociology of religion, of art, of law, of knowledge. But then we have again on our hands the problem of the relation of these special sociologies to the more generalized systematic sociology. Are we then not brought back to the synoptic or encyclopædic view of sociology?

Before answering this question, let us consider this latter view of sociology a little more in detail. If anything is well established, it is that all parts of social life are intimately related and interwoven. If society is not an organism, it certainly has something organic in its nature, in the sense that its parts function together and that changes at any one point have repercussions that affect the whole. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance that societies should be studied as wholes, and that the nature of the interactions between its various elements should be understood. The specialist very naturally comes to claim prominence for the factors of social life with which he is particularly concerned. The student of politics, for example, tends to identify the state with the whole of society, the economist to see the source of all social change in economic conditions, the historian of religion or of morals to assign a decisive part to the religious and moral beliefs of

peoples, while the student of the natural sciences will look to intellectual and technical development. But the interrelation between these elements of social life can only be determined by elaborate inductive and comparative study, a study of a kind not usually undertaken by the specialisms concerned with each of these parts of culture. There is, therefore, clearly need for a general and systematic sociology which, utilizing the results arrived at by the specialists, is concerned more particularly with their interrelations and seeks to give an interpretation of social life as a whole.

This conception of sociology is in general conformity with that held by such great thinkers as Durkheim in France and Hobhouse in England. According to Durkheim, sociology consists of three principal divisions, which he designates social morphology, social physiology and general sociology. Social morphology is concerned with the geographical or territorial basis of the life of peoples and its relation to types of social organization, and the problems of population, such as volume and density, local distribution and the like. Social physiology is extremely complex and has to be divided into a number of disciplines, such as the sociology of religion, of morals, of law, of economic life, and recently also of language, which is beginning

to be studied from the sociological point of view. These are all branches of sociology, in the sense that each deals with a set of social facts, that is, activities related to social groups and sustained by them. The function of general sociology is to discover the general character of these facts, that is, to determine what constitutes social fact as such, and whether there are any general social laws of which the different laws established by the special social sciences are particular expressions. This Durkheim regards as the philosophical part of sociology and he recognizes that, as the value of a synthesis depends upon the reliability of the analysis of which it is the result, the work of analysis, that is, the development of the specialisms, is, at present, the most urgent task of sociology.

In essentials this view is not very different from that held by Hobhouse, who himself made important contributions to various branches of social inquiry as well as to general sociology. Ideally for him, sociology is a synthesis of numerous social studies, but the immediate task of the sociologist is two-fold. Firstly, as a specialist, he must pursue his studies in his particular part of the social field ; but secondly, and more generally, bearing in mind the interconnection of social relations, he must prepare the ground for the ultimate synthesis by a discussion of the

central conceptions from which such synthesis might proceed, by an analysis of the general character of social relationships and by a study of the factors of permanence and change, and the nature and conditions of social development.

A closer examination of the opposed views of sociology set out above reveals that there is, at bottom, no necessary conflict between them. The study of social relations in abstraction from their content must inevitably lead to a verification of the results attained by reference to historical data, and this would only be successfully achieved by specialists in the various fields of social inquiry. What has been called general or systematic sociology cannot consist of a bloodless list of categories, but must prove its vitality by being brought into relation with history and anthropology and the concrete study of social institutions. Synthesis and detailed or specialized study are both necessary and may proceed *pari passu*. In this respect, sociology resembles other sciences dealing with living beings. Biology, for example, is in one sense a collection of several sciences, each very specialized, but no one denies that there is also a general biology, a growing body of knowledge of the conditions of life. So in sociology there are many specialisms concerned with bits of social life

and, from this point of view, sociology is identifiable with a whole group of social sciences. In another sense it is itself a specialism which has for its object the discovery of the links between the other disciplines and seeks to give an account of the general character of social relations.

I may now briefly state what I take to be the chief functions of sociology.

(1) It seeks to provide what may be called a morphology or classification of types and forms of social relationships, especially of those which have come to be defined in institutions and associations.

(2) It tries to determine the relation between different parts or factors of social life ; for example, the economic and political, the moral and religious, the moral and the legal, the intellectual and the social elements.

(3) It endeavours to disentangle the fundamental conditions of social change and persistence. Since social relationships depend presumably on the nature of individuals and their relations (*a*) to one another, (*b*) to the community and (*c*) to the outer environment, sociology seeks to pass from its preliminary empirical generalizations to the more ultimate laws of biology and psychology, and possibly also to distinctively sociological laws, that is, laws *sui generis* not reducible to the laws which govern life and mind in individual

organisms. In carrying out this ambitious programme, sociology must stand in friendly relation to such specialisms as history, comparative jurisprudence, anthropology, which are themselves within the social field, and to others more general, such as biology and psychology. Its object is throughout to determine the relation of social facts to civilization as a whole, and this involves the bringing together of results which cannot be attempted by the special sciences as such.

The methods of sociology follow naturally from its scope as just defined. The general principles of classification involved in working out a social morphology need no special discussion here. A great deal has unquestionably been achieved already in this connection. Thus various types of family have been distinguished, whether on the basis of the form of marriage or the system of kinship with which it is connected, or the locus and extent of familial authority, or the relation of the family to the wider social group. Forms of property have been classified on the basis of the body in which control is vested, or more fruitfully, perhaps, on that of the relation in which it stands to the total economic structure. Political organizations were already classified in an interesting way by Aristotle, and numerous other schemes have been worked out since which are of

value in different contexts. A tremendous amount has been done towards the descriptive classification of the phenomena of law, morals, cult, myth and language.

That there is a relation between the different elements of social life may be taken as a fundamental assumption of sociology. This was clearly seen by Comte, who invented the term "social consensus" to express it. He thought that society was a system of mutually interrelated parts, such that no change could occur in any part without affecting the other parts, or succeeding in imposing itself unless it was congruent with them. The point may perhaps be put more concisely in the words of John Stuart Mill : " When states of society and the causes which produce them are spoken of as a subject of science it is implied that there exists a natural correlation among these different elements ; that not every variety of combination of these general social facts is possible, but only certain combinations ; that, in short, there exists uniformities of co-existence between the states of the various social phenomena " (*Logic*, Book VI, Ch. X). Thus, for example, centralized government on a large scale may be impossible without a certain degree of literacy in the general population, or particular types of social classes may be linked with certain types of political organization. So, again, it may be that particular

modes of religious belief and ritual go together with particular levels of general intellectual development. To estimate the limits of variation, to ascertain what sort of combinations of social elements are compatible is an essential part of what Comte called Social Statics. In a lesser degree there is also a social consensus between the simultaneous social states of different nations, and their growing interdependence makes increasingly necessary the study of their mutual relations. Social Statics, or the inquiry into the mutual actions and reactions of contemporaneous social phenomena, was distinguished by Comte from social dynamics, which is concerned with the laws of sequence or change. Mill points out, in adopting this distinction, that ultimately uniformities of co-existence must be corollaries from the laws of causation, since each co-existing state is itself the effect of causes. The fundamental problem is to find the laws of sequence, or rather to combine the statical with the dynamical in such a way that we should be able to ascertain what changes in a given part of society are correlated with changes in other parts. Such laws, Mill thought, if discovered, would give us the middle principles or *axiomata media* of sociology.

The methods which emerge from the fore-

going considerations may now be briefly summed up thus: (i) In the first place we must inquire what elements in social life are functionally correlated. One form of this method goes back to Tylor, who called it the method of tracing adhesions. He applied it to the comparative and statistical study of the institutions connected with the family among primitive peoples. He showed, for instance, that the practice of mother-in-law avoidance is correlated with the custom of matrilineal residence (that is to say, the rule that the husband goes to live with his wife's people), by showing that the two customs are more frequently found in conjunction than they would be if they were independent of each other. This method has since been developed and generalized, and though beset with great difficulties arising out of the vagueness of the data derived from anthropology and history, and still more out of the ill-defined nature of the units which have to be used, it has been found profitable and suggestive of interesting sociological hypotheses. A few examples may be given. In an inquiry into the social organization of the simpler peoples, an attempt was made to measure the degree of correlation between types of economic structure and various social institutions such as the family, forms of government and property, war and class.

differentiation. The facts suggest that there is a correspondence between the growth of order as measured by the public administration of justice and the development of government in scale and intensity, and the stage of industrial organization. Again, economic factors are associated with the development of organized warfare and the substitution of the enslavement of war-prisoners for their slaughter, liberation or adoption. The rise of a nobility, too, and the extensive development of serfdom appear to be correlated with the growth of the economic system (cf. *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples* by L. T. Hobhouse, G. C. Wheeler and M. Ginsberg).

(ii) The first part of this method leads insensibly, as will have been observed, to the second stage, which consists in ascertaining whether there are any regularities in the changes of institutions, and whether the changes in any one institution are correlated with changes in other institutions. Thus, for example, we may inquire whether changes in class-structure are connected with changes in the economic organization, or again, whether changes in the forms and functions of the family are connected with changes in the economic order or in religious beliefs or in morals. The problem is throughout to ascertain how far the different changes imply

one another. The answer is to be found by an extension of the method of tracing adhesions or associations from a comparison of contemporary states to the study of sequences, or series of sequences.

(iii) Could these laws of correlated changes or sequences be established, they would provide, I think, what Mill called the middle principles of sociology. They would, however, not yield the final explanation of social phenomena, nor make possible the prediction of future trends. They would require to be related, in accordance with what Mill called the Inverse Deductive method, to more ultimate laws. These were, according to him, the laws of psychology and of a new science for which he proposed the name of ethology and which corresponds to a great extent to what is now called social psychology. Biological laws are not discussed by Mill in this connection. He appears to have thought that we ought to proceed in our explanation of human affairs by appealing to the laws of human nature in its relation to varying circumstances, and, only if there were an unexplained residue, to have recourse to differences in inborn disposition. We must regard the rôle of genetic factors in social life as still an open question and possibly we may have to assign greater importance to them than did Mill. We may further point

not part of our problem to determine whether purposes count in the process of civilization, and, more particularly, whether the functions or purposes which institutions are alleged to serve are in fact served by them, or whether they are sophistications or rationalizations of concealed underlying drives? Is it not clear that in some sense ends and values must form part of social science, and that the distinction between social philosophy and sociology does not quite correspond to the distinction between the study of facts and the study of values?

The identification of ethics with the psychology and sociology of morals is characteristic of what has been called naturalistic ethics, and has taken many forms. By way of illustration I will refer briefly to two outstanding examples of this attitude, namely, the ethical theories of Durkheim and Professor Alexander. Durkheim treats moral rules as a class of social facts. They have, he urges, the characteristics of all social facts, namely, generality, independence of the individual, and constraint. They have, however, certain peculiarities which require explanation. The constraint with which they impose themselves upon the individual has a kind of ambivalence, if we may use the Freudian term. Moral rules impose an obligation and so far are accepted with difficulty; on the other hand,

they also appeal to us, and so far are regarded as desirable. Our attitude to them is that of respect, a compound of constraint or compulsion mingled with attraction. Durkheim thinks that this peculiarity of moral obligation is to be explained by the fact that moral rules come from society, a being at once distinct from the individual and infinitely superior to him, yet also immanent in him, so that he feels that what society imposes upon him is, in a sense, self-imposed. Morality is thus essentially social. All moral rules practised by different peoples are in fact functions of their social organization and vary with it, and in the main each society has the morality which it needs. The business of ethics as a science is to investigate the relation between those social facts which are moral rules, and other social facts, and the knowledge thus gained should, as is the case with all knowledge of the real, put us in a position to control and direct. The function of ethics, in other words, is not merely to codify the moral rules which are, or have been imposed by different societies. This would result in an extremely conservative attitude to morals hostile to any reform. It is, rather, to bring our knowledge of the evolution of morals to bear upon current problems by pointing out, for instance, that at a given moment society is ignoring certain

elements of value which have proved themselves in the past. Thus, in periods like the present, when there is a tendency to ignore individual rights, sociological ethics might point to the important rôle which they have played in the past in the structure of human society. Secondly, a science of morals may be able to reveal tendencies in operation which are in conflict with existing moral rules, and to show that the latter really correspond to conditions in the collective life which are already in the process of disappearing. In this way, it is argued, a science which is a study of social facts can yet enable us in a sense to get beyond existing facts and afford guidance in social policy.

In estimating the value of this and similar theories we must ask whether they are inherently consistent and whether they answer the questions in which we are most interested. By what criterion can we determine, to begin with, whether a society has the moral system which it needs? Durkheim himself points out that this cannot be done merely by an analysis of prevalent opinion. It is important to know what society is, not what it thinks itself to be, for in this it may be mistaken. What society needs is not necessarily what it wants, nor, it must be added, is it necessarily what it is going to want. But this implies a reference to a standard in the light of which

we could decide what society ought to want in harmony with its fundamental nature. Socrates, says Durkheim, expressed more faithfully than his judges the morality which his society stood in need of. But if this need was not actually felt by his contemporaries, how could they have been bound by his superior morality? Are we not compelled to say that that alone is binding which is in harmony with the established social order?

Similar doubts are raised by the views of Professor Alexander as recently expounded by him (*Beauty and Other Forms of Value*). For him moral value is that which is approved by a standard mind, acting under the influence of the gregarious impulse. It is a mutual adjustment of the claims of individuals with which, when discovered, the standard mind can sympathize. What is the standard mind? It seems that in the process of exploration there may arise an individual who desires a scheme of life with which there is no sympathy, and which may in fact be opposed to the will of society. "Yet," says Alexander, "the ideal is still a forecast of new social ideals, and he propounds it in the hope of attracting the rest of his fellows, by discovering to them feelings to which they have not yet awakened. The prophet of a new order is rejected by the men of the old one," but maybe he wins his

way to the acceptance of the ideal hereafter. His singularity is thereby attested to be truly universal" (p. 252). Is it not then morally valuable until it is accepted? Is it made the ideal of a *standard mind* by wide acceptance? Unless this is so it is difficult to see how moral goodness can be identified with that which is 'approved' by the social sentiment. It may be remarked that much the same difficulty is already to be met with in the ethical theory of Adam Smith, whom Alexander in fact follows closely. Adam Smith's impartial spectator, like Alexander's standard mind, is not in fact guided by what others approve. "Compared with his final decision," says Adam Smith, "the sentiments of all mankind, although not altogether indifferent, appear to be but of small moment" (*Moral Sentiments*, p. 209).

It is, I think, clear from this short discussion that systems of ethics of this kind would have to be, if they were consistent, thoroughly relativistic. They would have to confine themselves to an historical and psychological account of the moral judgments of mankind in relation to the social systems of which they form part. In fact, however, no such system has ever succeeded in avoiding language which implies a comparative valuation of these moral judgments, and the description of some as more 'enlightened,' more

'highly developed,' more 'reflective' than others. Such description clearly involves an appeal to criteria going beyond those which happen to be accepted by the morality current in any particular society.

Ethics, then, is not identical with the comparative study of moral codes or the psychological analysis of obligation. This is not to say that these latter studies are not important. They are, on the contrary, of great value, firstly as parts of the sociology of culture, and secondly as affording important data to ethics proper. In this latter respect they are especially valuable because they serve to inculcate a critical attitude towards our moral intuitions by revealing the great diversity of moral beliefs and practices. But such studies do not take the place of ethics proper any more than the history and psychology of thought constitute logic. The function of ethical inquiry is to disentangle the assumptions upon which actual moral judgments rest, and the general principles in the light of which they can be criticized and systematized. The method to be followed in such an inquiry must be 'critical' in the Kantian sense and not merely historical or psychological. Ethics and the comparative study of morals are thus related yet distinct disciplines.

I turn now to our second problem, namely,

whether in the interests of objectivity and detachment social science should keep clear of the study of values and confine itself to the actual. It is evident that so far as beliefs in ideals are themselves agents influencing social behaviour and social change they cannot be ignored by sociologists. From this point of view, it might reasonably be maintained that ideals are simply another class of facts which the sociologists can study without inquiring into their validity or truth. Indeed, false ideals are just as important to him as true ones, if they can be shown to mould behaviour and affect social movements.

But the question arises whether the efficacy of ideals can be investigated without inquiring into their truth. If human endeavour is, in fact, influenced by ideals, their coherence and consistency must affect their practical efficiency profoundly, and their truth or falsity must thus be considered in estimating their significance as agents of social life. More generally, it might be urged that the true nature of institutions is not to be gathered from a study of their present and past forms alone, without reference to what they might have it in them to become, and this immanent purpose, it might be argued, is only to be ascertained by considering what at their best they ought to be. In other words, comparison with an ideal or norm may help us to

SCOPE AND METHOD OF SOCIOLOGY

grade institutions and to grasp their limitations as well as their potentialities. To this, it may be added, as a further argument, that however desirable it might be in theory to keep distinct the study of ideals and of facts, it is impossible to achieve this detachment in practice. In the social sciences the selection of the material and the criteria of relevance are influenced to an enormous extent by the direction in which we want our society to travel, and in pretending to objectivity and detachment, social science runs the risk of degenerating into an apologia of the existing order. Some Marxian writers have even urged that in dealing with matters in which lively interests are involved we ought not to pretend to be describing mere facts, but must and should take sides. They thus make what might be called a pragmatic virtue of necessity.

If we once more approach the problem from the side of ethics it may also be argued that the study of ideals ought not to be divorced from the study of facts. Firstly, as we have already seen, the moral judgments which men in fact make must be the starting-point of ethical inquiry. Secondly, we can hardly arrive at a satisfactory theory of what is desirable without paying attention to the actual nature of man and his potentialities. Further, on any view of ethics the con-

sequences of alternative lines of behaviour cannot be ignored in estimating their goodness or rightness, and the ascertainment of such consequences is clearly a matter which belongs to the social sciences. Thus, whether we start from the needs of the social sciences or of ethics, the study of ideals and the study of facts appear to be intimately interwoven.

Despite these arguments, it is clear that the two studies, though they may be pursued side by side, must not be confused, and at each stage in the inquiry we ought to know whether we are dealing with things as they are, or with what we regard as desirable or ethically obligatory. "We must avoid," as Hobhouse has urged, "thinking either that things happen because they are good, or are good because they happen, otherwise our statements of fact will be biased and our judgments of value corrupted." Of these dangers there is abundant illustration in the history of the social sciences. Institutions, such as war and slavery, have frequently been defended as fundamentally rational merely because they have held their ground for a considerable time, or have obtained a wide diffusion; and nothing is more common than the condemnation of any policy which involves radical transformation as a dangerous untruth, on the assumption that what exists

has established its value merely by the fact that it has managed to survive.

To avoid the dangers which thus arise, on the one hand, of idealizing the actual and so debasing the ideal, and on the other, of distorting the actual by reading into it our desires and predilections, the study of fact and the study of values should be kept distinct; though in a final synthesis the two types of inquiry must be brought together. Confusion is likely to arise if their distinctness is not recognized, but also if they never meet at all. A complete study of human life thus involves a synthesis, but not a fusion, of social science and social philosophy.

II

SOCIETY, CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION

MODERN sociologists have given much attention to matters of terminology. Indeed, they have often been accused of devoting so much energy to arguing about the meanings of words that they never get near the study of social facts. The difficulties have arisen mainly from the fact that sociology, like many other social sciences, has borrowed its terminology from everyday speech and shares in its vagueness and ambiguity. Partly they are due to the tendency of some sociologists to use the technical terms of other sciences, especially biology, physics and psychology. Terms like social equilibrium, social organism, social mind and the like, though suggestive in some ways, have created more problems than they have helped to solve. Here we must try to avoid merely verbal controversy and concentrate our attention on the definition of certain terms indispensable in the classification of human relations.

The widest and most inclusive term is 'society.' This has sometimes been defined

to include all the relations between men which have been embodied in definite associations or unions, possessed of recognizable structure and organization, and to exclude those relations which have escaped organization or are insusceptible of it. In practice, of course, sociologists have concerned themselves in the main with associational structures, since unorganized personal relations are so numerous and varied that they hardly lend themselves to scientific treatment. On the other hand, it is clear that it is just these personal relations that constitute the matrix out of which organizations gradually emerge, and in theory they cannot be ignored. Hence it seems more convenient to use the term 'society' for the whole tissue of human relations, whether organized or not.

Some sociologists have attempted to restrict the use of the term 'society' in another way. 'Society,' they say, only exists when the members are aware of each other and have some interests or objects in common. But this restriction again appears to be inconvenient, since indirect and unconscious relations are of very great importance in social life. In the economic sphere, for instance, the lives of individuals may be deeply affected by changes in the relationships of the world market of which the individuals in question have no clear knowledge and the causes of

which can indeed only be brought to light by elaborate and highly technical investigations. Accordingly, we shall here use the term to include all or any dealings of man with man, whether these be direct or indirect, organized or unorganized, conscious or unconscious, co-operative or antagonistic.

Society in this very wide sense is to be distinguished from *a* society. Society is universal and pervasive and has no definite boundary or assignable limits. A society is a collection of individuals united by certain relations or modes of behaviour which mark them off from others who do not enter into those relations or who differ from them in behaviour. Not all collections or aggregates form groups. Groups are masses of people in regular contact or communication, and possessing a recognizable structure. There are other aggregates or portions of the community which have no recognizable structure, but whose members have certain interests or modes of behaviour in common, which may at any time lead them to form themselves into definite groups. To this category of quasi-groups belong such entities as social classes, which, without being groups, are a recruiting field for groups, and whose members have certain characteristic modes of behaviour in common; and other incipient groups such as collections of individuals interested in the

same pursuits or favouring the same policy, for example, employers of labour who have not yet formed any association in the defence of their interests, or individuals interested in particular sports, or in social reform, who yet possess no definite organization. Groups can be classified in numerous ways, according to size, local distribution, permanence, and inclusiveness of the relationships on which they rest, mode of formation, type of organization and so forth. The quasi-groups also differ enormously in size and especially in coherence and the tendency to organize themselves into groups proper ; and it is a matter of no small interest to determine at what point these looser configurations crystallize into associations.

The most important species of societies are communities and associations. The community may be described as the entire population occupying a certain territory (or, in the case of nomads, habitually moving in association) held together by a common system of rules regulating the intercourse of life. The community must possess a distinguishable structure, that is, definite rules of behaviour determining the relations between the members. This, however, does not prevent it from being part of a larger community. There are, that is to say, communities within communities. It must also be noted that

the existence of special organs for the enforcement of rules is not essential to community, though it is characteristic of highly developed communities.

Associations consist of groups of people, united for the performance of a specific function or functions, such as trade unions, political parties or learned societies. They may be classified on the basis of their principal purpose or end, but also on the basis of various other characteristics, such as territorial extension, size of membership, conditions of admission and the like. From associations it is now usual to distinguish institutions. These may be described as recognized and established usages governing the relations between individuals or groups. For example, property is an institution, that is, a set of accepted usages governing the relations between men in respect of their control over material things, their acquisition and exchange. Institutions are sustained and created by the community or by associations which may, of course, fall outside the community. In common usage, the terms association and institution are sometimes confused because they frequently refer to the same entity, the one in its abstract, the other in the concrete or human aspect. Thus the state is a set of institutions if we refer to the system of rules controlling the life of the community ;

SOCIETY, CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION

but regarded as a union of human beings it is also an association.

The points raised in this brief discussion may be conveniently brought together in the following scheme :

SOCIETY

The whole complex of social behaviour
and the network of social relations

SOCIETIES (definite collections
of people)

GROUPS

QUASI-GROUPS

(e.g. social classes, the 'public'
'sets' of people having com-
mon interests such as sport or
social reform)

Based on direct
contact

Based on indirect contact

Relations
comprehen-
sive, endur-
ing, e.g.
family,
neighbour-
hood, small
community

Relations
limited,
temporary,
e.g. crowds

Relations
enduring,
comprehen-
sive, e.g.
town, na-
tion, poli-
tical com-
munity

Relations
limited or
specific,
e.g. associa-
tions such
as trade
unions,
learned so-
cieties

I turn now to the terms 'culture' and 'civilization.' There is a lamentable confusion in the use of these words and probably

little hope of arriving at agreed definitions. By anthropologists culture is used in a very wide sense to cover the whole field of human life. This goes back to Tylor, who understands by culture "that complex whole which included knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." 'Civilization' is also quite commonly used in an extremely wide sense. In its literal meaning it refers presumably to the sum of attainments characteristic of life in an organized city or state, but it has been extended to cover not only social organization but all other achievements which mark off man from the animals. Both terms are sometimes used to distinguish levels of human development, for example, to mark off civilized peoples from barbarians, or nature-peoples from culture-peoples. But for this usage there is little to be said. There are no peoples who have not some degree of culture and civilization, that is to say, some power of transforming nature, or selecting from natural objects in a manner more or less corresponding to their needs and by methods which are socially conditioned.

Nevertheless, civilization and culture are often distinguished on various grounds. Already Kant insisted that the idea of morality was necessary to culture, that is, morality as

an inward state ; and he contrasted it with civilization, which was a matter of outward behaviour. Since Kant, various other antitheses have been employed in this context. Thus, Matthew Arnold defines culture as "the study of perfection, the disinterested search for sweetness and light," and he urges that it consists "in becoming something, rather than in having something, in an inward condition of the mind and spirit, not in an outward set of circumstances"; while civilization is relatively mechanical and external, and tends constantly to become more so. In another form, and as part of an ambitious philosophy of history, Spengler uses the same distinction. He regards civilization as the decaying phase of culture, the phase in which culture loses its creative vitality and becomes mechanical and imitative. Among other recent writers, Professor MacIver interprets the distinction between civilization and culture as one form of the contrast between means and ends. "Our culture is what we are, our civilization is what we use" (*The Modern State*, p. 325). Civilization includes, according to him, the whole mechanism or apparatus which man uses in his endeavour to control the conditions of his life, including the whole machinery of social organization. Culture, on the other hand, is concerned with intrinsic values, with the things which are desired for

their own sake. "It is the expression of our nature in our modes of living, and of thinking, in our everyday intercourse, in art, in literature, in religion, in recreation and enjoyment" (*Society : its Structure and Changes*, p. 226). Professor McIver's distinction, though worked out independently, resembles that elaborated by Dr. Alfred Weber, who, however, finds it necessary to distinguish three processes, namely, the process of society, of civilization, and of culture. The social process results in the production of typical social structures, and these, he thinks, follow a definite order and can be traced, though with some individual variations, among the different peoples of the world. Thus, for example, we find everywhere the transition from organization based on kinship to that based on territorial grouping. By the process of civilization he understands essentially the growth of knowledge and the technical command over the forces of nature. This is a coherent growth, following a regular order, transferable from people to people, valid for all humanity. The process of culture, on the other hand, follows no necessary order. It is not unilinear or cumulative, but occurs sporadically in a series of 'protuberant-like' outbreaks having little continuity, except, of course, in so far as it is affected by the technical methods of expression. Culture can

only be dealt with historically, that is, each case must be studied in its individual character, and it does not lend itself to the generalizing methods of science. Unlike Spengler, he thinks that the process of civilization is unitary, that is, not tied to any one people ; while the cultures of the different peoples are not in any sense homologous, each being unique, and accordingly there can be no morphology of culture as Spengler imagines.

These distinctions are clearly of some value, but in view of the great divergence of usage we must now inquire what importance they have for sociological investigation. Firstly, then, the distinction between means and ends, or between the instrumentally valuable and the intrinsically valuable, is no doubt illuminating, but it has to be remembered that there are many social activities which serve both kinds of ends. Thus men pursue science not only because it is useful in controlling the conditions of life, but also because of their interest in discovery or for the pleasure of construction. Similarly, in social institutions it is often difficult to draw the line between means and ends. How much, for instance, in the life of the family is to be regarded as means and how much as end ? Even in the case of economic organization we are concerned not only with the means of life but also with providing opportunities for the active

exercise of faculty, which as a method of self-expression must be counted among the ends.

With regard to order and continuity of development, there are clearly differences between the growth of knowledge and technique and other achievements of the social mind. Knowledge is cumulative, and, despite occasional lapses in periods of barbarization, its progress is continuous. On the whole, each generation reacquires the possessions of the past unimpaired and makes its own further contributions. Apparently there is no such continuity in religious, ethical or artistic development. But here again the question must not be prejudiced at the outset of our inquiry. It may well turn out, for example, that there is an underlying unity behind the rich complexity of religious movements, and it has even been held that religion is the one element in human experience which persistently shows an upward trend. "It fades and then recurs. But when it renews its force, it recurs with an added richness and purity of content" (Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 268). Moreover, it is by no means to be assumed that, in respect of order and continuity of development, the different elements within culture must necessarily follow the same line. There may, for example, be important differences in this

respect between ethical thought and practice, and art. Similarly, with regard to power of diffusion and transferability, each element of society and culture must be considered, so to say, on its own merits. The products of technical discovery are readily transferable from one people to another, but the knowledge lying behind them, and still more, the power to make further independent contributions, cannot be transferred without elaborate preparation and possibly the reorganization of the whole social life. Forms of government, again, are only superficially transferable, and, as in the case of democratic institutions, they have not always proved adaptable to new surroundings, and have either disappeared or been profoundly modified to meet the new conditions. Nevertheless, it is true that the nearer we get to the relatively external side of life, the easier does transfer and borrowing become. These differences in the rate and ease of spread are of great importance. The peoples of the world are rapidly coming to resemble each other in matters of technique and the externals of life, but there is no similarly rapid convergence in their attitudes to the values of life. This lack of balance in social development is becoming increasingly obvious with the growing interdependence of peoples, and constitutes one of the major problems of

modern society. (Cf. MacIver, *Society : its Structure and Changes*, p. 230.)

The distinctions which have emerged in the course of our discussion of the terms culture and civilization are clearly of some importance, even though we may be unable to accept them in the form in which they have been drawn, or secure agreement in the matter of verbal usage. It is important to realize that within the complex whole of society, the different spheres of activity may possibly follow each their own order of development, but it is equally important not to commit ourselves in advance to the view that these different processes or activities either vary independently, or that any one of them, for instance, that which we describe as economic, determines all the rest. The relation between the different parts of social life is just our problem and to answer it we must isolate as many variables as possible, and examine the connections between them. Thus, for example, we may inquire whether differences in social behaviour are correlated with changes in moral ideas, or whether, as some think, moral ideas have remained essentially the same throughout the course of social evolution, and that the determining factors are to be found in the changes that have occurred in social and economic structure, and in the advance of knowledge in

fields other than the moral. Or again, we may inquire into the relation between moral development and the growth of religion, and into the relation of both of these to custom and law. Within the field of social organization, we may ask whether there is any correlation, say between the forms of the family and forms of class structure, or economic organization, or whether differences in social institutions are found among peoples who live on the same economic level.

The progress that has been made by sociology in dealing with these and kindred questions is naturally very unequal in different fields. There is a vast accumulation of data regarding moral beliefs and practices, and these have been systematized in an impressive way by such workers as Hobhouse, Westermarck and Wundt. The multitudinous facts of religious evolution have been analysed and classified by numerous students, and efforts have been made to trace their historical affinities and to indicate the part that religion plays in social life. Within the field of social institutions very full and numerous accounts exist of political and legal organizations. Economic institutions are also beginning to be handled from a comparative point of view by sociologically-minded historians and anthropologists, and they offer a rich field for sociological study and exploration.

SOCIOLOGY

In addition, there are the ever-multiplying studies of contemporary social conditions now undertaken in all civilized countries frequently with the aid of quantitative methods of great value and reliability. Especially noteworthy are the numerous surveys of entire areas, large and small, which are now rapidly accumulating, and which, though as yet uncoordinated, will sooner or later provide the systematists with valuable material for comparative study. The analysis of fundamental causes of social change and persistence has also made some progress, though social psychology, which in my view has most to contribute in this connection, is still in a very elementary stage.

It is clearly impossible in a small volume to cover even in outline this vast field. I have selected certain important problems for discussion with a view to illustrating the general scope and methods of sociology, as they have been briefly explained in this and the preceding chapters. Chapters III and IV examine some of the conditions governing the life of communities, the former being devoted to a study of the influence of the physical environment and of race, and the latter to a psychological analysis of those elements in human nature which bear most directly upon the relations of man and man. The discussion which follows, seeks to give

SOCIETY, CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION

some account of the various forms of social relations which have been outlined in this chapter. No detailed description could, of course, be attempted. Chapter V deals with the general principles of social organization, as reflected in the growth of political communities, and with the various types of social control. Chapter VI is concerned with class structure and economic organization. Chapter VII discusses in very brief outline the principal trends of mental development, in the field of morals, religion and science. The concluding section raises the problem of the relations between these different spheres of social life, and indicates the future tasks of sociology.

III

RACE AND ENVIRONMENT

(THE problem of the influence of race upon social and cultural evolution is one of great difficulty.) The facts are extremely complicated and require for their elucidation the co-operation of numerous disciplines, such as physical anthropology, genetics, comparative psychology, archæology, and history. (These disciplines are very unequally developed and the student of any one of them is apt to use the conclusions of the others without being able to test their accuracy or reliability.) The sociologist who wishes to make a broad survey of the relations between race and culture is in even worse plight. He finds himself overwhelmed by a mass of material which he cannot control, and by numerous theories which he can see to be one-sided, but which have the support of the specialists in different fields. To add to his troubles, the discussions of the problem have been embittered by political prejudices, hatreds and antipathies, and scientific detachment becomes increasingly difficult. The

prejudices, it may be noted, are not all on one side. There is an egalitarian as well as an anti-egalitarian bias. Those who start with the assumption of the essential unity and identity of the whole of mankind tend to look to the environment, physical and social, for the explanation of cultural differences, and to emphasize the plasticity and malleability of human nature. On the other hand, those who start with the opposite bias tend to explain these differences as the product of inborn or genetic variations, which they take to be constant or, at least, of great permanence. It is safe to say that, so far, no adequate technique has been worked out, which would enable us to disentangle the genetic factors from the environmental ones, and to estimate the part played by them in the shaping of civilization. The matter is evidently one for prolonged and difficult research, and not for dogmatic assertion either way.

Here, I shall be concerned to define more accurately the questions which arise, and to indicate the sort of answers that can be given in the light of present-day knowledge. These questions may be provisionally formulated thus :

(A) What do physical anthropologists mean by race, and to what extent are the classifications, which they have arrived at, convenient or suitable units for the study of

the relation between genetic factors and forms of culture or civilization ?

(B) Do the various races of mankind differ in inborn mental constitution ? Further, do these differences, if they exist, determine the differences in mental character between nations or peoples ?

(C) What light is thrown by the answers to these questions upon the general problem of the relation between race and culture ?

(A) By race, anthropologists understand a group of individuals who, within given limits of variation, possess in common a combination of hereditary traits sufficient to mark them off from other groups. To be used as criteria of race, traits must be hereditary and remain relatively constant despite changes in the environment. Further, they must be common to a fairly large group. A family line marked by certain hereditary peculiarities would not be regarded as a race, though theoretically, if it multiplied and expanded over a given geographical area, it would have to be so considered. The most important traits which have been used by anthropologists in their classifications are : (1) hair-form, grouped as straight, smooth, wavy or curly, and woolly ; (2) pigmentation, including the colour of the hair, eyes and skin ; (3) the form of the head, especially the ratio

of the breadth of the skull or head to its length ; (4) stature and bodily proportions ; (5) certain facial traits, such as nasal-form, lip-form, the form of the eyelids. It is always a combination of these traits that is used in distinguishing racial groups, and the number of groups arrived at must obviously vary with the number of traits combined. There is, apparently, no one trait which can be regarded as fundamental, and for different purposes, now one character, or combination of characters, and now another, is emphasized by anthropologists. In some of the best-known recent classifications, however, hair-form is taken as the starting-point for arriving at the primary divisions, and stature, nasal index and pigmentation are used for purposes of subdivision.

Numerous schemes of classification have been suggested by anthropologists and even the most recent ones differ widely from each other. Sergi has three genera, eleven species and forty-one varieties ; Deniker has six grand divisions, thirteen minor divisions and twenty-nine types or races proper. Giuffrida Ruggeri has eight elementary species and forty-three subdivisions, while Haddon gives three main branches and thirty-six subdivisions. Many English anthropologists adopt the scheme suggested by Huxley in 1870 giving five principal types (Negroid, Austra-

loid, Mongoloid, Xanthochroid and Melanochroid), while others use a four-fold division into Caucasian, Mongol, Negro, Australian, and subdivide the Caucasian into Nordic, Alpine and Mediterranean, thus giving six great divisions of mankind.

Without discussing the merits of these and other schemes, we must ask ourselves what precisely they are attempting to do and what is the nature of the units which they arrive at. To these questions anthropologists appear to give very different answers. Thus, for example, in the standard works of Ripley and Deniker on the races of Europe the data employed are very much the same in the two books, but the one finds six fundamental races, the other only three. The reason is that their conceptions of race differ. Deniker understands by race a group of characters actually found in combination in existing populations. Ripley, on the other hand, is concerned to find ideal types, that is to say, hypothetical entities supposed once to have existed in pure form and by whose intermingling we may account for the existing distribution of traits and for the varying frequency with which they now occur in association. On this view, anthropology must combine the study of the existing distribution of traits with the results of historical ethnology and prehistory and so arrive at the original

pure types and the history of their intermingling. Deniker points out that while he does not dispute the importance of studying skeletal remains, he doubts whether in the present stage of our knowledge they can afford sufficient evidence for the tracing of genealogical affinities. The number of specimens so far studied is generally very small, and, in any case, they give us no information of traits other than head-form and occasionally stature ; they thus provide only a very shaky foundation for estimating the frequency with which characters appear in association. The difficulties which thus arise have been felt by many other authorities and many of them regard the attempt to build up genealogical schemes giving the affinities of the various races to each other as hopeless. Thus, for example, Eugen Fischer says : " Every attempt at genealogical classification is idle " (*Rasse und Rassenentstehung beim Menschen*, p. 116), and Matiegka concludes a survey of recent anthropological work with a quotation from Topinard : " Anthropology is still in its analytical stage ; it is in search of types ; the affiliation between these types remains entirely to be established." Martin, in his standard text-book of anthropology, frankly falls back upon the geographical classifications of the distribution of traits and their combinations and abandons the attempt

at genealogical classifications. Many other classifications waver somewhat uneasily between the conceptions of race that I have outlined. Dr. Haddon is aware of all the difficulties and says clearly that his scheme is "not a classification as that word is understood by zoological and botanical systematists, as it includes geographical considerations" (*Races of Man*, p. 155). Indeed, for him race-names such as Nordic or Alpine are merely convenient abstractions helping us to appreciate broad facts. "A race type exists mainly in our minds" (*Ibid.*, p. 1), and on another page he stresses the complexity, "one might almost say the impossibility, of the task of framing a consistent classification of mankind" (*Ibid.*, p. 140).

In order to appreciate rightly the work of the physical anthropologists it is important to realize the difficulties which they encounter in their task. To begin with, individuals rarely exhibit all the characteristics of the type to which they theoretically belong. The reader may recall Ripley's account of the difficulty in which his friend Dr. Ammon found himself when he was asked for photographs of pure Alpine types. He had measured thousands of heads but could find no specimen perfect in all details. "All his round-headed men were either blond or tall, or narrow-nosed, or something else that they

ought not to be " (*Races of Europe*, p. 108). In general, the more civilized a people is, the greater the mixture it has undergone, or at any rate, the greater the variety of types which can be distinguished within it ; and even among primitive peoples we practically never find any correspondence between people and race. It is said that the Andaman Islanders are the only human group which approximates to a 'pure' race.

In most peoples studied so far anthropologists find that the majority of individuals do not correspond at all points to the supposed pure types but possess many characters intermediate between them. This may be due to the race mixture which has everywhere been going on from time immemorial, but it may also be explained as a survival from an earlier undifferentiated stock, from which the hypothetical race types have themselves diverged. For example, the Nordic and Mediterranean groups, according to Professor Fleure, represent divergences from mixtures of ancient long-heads. The mass of the people in Britain is, he thinks, 'betwixt and between,' neither fully the one nor fully the other. It is, however, not a mixture of the two, but rather a differentiation which has reached neither the one goal nor the other (*Eugenics Review*, XIV, 1922, p. 97 ; and *J. Royal Anthro-*

pological Institute, Vol. L, pp. 39, 40). It is obvious that such possibilities make the tracing of affinities between different groups very hazardous. The difficulty is increased by our ignorance of the source of variations. This leaves open the possibility of the independent occurrence of mutations in different parts of the world, and therefore of the existence of similarities not due to identity of origin. Are we, for example, to regard the European Alpines as connected genealogically with the Alpines of Asia Minor because they are both brachycephalic, or are we to regard broadheadedness as having arisen independently in the two cases? If it be further borne in mind that the laws of inheritance, especially in relation to the effects of race mixture, are only now beginning to be studied scientifically, and that in any case they can hardly be applied with any confidence to the scanty data derived from the imperfect descriptions of past times, whether historical or prehistoric, the perplexities of the anthropologists and the lack of agreed schemes of classification will be readily understood.

These considerations suggest that apart from the major divisions of mankind into three or four groups which are based on definitely linked characters, classifications of the races of mankind must be to a large

extent arbitrary and of service principally in giving us a provisional empirical survey of the facts and thus preparing the ground for more detailed intensive study. In so far as such intensive studies have been made, their effect has been to reveal differences which had been concealed by the method of taking averages from large groups, and thus to break up the large units into numerous subdivisions, whose relations to each other and to the larger groupings become ever more complex and obscure. It is only very seldom that a local group is encountered whose members agree in all racial characters. For the most part, ethnic groups are of highly mixed origins and the genetic elements contained within them are reshuffled in each generation. From the point of view of modern genetics, race is to be understood as a complex of characters which through long isolation and inbreeding has achieved a certain stability. When such isolation is broken down and race mixture results, the traits characteristic of the different groups form ever new combinations, and it becomes increasingly difficult to class any particular individual as belonging to a particular race. He may possess certain characteristics which once belonged to a 'pure' race, but he may also carry within him genetic factors which are the basis for characters belonging to

other races, characters which may reappear in his offspring. "It is wholly possible," according to modern geneticists, "that a tall, blue-eyed dolichocephalic Frenchman really possesses less of the so-called Nordic factors than a short, dark-eyed round-head" (East and Jones, *Inbreeding and Outbreeding*, p. 250). This reshuffling clearly makes the task of historical ethnology, that is to say, of linking up present populations with their racial affinities in the distant past, extremely difficult and precarious, and it is possible that anthropologists will in the future devote their attention increasingly to the genetic analysis of strains in existing populations and to the study of the observable effects of race mixture.

(B) I turn next to the evidence relating to race differences in mental characters.

It has been argued on general grounds that since races differ in physical characters we may expect them also to differ mentally. To this argument no doubt some weight attaches. It has to be remembered, however, that we have no *à priori* reason for expecting any association just between those characters that anthropologists employ as criteria for race and mental qualities; no reason for expecting intelligence to vary, say, with skin-colour or hair-texture. Each such association must be examined on its merits. Differ-

RACE AND ENVIRONMENT

ences in intellectual ability have been inferred by many authorities from differences in cranial capacity, brain-weights and the finer configuration of the brain, but in each case the evidence is quite inconclusive.

(i) An interesting table has been compiled by Martin (*Lehrbuch der Anthropologie*, Jena, 1914, pp. 642-3), giving measurements of the cranial capacity of different races. The average capacity of European groups is given as 1,450 for males and 1,300 c.cm. for females. Nearest to the Europeans come the civilized peoples of Eastern Asia, the Oceanic groups and the Americans. Far below are the Australian tribes with 1,347 for males and 1,181 for females; the Veddas with 1,250 and 1,139; and the Andaman Islanders with 1,281 and 1,148. Further, within each group the distribution is worthy of attention. The higher values occur with greater frequency among the civilized peoples:

Capacity below 1,200 c.cm.

| Hottentots | Australians | Germans | Chinese |
|------------|-------------|-----------|-----------|
| 51 | 45 | 8 | 2 |
| per cent. | per cent. | per cent. | per cent. |

Capacity above 1,300 c.cm.

| 16 | 28 | 75 | 92 |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| per cent. | per cent. | per cent. | per cent. |

(Buschan).

Closer inspection of the tables shows, however, that there is no real ground for assuming any correlation between cranial capacity and cultural level. This will be readily seen if we compare the average given for the Chinese which is 1,456 with that of the nomadic Kalmucks, 1,466; or that of the Japanese, namely 1,485, with the Javanese 1,590; or still more strikingly the Kaffir 1,540 and Ama Xosa 1,570, with that of the Arab 1,474. There are also notable differences among peoples of the same group; thus, for example, the Greenland Eskimos have a capacity of 1,452 while others have 1,563, and a capacity of 1,600 c.cm. has been quoted for pygmy tribes (Lebzelter, p. 798). It is to be noted further that the individual variation is large in all groups; the range according to Martin is from 1,100 to 1,700 c.cm.

(ii) *Brain Weights.* The average for adult Europeans is given by Topinard on the basis of 11,000 cases as 1,361 grammes for males and 1,200 for females. For other races the number weighed is small and, as the range of variation is known to be wide, being 1,013-1,587 in the case of the American Negroes and 1,063-1,790 in that of the Japanese, the results are not very reliable. The following figures may be quoted from Topinard (cf. Deniker, p. 116): European average, 1,361; North American Negroes,

1,316 ; Annamites, 1,341 ; Japanese, 1,367 ; Buriats, 1,380 ; Chinese (small number), 1,428. The danger of drawing any conclusions from such comparisons may be brought home by the case of the natives of Tierra del Fuego. According to Martin, the Peschera, who are described as half animals, have a brain-weight approximating to that of the European, and when their bodily size is taken into consideration the comparison is in their favour.

(iii) Differences in ability corresponding to differences in the finer structure of the brain have been alleged by various authorities to exist between racial types. The number of cases examined is, however, usually very small, and as here again great individual differences are known to exist, conclusions regarding large racial groups appear unwarranted. Kohlbrugge (*Ver. Kon. Acad. van Wetensch.*, deel XII, No. 4), who has made the most exhaustive examination known to me (1,000-1,200 brains), concludes that there are no varieties of brain limited to any one race and that differences in the frequency of distribution of these varieties in different races are improbable and that differences in the finer structure are not likely to be race-characters. This is evidently a problem in need of further investigation.

(iv) We come now to the direct examina-

tion of the mental characters of racial groups by means of tests. Of these, the best known are those which have been made in America on various national and racial groups. The most elaborate of these was made during the war in the American army. It has been claimed that the tests establish the superiority of the Nordic races over the Alpine and Mediterranean. It is important to note that Professor Brigham, who was responsible for some of these conclusions, has categorically withdrawn them. In an article published in the *Psychological Review*, March, 1930, he says: "This review has summarized some of the more recent test findings which show that comparative studies of various national and racial groups may not be made with existing tests, and which show in particular that one of the most pretentious of these comparative racial studies—the writer's own—was without foundation" (p. 165). His criticism of this work is based on the view that the test scores do not represent unitary things and therefore the scores of sub-tests cannot be added as was done in the earlier inquiries. Apart from these mathematical objections, there are other serious objections to the conclusions as to racial differences which have been drawn from these studies. To begin with, the groups tested were not racial but national

groups. There is no guarantee whatever that individuals described as English, French or Italian represent racial types, since in the view of anthropologists Nordic, Mediterranean and Alpine stocks are inextricably mixed in every country in Western Europe. Attempts to correlate racial characteristics such as hair and eye colour with intelligence directly have so far failed. Further, it is in any case absurd to assume that the small numbers tested in America are fair samples of the peoples from whom they are derived, and in all probability there are considerable differences in the type of immigrant which the different countries in Europe send to America. It may be added that studies made in Europe show no differences which can be called racial (cf. Garth, *Race Psychology*, quoting Klineberg, p. 79). Apart from these studies relating to European groups which appear to be of little importance, other results may be summed up briefly thus. Taking the Intelligence Quotient of the Whites as 100, other I.Q.'s are Chinese, 99; Japanese, 99; Mexicans, 78; Southern Negroes, 75; Northern Negroes, 85; American Indians, full blood, 70 (Garth, p. 83). With the technique of measurement employed in these studies it is difficult to estimate the part played by the racial factor in determining the Quotients. Psychologists

now generally admit that the findings of intelligence testings are affected by environmental factors ; and in comparing the groups mentioned above, it is extremely difficult to make allowance for differences in social status, linguistic handicaps, differences in habits of thought and action, and especially in the attitude adopted by the people to the tests. It is true that differences have been shown to persist, though in reduced magnitude, when allowance has been made for these environmental factors, but the investigators themselves rarely claim complete success in eliminating variations in environmental or in cultural traditions. It remains to be added that there is some evidence of the possibility of changing the I.Q. by improving the environment. Thus Garth has shown that " full- and mixed-blood Indians placed in the favourable environment of the government school improve more in score and I.Q. than Indians who attend the common schools or than whites who attend the same common schools " (p. 101). Until a better technique has been evolved for controlling the environmental factor, it is somewhat hazardous to draw conclusions regarding racial differences from comparative inquiries based on intelligence tests. The verdict so far must be " not proven." If there are any inborn differences between the groups they are un-

questionably accentuated by environmental factors. Further, there is always much overlapping and the individual differences within the groups are greater than the differences between the groups.

(v) Experimental studies of racial differences in qualities of temperament and character are still too meagre, and the technique which they employ is still too undeveloped to justify discussion here. There is, however, an abundance of generalizations of a non-experimental kind about these qualities in sociological and ethnological literature, which exercise an influence upon the popular mind quite out of proportion to their scientific value, and which therefore call for some comment. They all suffer, I think, from very serious defects of method. To begin with, these generalizations quite frequently assign particular traits to vast aggregates of human beings whose racial unity has not been established and on the basis of the very limited and casual experience of travellers and literary men. Thus, for example, a well-known authority tells us the Mongolian division of mankind (who number, it should be remembered, about 695 millions—38 per cent. of the whole of mankind) are "generally somewhat reserved, sullen, apathetic, outwardly very courteous, but supercilious . . . nearly all reckless gamblers" (Keane, *E.R.E.*,

Vol. 5, p. 529). Contrast with this the remarks of Professor Seligman on the Chinese : "It is only necessary to watch a group of Chinese coolies seeking for hire, or a crowd brought together by a mishap, or even labourers at work, to be convinced that the Chinese are more excitable and emotional than North Europeans. . . . Their outlook is as far as may be from the inscrutable unemotional quality . . . attributed to them by the layman " (*Outline of Modern Knowledge*, p. 459). Similarly, many authorities tell us that the "Mediterranean race" is characterized by extreme sociability or gregariousness. Is this supposed to be true of all the Mediterraneans? Let us listen to what a subtle Spanish observer says of his own people : "The Spaniard is the very reverse of gregarious. If he seeks company it is in order to feel the edges of his personality against that of other personalities, so that in society it is not the community that he seeks, but other personalities ; hence that hard feeling in Spanish gatherings, that impression they give as if they were a field of hard flint stones " (Madariaga, *Englishmen, Frenchmen and Spaniards*, p. 246). Examples of generalizations of this kind could be multiplied *ad infinitum*. They seldom survive a critical survey of the evidence.

A second serious defect of ethnological

psychology is its tendency to ascribe to racial groups characteristics inferred from the behaviour of individuals who belong to racially mixed peoples without any effort being made to identify the racial characteristics of the individuals in question. When, for example, it is asserted that the founding of the American republic was due to the vigour and leadership of Nordic immigrants, is there any evidence that the individuals in question were especially Nordic, at any rate in respect of physical characters? None at all. Such investigations as have been made into the physical characters of the old Americans suggest that only a few of them were blond and that the round-headed were distinctly more numerous than the long-headed (cf. Hrdlička, *The Old Americans*, p. 54). Similarly, when we test the statement so often made that the Nordics are the finest explorers in the world we find no evidence given of the physical type of the explorers. As far as English explorers are concerned, Havelock Ellis's study shows that "Our most eminent and experienced explorers are mostly men of dark eyes and hair" (*A Study of British Genius*, p. 304).

Finally, an even more serious defect of current race psychology is its failure to distinguish between what are possibly cultural

traits and habits and inherent racial characters, and especially its lack of historical perspective. Consider, for example, the alleged gifts of the Nordics as organizers and rulers.¹ This is certainly not borne out by the history of the Teutonic tribes. Before the rise of Prussia the Germans were notoriously lacking in the power of organization on a large scale. But the racial composition of the Prussians is among the most disputed points in anthropology and such scanty data as exist indicate that the Prussian population is about four-fifths round-headed (cf. F. H. Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization*, p. 185).

Another striking example of the danger of generalizing about race characters is afforded by the extreme divergence of the accounts

¹ Aristotle's comments in this connection are amusing:

"Those who live in a cold climate and in northern Europe are full of spirit, but wanting in intelligence and skill; and therefore they keep their freedom, but have no political organization, and are incapable of ruling over others. Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent and inventive but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore they are always in a state of subjection and slavery. But the Hellenic race, which is situate between them, is likewise intermediate in character, being high-spirited and also intelligent. Hence it continues free, and is the best governed of any nation, and, if it could be formed into one state, would be able to rule the world." *Politics*, VII, 7.

given of the Alpine race by two writers separated from each other by only about thirty years. Thus for Ripley the Alpines are patient, passive, peaceful, socially conservative and resigned. Witness, he says, "the abject resignation of the Slavic horde." For Peake, writing after the Russian Revolution, they are democratic and in fact inclined to communism, for "Soviet Russia is mainly Alpine, and Marx came from the Alpine zone." In sum, the psychology of race, especially in so far as it has concerned itself with temperament and character, is still largely in the "anecdotal" stage. It indulges in generalizations about vast groups whose racial composition is uncertain and probably unascertainable. It makes no allowance for historical and sociological factors and has developed no technique for isolating the genetic from the environmental elements, and this is all the more important because singularly little is known of the laws governing the inheritance of traits of character and temperament. There is no reason to doubt that they have a hereditary basis, but this is not to say that they are racial traits or necessarily associated with the physical characters which are employed as race criteria. The attempt which has been made recently to link up Kretschmer's constitutional types with specific races has not so far succeeded

and, in the opinion of good observers, all the constitutional types are to be found in every race (cf. Ziehen, *Grundlagen der Charakterologie*, p. 241, and the citations there given). It is of interest to note also that inquiries by means of the rating method into the relation between brunette and blond traits and various qualities of temperament and character such as aggressiveness, patience, drive and domination, imitativeness and submissiveness, have led to negative results (cf. *Physique and Intellect*, by D. G. Paterson, p. 218). Unfortunately, physical anthropology has so far paid but little attention to physiological as distinguished from anatomical differences between racial groups. Possibly when we know more about the physiological differences the problem of the relation between race and temperament will come to be seen in better light.

(vi) I come now to the difficult problem of national character. By this is meant the totality of dispositions to thought, feeling and behaviour peculiar to and widespread in a certain people, and manifested with greater or less continuity in a succession of generations. We may perhaps also speak of the temperament of a people, meaning by this certain qualities of mind such as the degree of intensity of response, the tempo of activity, the range of susceptibility to

stimuli, the mood-colouring or predominant feeling-tone of behaviour. If there is such a thing as national temperament this would imply that there are differences in respect of these qualities between national groups. By calling these qualities national is presumably meant that they are widely and continuously dominant in a given people, and also that they are reflected in the institutions and traditions of the people and in its public activities and policy. Thus it is said, for example, that the Germans are 'heavy' (lourds allemands), slow to react, but once aroused energetic and persistent; patient and industrious, disciplined and thorough; lacking in impulsiveness and expansiveness; with a tendency to individualism and exclusiveness. Or again, we hear that the English nation has energy, initiative, a sense of individual responsibility, law-abidingness, the habit of compromise and moderation (Barker, *National Character*, p. 271); or that the French are vivacious, mobile and expansive, sociable, lacking the strength of the English or the heavy patience of the German (Fouillée, *Esquisse psychologique des peuples Européens*, p. 458). It is highly probable that if there are national characters and temperaments in the sense here intended, there will be great differences among different peoples in the degree of homogeneity which

is attained by the people as a whole, and in respect of the permanence and continuity of the national traits. But there are few, if any, adequate studies of the differences between, say, town and country, or between the various occupational and social groups. As to continuity, the permanence of national character has been especially stressed by German writers, whether under the influence of theories of a National Spirit or Soul or more frequently of doctrines of race. It has, however, also been stressed by French historians and in England by such writers as McDougall (cf. *The Group Mind*, ch. XVI). The question cannot here be argued at length. Some continuity there unquestionably is in the case of the great nations with a long historic past. Yet here is no justification for thinking that national character is either unitary or unalterable. This was clearly pointed out by Hume in his well-known essay on National Characters. "The old Spaniards," he says, "were restless, turbulent and so addicted to war that many of them killed themselves when deprived of their arms by the Romans. One would find an equal difficulty at present (at least one would have found it fifty years ago) to rouse up the modern Spaniards to war." In English history he notes important differences at different periods in the degree of enthusi-

asm for religion. Professor Barker notes the new habits and tendencies which are being developed in modern England: a greater febrility of temper, and gregariousness of behaviour, and a greater readiness to submit to state regulation (*Ibid.*, p. 271). The modern Germans furnish a good example of a change from an extreme individualism to the most exaggerated state worship. Estimates of the potentialities of a people on the basis of its supposed character are particularly unwarranted, as can easily be seen from the fate of such ventures in the past. Good instances are the scepticism felt by Europeans of the attempts by the Japanese at 'westernization,' which it was thought were doomed to failure, or the views of early observers regarding the industrial capacities of Italians and Germans which are decidedly amusing in the light of later history.

The psychology of peoples, it will be seen, has hardly yet attained scientific precision. It consists in the main of a series of impressions, often by very brilliant writers and acute observers of the behaviour of different peoples and of inferences as to disposition derived from a study of their institutions and contributions to art and science. We must not belittle these efforts, or make the mistake of denying the existence of national

characteristics merely on the ground that they have so far not lent themselves to exact analysis or quantitative measurement. Better results may be expected when more is known of the genetics of character, and when a reliable technique has been elaborated for observing and recording group behaviour.

We may now consider the possible influence of race upon national character. We can conceive of this influence as being exerted in the following way. Assuming that races differ in their hereditary dispositions, these innate dispositions will exist in different proportions among different nations or peoples according to the racial stocks which have entered into their composition. Further, environmental agencies, including the influence of other peoples, and the internal history and institutions of a given people, will act selectively upon the mass of innate dispositions, encouraging some and eliminating others. The result will be the formation of a national type of relative permanence capable of being transmitted by heredity. Institutions and historical happenings will thus act indirectly upon the originally given qualities by way of stimulus, elimination or inhibition, though these qualities may also be regarded as, in a sense, the basis of the institutions and historical happenings. Thus, for example, the forced emigration just now

of Germans of high individuality and mental independence may facilitate the growth of institutions requiring submission and docility, and the institutions thus developed may help further to impress these qualities upon the minds of Germans. In normal times this selective influence of institutions may be exercised more slowly and on a smaller scale, thus accounting for the relative stability of national character.

Put thus in outline the hypothesis is perfectly plausible. But when we examine the attempts that have been made to work it out in detail we find that, for the most part, it implies an appeal to unknown and probably unknowable factors. The nations or peoples whose characters are to be explained are all ethnically mixed, and we know practically nothing of the inborn traits of the hypothetically pure races out of which they are supposed to be composed. The descriptions that are given of the inborn mental constitution of the Nordics, or the Alpines or Mediterraneans, are themselves derived from the history of the peoples whose character is the very thing to be explained. But since we know so little of the effects of race mixture upon mental qualities, and traits appear to be combined and recombined in a thousand manifold ways, the reconstruction of the original racial mental types is nothing

but guesswork. The further we go back in time, the more precarious they become. What, for example, the Roman writers say of the mental character of the Gauls and the Germans, if it is to be taken seriously at all, is certainly of little use in arriving at the mental constitution of the Alpine and Nordic races. The theory is so plastic that it can be made to fit any preconceived notion of racial character. Any departure from the standard of the ideal race can always be attributed to race mixture. "Nordic souls," says a distinguished German anthropologist, "may often be combined with un-Nordic bodies, and a decidedly un-Nordic soul may lurk in a perfectly good Nordic body" (Kossina, *Ursprung der Germanen*, p. 127). Similarly, it is not uncommon in discussions of the relations between white and coloured peoples to attribute any merit of capacity or character found in a 'coloured' man to the 'white' strain in his ancestry. Such 'explanations' admit of no proof and open the doors wide to dogmatism and prejudice.

I conclude that the psychology of peoples has at present little to gain from the psychology of race. Genetic analysis of traits of character, temperament and capacity is important, but this has at present little application to large groups. The most reasonable procedure is to exhaust first the possi-

RACE AND ENVIRONMENT

bilities of explanation in terms of verifiable factors, such as tradition, geographical, economical and political agencies and to resort to racial peculiarities only in dealing with residual or otherwise unaccountable phenomena.

(C) We must now return to our fundamental question of the relation between race and culture or civilization. A broad survey of anthropological and historical facts shows that the distribution of cultural traits does not follow racial lines. Neither languages, nor art, nor forms of social structure are in any way definitely associated with distinctive racial groups. Nevertheless, the importance of race as an agent of cultural development has been stressed on numerous grounds, and I propose to discuss the more important of these very briefly.

(i) Differences in the level of culture have been attributed to differences in inborn or racial endowment. It has been argued, for example, that the backwardness of the negro is to be explained as due to his inferior capacity. But such argument from attainments to potentialities rests on no solid foundation. The point may be brought home by asking what would have been the opinion of a Roman observer if he had been told that the Teutonic barbarians would one day produce great music and systems of

metaphysic. Indeed, the vitality and energy shown by western Europeans is a new thing and could hardly have been foreseen by anybody before the sixteenth century. "A man of foresight surveying the world in the early sixteenth century might well have concluded that it was only a few generations before the whole world became Mongolian . . . and probably Moslem" (H. G. Wells, *Outline of History*, 2, p. 491). In a few hundred years, say, the Negro may reach the level of other races, a period which is only a negligible fraction of the time which it has taken for the fundamental human racial types to differentiate. It may be added that there are other reasons which might well account for the peculiarities of negro civilization, notably the limited contact with other cultures and the peculiar character of African diseases which are especially inimical to mental and physical efficiency and have a debilitating effect without conferring immunity (see on this Norman Leys, *Kenya*).

(ii) Theories have been suggested which account for the decline of civilizations on the ground of racial changes. Thus the decline of Rome has been ascribed to race mixture (Chamberlain), to excessive inbreeding (Reibmayr), to a reversal of natural selection brought about by war and birth

limitation, resulting in the elimination of the best elements of society (Seeck, Schallmayer and others). These theories evidently clash, but there is, in any case, no reliable evidence of biological degeneration or of the failure in the supply of able men. "The old families that made the Republic may have died out, but the literary complaints of degeneracy familiar in Horace date, if they have any scientific value at all, from the beginning of the Principate, which was not an age of decadence but of remarkable progress maintained for nearly two centuries" (Hobhouse, *Social Development*, p. 313). Historians like Beloch, Heitland, Rostovtseff dismiss the racial explanations as of little value (cf. Heitland, *The Roman Fate*, 1922; Rostovtseff, "The Decay of the Ancient World," *Economic History Review*, Vol. II, No. 2; Beloch, *Hist. Zeitschrift*, Vol. LXXXIV). The vicissitudes of the ancient world are far more easily to be explained in accordance with recent historical research as due to socio-economic factors and their repercussions on military relations (see on this F. Hertz, *Race and Civilisation*, Ch. VII; and on the economic side more especially, Lot, *La Fin du Monde Antique*).

(iii) In dealing with European prehistory, archæologists have attempted to map out

distinct culture-cycles and to relate them to specific racial groups. I am not competent to estimate the value of these studies, but I gather that, even in these early times, the carriers of distinct cultures were already peoples and not races. There is evidence of race mixture even for the Paleolithic Age, and in the Neolithic Age the racial composition of Europe was wellnigh as complex as it is now. According to Professor Gordon Childe, the skeletons found in the graves of Denmark and Sweden associated with the Nordic culture of the new Stone Age (third millennium B.C.) belong to different physical types. Only about 30 per cent. were long-heads and even these cannot be definitely attributed to the Nordic race (*History*, October, 1933, p. 196). Scheidt's elaborate analysis shows that in Neolithic North, Central and Eastern Europe at least nine cranial types can be distinguished. In these circumstances the difficulties of linking up cultural with racial types are overwhelming (*Die Rassen der jüngern Steinzeit in Europa*, p. 68). Professor Gordon Childe thinks that "on these lines prehistoric anthropology seems leading to chaos." Wahle, in a careful review written in a spirit on the whole favourable to racial explanations, concludes that the attempts which have so far been made in this direction rest on no adequate

basis, and that they assume important differences in endowment for which no evidence has so far been provided (cf. Appendix to Scheidt's *Rassenlehre*, p. 570).

(iv) Extravagant claims have been made for the Nordic race as the creators and sustainers of civilization. Many writings on this question belong to the pathology of thought and are of interest mainly for the light they throw upon the mentality of their authors. The theory rests in part on an identification of the peoples who originated and spread the language from which the group of languages now known as Indo-European have diverged, with the Nordic race, and partly upon the rôle supposed to have been played throughout the history of civilization by men of Nordic physique. There is still great divergence of view regarding the 'cradle' of the Indo-European languages. Among English archæologists, some find it in the South Russian steppes. But others, Professor Giles for example, conclude that this region has not the characteristics required by linguistic palæontology, and for his part suggests the area now corresponding to Austria, Hungary and Bohemia. The French archæologist, de Morgan, even advocates a return to the older view of an Asiatic origin. As to the racial characteristics of the original Indo-

Germanic-speaking peoples we know nothing beyond that they belonged to the white races. "We cannot tell," says Dr. Giles, "whether they were long-headed or broad-headed, tall or of little stature, brunette or fair. It has been customary to imagine them as having something of the characteristics which Tacitus describes as belonging to the Germans of the end of the first century A.D., but all the evidence adduced in support of this is really imaginary" (*Cambridge Indian History*, Vol. I, p. 66). The Italian anthropologist, Giuffrida Ruggeri, discussing the whole problem, dismisses it as a riddle to be solved only by extravagant invention for personal amusement. "It is highly probable," says Schrader, "that the first Indo-Europeans were composed of somatically heterogeneous tribes and individuals."

Equally flimsy is the argument urged by race dogmatists that Greek and Roman civilization owed their inspiration to the Nordic strain within them. As far as Greece is concerned, it is now generally recognized that the brilliance of historical Greece was in essence due to a renaissance of the much older *Ægean* civilization. Racially, the *Ægeans* appear to have been of the Mediterranean type with a later admixture of broad-heads. In classical Greece fair and dark types existed apparently side by side, but

there is no ground whatever for associating its greatness with any one racial element in it. The first result of the invasions by northern peoples was to introduce a period of darkness from which it took some centuries to recover, and the new-comers were, by all accounts, inferior in culture to the peoples whom they dominated. As to the Romans, their ethnic constitution is still a matter of dispute. It has been held that the Patricians and Plebeians differed in race, but this seems very doubtful. According to Dixon's account of the craniological evidence, the Romans of the earlier period were largely long-headed of the Mediterranean type, but by the period of the Empire the population had become dominantly broad-headed and it seems that the invaders of the Iron age, who included men of Nordic type and who were apparently few in number, had been quickly absorbed.

Upon the whole problem of the ancient civilizations a much stronger case can be made out for the Mediterranean race than for any other. It originated not only the Ægean cultures but also those of Ur and Kish, and one of its branches was the basis of the civilization of Egypt. But it would be just as mistaken to insist on a pan-Mediterranean view as on a pan-Nordic. For in none of the instances just given are

we concerned with a pure race. Both in the case of the Egyptian and the Sumerian and the Ægean civilizations, for example, there was present an intrusive Armenoid element whose influence no one can estimate with certainty. As far as modern Germany is concerned, the claims of the Nordics to be the creators of culture has extremely little to support it. The first flowering of German culture has occurred not in North Germany but in the South and at a time when the non-Nordic element was dominant in the population (cf. W. Schmidt, *Rasse und Volk*, p. 51). Further, such anthropometric studies as have been made of great German thinkers show a remarkable preponderance of the broad-headed type. Weidenreich gives the following cephalic indices: Schopenhauer, 90; Leibniz, 92; Kant, 85; Beethoven, 85; Schiller, 84.2; Goethe, 88; Bach is mesocephalic and certainly not Nordic in type. Weidenreich goes so far as to say that till now no case has been produced of a long-headed type among the great Germans (*Rasse und Körperbau*, p. 140). Huntingdon's study of the distribution of genius in Europe (cf. *The Character of Races*) shows no relation whatever between racial character and either the frequency or the type of genius.

We may now bring together the con-

clusions which emerge from our discussion. First, the groups which are called races by anthropologists constitute very inconvenient units for the study of the part played by genetic factors in civilization. Such a study will for long have to confine itself to the genetic analysis of more limited groups and to discovery of a technique for disentangling the environmental from the inborn factors. Secondly, the study of the psychological differences between peoples, as distinct from races, cannot at present derive much help from race psychology. Third, no correlation has so far been established between culture and race, and it is highly probable that no culture of any known people is entirely aboriginal. Fourth, and more positively, everywhere we find culture migrations and amalgamations. Fifth, these amalgamations are sometimes accompanied by racial amalgamations, but there are numerous instances of the diffusion of culture which have not involved any recognizable race mixture. This is a point which has not been dealt with in my general discussion, but requires to be emphasized here. Both languages and religions, for example, have spread widely without loss of vitality, quite independently of race, and there is no warrant for assuming any such radical differences in racial constitution as would amount to an incapacity

SOCIOLOGY

on the part of any one group of peoples to assimilate the cultural achievements of another or to play its part in the general movement of civilization. This is certainly true in relation to the different peoples of the civilized world, and is, I think, highly probable even in relation to the backward peoples. In the main, culture is independent of race and it becomes increasingly so with the advance of civilization. Always the least-developed peoples have been those who were isolated and who lacked the fertilizing influence of culture contacts. Hereditary differences must count both in the creation and the diffusion of cultural elements, and one day we may be able to measure these differences with some degree of accuracy. But in the present state of our knowledge it does not appear probable that changes in social structure and in civilization have depended on changes in inherited structure, or that in the course of civilization race could have been a dominant factor.

The Influence of the Physical Environment. It is widely held by biologists that the physical environment does not act directly upon the inherited structure, that is to say, that it does not of itself give rise to new qualities, but exerts an indirect influence through the mechanism of selection by favouring some types, and eliminating others. The socio-

logical effect is in all probability of a like nature. The environment does not create new arts or institutions, but it may play an important part by encouraging some experiments and hindering others. The social structure has to adapt itself to the environment, or adapt the environment to itself. The latter method is the more prominent, as the power of man over nature increases. With the advance of civilization, the relations between man and nature become more and more intricate, and the operation of the environment becomes a complex function of its own structure and of the development of the arts and sciences. The result is that the influence of the environment is not unvarying, and every generalization that can be made in regard to it is subject to numerous qualifications.

Among the conditions which are of greatest importance for the development of societies are the geographical conditions which determine internal security and facility of intercommunication. The most favourable conditions appear to be those which provide relative internal security, while also affording opportunity for numerous and varied contacts. In this connection, of course, the conditions of the environment are continuously transformed by changes in the technique of warfare and in the means of

communication. But at any given stage of technique differences in natural conditions which affect accessibility and interchange remain of importance. One of the best-established generalizations in sociology is that culture contacts are the most pervasive influence in civilization. But what sort of contacts are most favourable is a problem which has not yet been sufficiently investigated. There would appear to be considerable differences in the results obtained according as a contact is effected : (a) through commerce or cultural exchange without warfare ; (b) through conquest ; (c) through slow infiltration in large or small numbers ; and (d) according as the peoples in question are on the same general level of civilization or on widely different levels. The most rapid growths appear to have been achieved by way of the multiplying of free contacts among trading communities, and among the free colonies of such. Examples are the ancient Ægean civilization ; the colonies of the Phœnicians ; those of the Greeks in Asia Minor, Italy and Sicily ; the Mediterranean republics ; the Hansa towns ; the cities of the Netherlands ; and the United States (cf. J. M. Robertson, *The Evolution of States*, p. 58). An important question arises as to the relative importance of race mixture and culture contact. A great many forms of cul-

ture contact do not involve any racial admixture, either because the number of the agents through whom it is brought about is small, or because the peoples concerned are of the same racial stock. It is an interesting sociological problem whether civilizations which result from culture fusion are as viable and as capable of future independent development in the cases where there has occurred no mingling of stocks as in those in which culture fusion has been accompanied by race fusion on a considerable scale.

Another way in which the environment affects social development is through its influence upon physique. The most important questions that arise are those of disease and immunity. The distribution of races and peoples over the earth has been affected by their adaptability to different environmental conditions and especially by their power to acquire immunity to infectious diseases. The growth of urban civilization seems also to depend on the power to acquire partial immunity. It will further be recalled that, according to some authorities, one of the principal causes of the cultural backwardness of the African peoples has been their comparative isolation, due in part to the nature of disease in Africa, which checked invasions and settlement on a big scale until the nineteenth century.

SOCIOLOGY

Finally, it has been held by some authorities that in early periods at any rate, those areas were most favourable to social and economic development in which nature was neither too profuse nor too niggardly in her gifts and in which man was compelled to put forth his energies but not overwhelmed by insuperable difficulties. It is doubtful, however, whether in this form the generalization is of much value. Herbert Spencer noted that the first civilizations arose in the fertile valleys of the Nile and the Euphrates, and, indeed, it may be argued that it is only when there are the possibilities of an economic surplus, at least for certain classes, that any advance can be made in the arts and sciences. Nevertheless, differences in natural resources must clearly have played a rôle in shaping social life, in particular, by their effect on the progress of the industrial arts.

In general, it would seem that the most pervasive and important influences exerted by the physical environment upon social development are to be found in its effects upon internal security, military expansion, and, especially, upon culture contacts. The influence of what may be called the social environment is a problem which belongs properly to social psychology, and can be more conveniently discussed when something

RACE AND ENVIRONMENT

has been said of the psychological conditions of social life.¹

¹ On the rôle of the environment, cf. J. Brunhes, *Human Geography* ; L. Febvre, *La terre et l'évolution humaine* ; L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Development*, Chap. V.

IV

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIAL LIFE

IN all social relations two opposed elements in human nature are subtly interwoven. The one strain is pre-eminently assertive, expecting resistance on every side and ready to resist, easily roused to pugnacity when thwarted. The other is pre-eminently gentle and tender, craving for relationship with others, seeking and giving response. This mingling of opposites was expressed vividly by Kant in the phrase 'the unsocial sociableness of man' ('Ungesellige Geselligkeit'). Kant thought that it was just this antagonism which served to awaken man's powers, to overcome his inertia and in the search for power to win for himself a place among his fellow-men, "with whom he cannot live at peace, yet without whom he cannot live at all." Without this resistance, the spiteful competition of vanity, the insatiable desire of gain and power, the natural capacities of humanity would have slumbered undeveloped. Whether or no we accept this view of mutual conflict as a spur of development,

we must grant that self-assertion and aggression are integral elements of human nature, blended in infinitely variable and subtle ways with the opposite elements of self-surrender and a craving for reciprocity. To interpret this duality in human nature and its expressions in social life is one of the first tasks of social psychology.

(i) *The Social Tie.* The social interest has been derived by some psychologists from gregariousness. Dr. Trotter, for example, in a well-known work ascribes to the herd-instinct, not only the sensitiveness of each member of the group to the behaviour of his fellows and the impulse to seek and remain with the herd, but also a profound influence on the mentality of the members of the herd. It gives to the opinions which come from the herd an authority and a quality of certainty and utter convincingness. In this way, it moulds the whole system of morality and religion ; conscience being on this view the sense of discomfort aroused by the disapproval of the herd ; while religion is based upon the realization of inadequacy or dependence felt by individuals of gregarious species, and the consequent yearning for completion and absorption within the larger whole. Other authorities have treated gregariousness not as a single tendency but as a group of tendencies, including suggestibility, imitation,

and sympathy. This wide use of the term is to be deprecated. The tendencies referred to are extremely complex and include a number of very different kinds of reaction, belonging to very different levels of mental development. They appear to depend on different emotional and conational factors, and very little light is thrown upon them by lumping them together under the term herd-instinct.

There is indeed still much dispute whether this instinct exists at all in man or, at any rate, whether it is primitive. Tansley considers gregariousness in man to be secondary, its function being to (regulate and control the self-preserving instincts.) Westermarck thinks that man was not originally gregarious, but lived in separate families, and that it was only with the increasing food supply, when tribal life became possible and advantageous, that the gregarious instinct established itself, 'owing to its usefulness.' Westermarck means by this instinct the tendency to live together with other members of the species, apart from the parental, conjugal and filial attachments. From it he distinguishes the social instinct which is characterized by the tendency to co-operate, and on the affective side by pleasure in the company of other members, and a feeling of mutual kindliness. Drever thinks there is something primordial

about the whole experience involved in the operation of the gregarious tendencies in man. The matter is evidently one for further exploration by comparative psychology and biology. It is, however, doubtful whether the phenomena usually brought under this head are adequately described by a term like gregariousness or the herd-instinct. Strictly this should mean the tendency to consort. What man needs is far more subtle and varied. He needs the response of others and the active interplay of interests. It is for this reason that solitude, which deprives him of this interplay, has such a devastating effect on his mind. But this is not to say that he needs a herd, or that his co-operative and altruistic activities bear any fundamental resemblance to the behaviour of gregarious animals (cf. Susan Isaacs, *Social Development in Young Children*, p. 388).

(ii) *The Parental Feelings.* Other writers have sought to derive the social impulses from parental love. This goes back to Darwin (*Descent of Man*, p. 161), and in one form is adopted by McDougall, who holds that it is the only altruistic factor in human nature, and that from it all truly altruistic striving, directly or indirectly, proceeds (*Outline of Psychology*, p. 138). This instinct was, according to him, primarily maternal, but was later transmitted, though

imperfectly and with many individual variations, to the members of the other sex, and generalized so as to be evoked, not only by the distress of the child, but by the need of any weak or defenceless creature. Although this derivation of the altruistic impulses has been widely held, there are good reasons for doubting it. It may well be the case that, in order of temporal development, mother-love was the first step in altruism, but it does not follow that all other forms of altruistic behaviour must necessarily be traced to it. Darwin himself noted that "(with respect to the origin of the parental and filial affections which apparently lie at the base of the social instincts,) we know not the steps by which they have been gained." Presumably, we have to assume them as variations which somehow happened to occur and to have established themselves by natural selection. From this point of view, there is nothing to prevent us from assuming other underived or primitive social responses, since, biologically, they also would be useful in the struggle for existence. This avoids the unproved assertion of the transfer of an instinct from the female to the male, and the difficulty of deriving a generalized form of behaviour from a specialized one. Despite our refusal to derive all social impulses from the parental feeling, we may nevertheless grant that life

within the family provides the child with the earliest pattern of other-regarding behaviour, and in that sense is of fundamental importance for social life.

(iii) *Love and Aggression*. A far-reaching theory of the foundations of social life has been elaborated by Freud in his later writings. I propose to discuss this theory briefly before indicating my own view of the nature of the social interest. (According to Freud, social life is the result of a struggle between love and hate, or rather the erotic and aggressive tendencies. He is profoundly impressed by the deep-seated feelings of aversion and hostility which infect even the most intimate relations between people, and in describing the emotional relations of men, quotes with approval Schopenhauer's famous simile of the freezing porcupines which crowd together to save themselves from being frozen to death, but separate again as soon as they feel one another's quills until at length they discover a mean distance at which they can tolerably exist. In his later works, Freud lays great stress on the element of aggression which he regards as primary or underived and capable, in the absence of inhibiting factors, of unprovoked cruelty: *homo homini lupus*. (Social life depends on the control and curtailment of this impulse) This is achieved with the aid of love or Eros, a term which

Freud uses in a very wide sense, identical, he claims, with the platonic Eros, and the word love as used by the apostle Paul when, in the Epistle to the Corinthians, he prizes love above all else. This bold identification, however, leaves the definition of love, or libido, extremely ambiguous. Sometimes Freud uses libido in so wide a sense as to make it include all forms of attraction. It is, he says, "the Eros that impels the separate parts of living matter to one another, and to hold them together" (*Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 79). Of the libido thus understood, the sexual instinct is only a part, namely, "that part that turns towards the object." At other times, and more frequently, all forms of attraction are derived from sex, in a narrower sense. Hence the theory of aim-inhibition, according to which an impulse may still be called sexual despite the fact that the object at which it is directed is not the normal object of sexual satisfaction.

Upon the whole, it would seem to be Freud's real intention to urge that all tenderness to others is diffused and aim-inhibited sexuality. This is the root of the family, but also of wider groups; theoretically indeed Eros is capable of binding into a unity the whole of mankind. Yet in a sense, there is, according to Freud, a conflict between the

wider libidinal force and sex as embodied in the family. For culture needs libidinal energy in order to overcome the aggressive tendencies which, if left unchecked, would shatter society. Hence the restrictions everywhere imposed on sex relations by custom and law. Cultural or social life is in great measure based on the renunciation, or restriction, at once of the aggressive elements in human nature and of sexual appetite. This is achieved by various means, especially by the formation of ideals and the mechanism of identification. By the aid of these, aggression is turned inwards and leads to the evolution of the inward monitor we call the conscience. The social bond implies a common attitude to a leader or leader-substitute, and this attitude rests upon an identification with him, which Freud interprets as a compensation for an original sexual attachment. The tie which binds members to each other thus rests upon a double identification, namely, of each with the leader and consequently of each with all the others. In this way, the hostile and aggressive attitude is either turned inwards or transmuted by the formation of a common tie and a common ideal. Yet the strength of the bond which ties the members to each other within the group depends on, and varies with, their hatred or hostility toward other groups, and

unity within has frequently been furthered by persecution of the stranger without. Social life is a process in which the primary impulses are controlled, repressed, and sublimated in the service of Eros, which wages battle against the aggressive elements in human nature and the inherent enmity of all against all.

Both elements in Freud's antithesis, libido and aggression, call for comment. In the beginning of this chapter, I drew attention to another duality, namely, self-assertion and self-devotion, but the two antitheses do not correspond. I incline to the view that aggression is not a primary tendency to hurt or destroy, but rather an intensified form of self-assertion and self-expression, brought into play under conditions of obstruction, or the fear of obstruction, or of loss of independence, on the one hand, and of enhanced self-feeling and the enjoyment of mastery or power on the other. The element of hate in love may also be associated with the fear of losing one's independence, and of the restricting effects of the bond of affection. If this be so, aggression and ill-will generally may be a secondary result of thwarting and interference, due either to discordant aims, or to exaggerations of self-assertion and exclusive egoism. To this question I will return in discussing the anti-social elements

in human nature. Meanwhile, let us consider Freud's conception of the social tie, as essentially libidinal. If by this is meant that experiences within the family, with its rivalries and hostilities, as well as its friendliness and affection, set the pattern for all subsequent behaviour in other social situations, observation of children and the study of adult behaviour strongly support the allegation. But the important question is, whether this admission supports the view that ultimately all social tendencies are special differentiations of the sexual tendencies. This can only be made plausible by using the word libido or love in an extremely wide sense, and by the doctrine of aim-inhibited impulses. Would it not be better to admit the existence of social impulses in their own right, the proper object of which is not sexual satisfaction, but wider intercourse and reciprocal response. With this general social need, the craving for another, sex proper may fuse to constitute what we call sex love, and from it possibly the latter derives the element of tenderness which sex in the narrower sense does not possess. The family, on this view, is a social group, in which social needs and relationships are complicated by relationships of sex and dependence; and in the interpretation of which it is necessary to take account of the wider society, of which, as it would seem, the

family is always an integral, but not self-sufficient element.

(iv) *The Social Interest.* The position I have here taken, after reviewing the more important theories, is that the social interest is not to be derived from any one single tendency, such as gregariousness, or sex, or the tender impulse of the parental instincts. The fundamental drive seems to be a much more general need. This may be described as a need to go outside of ourselves, and to enter into relationship with others. It is not necessarily a desire to co-operate in the service of common ends, nor is it as such benevolent. Rather is it the need of some kind of response from others, and the tendency to respond to them. It is to be remembered that it is mainly in consequence of reciprocal responsiveness that we come to know other selves as selves at all. Such reciprocity of response is essential to mental development, and constitutes a root interest of the human mind. With this generic need of, and interest in, others, there come to be combined several more specific tendencies. In sex love the social feelings and impulses are individualized and fused with sex in the strict sense, that is, regarded as a specific instinct or instincts, with determinate stimuli and responses. Perhaps it is this duality in love which accounts for the conflict between

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIAL LIFE

sexuality and sociality, to which the Freudians have drawn attention. For the concentration of the social impulses onto one person must tend to diminish interest in the wider social life. And on the other hand, a highly individualistic society which inhibits social contacts and a free expression of social interests may drive the individual to find relief in a closer sexual life, and thus encourage a form of passionate individual love, which may not be common in societies where the social sentiments are afforded more general adequate expression. Apart from sex, the generic need of others may also become specialized, and form the root of a sentiment for particular persons, to whom we may come to stand in a relation of intimate and individual responsiveness. To these must be added the benevolent or protective tendencies, the impulse to pity or to help or protect others in need : and sympathy, which is a complex of imaginative insight and tender impulse, a tendency to respond to the need of others, stimulated by an imaginative grasp of their situation, and by a kind of identification with them which leads us to imagine ourselves in their position. The craving for a response, it must further be noted, is also characteristic of the antagonistic impulses, and especially of the desire for mastery and power, and it is also involved in the desire for the approval

of others and the dislike of their disapproval. The general social proclivity, the need of others to complete our own lives, is thus partly specialized, and partly fused with other specific tendencies in the relations of social life.

(v) *Self-interest*. Some psychologists speak of an instinct of self-assertion. This goes back to Ribot, who called it positive self-feeling and contrasted it with negative self-feeling. This has been elaborated by McDougall, who speaks of the instincts of self-assertion (or self-display) and self-abasement (or subjection) with their corresponding emotions of positive and negative self-feeling. In his earlier expositions, in *The Introduction to Social Psychology*, Professor McDougall connected self-assertion especially with self-display, found in the animal world in connection with courting or mating. In his later writings, he links it up more directly with combat and leadership within the herd in gregarious animals, and includes under it a group of tendencies, such as the impulse to domineer, to lead, to assert oneself over, or display oneself before, one's fellows. The subject requires more examination than it has so far received. It is doubtful, for example, how far in the animal world, at any rate, the phenomena of display have anything to do with self-feeling, or imply an awareness of the

effect produced on the mate ; and it is possible that they do not imply any impulse to impress or dominate others.

As to combat, aggression is recognized by most psychologists as an integral part of the human make-up, but there are considerable differences of opinion with regard to the conditions which arouse it. We have seen that, according to Freud, it is an original and underived instinct. William James thought that man was the most ruthlessly ferocious of beasts, and he explained many aspects of human behaviour as due to the co-operation of the hunting and fighting instincts. Recently, some anthropologists have argued that primitive man was gentle and peaceful ; but the data on which this view is based are inconclusive and rather suggest that if primitive man did not wage war in a strict sense, neither was his life free from violence and the fear of violence. The question remains whether there is in man an inner need to fight, to hurt or destroy, as there is a need to love or eat and drink. Should we not rather say that the impulse is secondary and aroused only when other impulses are interfered with or baulked ? A great deal of pugnacity is certainly connected with thwarting. In other cases, it may be the expression of heightened self-feeling, and the desire for the active exercise of power. But whether there

is also an original craving to hurt or destroy remains a question which urgently requires further investigation (cf. Bovet, *The Fighting Instinct*; Glover, *War, Sadism, and Pacifism*; and S. Isaacs, *Social Development in Young Children*).

Self-assertion is, in any event, wider than either pugnacity or self-display. It is, in fact, best not regarded as a specific instinct, but as a characteristic of the whole make-up of personality, since every activity is an assertion of self, or a mode of self-fulfilment. It passes easily into self-regard, the sense of power in what the self does, the realization that what is done, is done by us, and is a manifestation of our energy. It is extremely difficult to disentangle interest in self from interests in the objects to which the activities of the self are directed. But when our interest is in the feelings and impulses *qua* parts of the self with their objects thrown into the background, when the interest is in impulse fulfilment rather than in the objects, we have self-interest and self-regard.

With self-assertion is connected the desire for power or domination. This again is not a specific instinct, but rather assertion intensified, and made conscious of itself. Here the experience of resistance is of great importance, as indeed it is for the whole development of the consciousness of self. It is

primarily that which offers resistance to our impulses which is distinguished as the not-self, and no doubt the resistance offered by other selves, especially if differentiated and graded, serves to make us keenly aware of our own desires and impulses. When resistance is successfully overcome there is heightened self-feeling, and from this enjoyment there arises in some natures the longing for the exercise of faculty against resistance, the desire to pit oneself against others, the will to overcome and dominate. From this, coupled with the desire for distinction and joy in activity, there may develop a desire for power as such, as an end in itself.

(vi) *The Interweaving of the Self-assertive and the Social.* There is no necessary conflict between self-assertion and the social impulses, since, in satisfying, say, the benevolent impulses, we also express or assert ourselves. Even self-regard and the desire for power are not irreconcilable with altruistic acts ; there are many people who satisfy their desire for self-display and power in activities useful to society. On the other hand, of course, calculated self-regard or self-love, as the older moralists used to call it, may come into conflict with particular impulses whether self- or other-regarding. Thus, as Bishop Butler pointed out, self-love may be over-

come by anger and envy, or by an exaggerated and ill-regulated sympathy ; and in all probability he was right in thinking further that the dictates of enlightened self-interest and benevolence are not fundamentally at variance. The causes of conflict are due far more generally to disharmonies within the self, and to the clash of collective or group egoisms in which the devotion of the individuals to their group serves to embitter the conflict between the groups. It is thus that families, occupational groups, social classes or nations, each develop their own self-assertiveness in actual or potential antagonism to others. Much has been made of the conflict between egoism and altruism, but the serious problems of social life seldom permit of analysis in terms of this overworked antithesis. The clash is far more often between interests in which mingled altruism and egoism appear on both sides. We have here another example of the blend of opposite elements in social relations which we see also in the mixture of domination and good-will in social leadership, of possessiveness and self-devotion in family relationships, of competitiveness and mutual service in economic life. It is essential to bear this duality of human nature in mind in the sociological interpretation of group life.

(vii) *Common and Divergent Purposes.* So

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIAL LIFE

far I have been discussing impulses in the human mind which directly involve social relations, that is, reference to others. The generic need of response, the impulses of sex and parenthood, on the one hand, and the self-assertive tendencies, such as domination and the desire for power, on the other, require other individuals as their objects, and are stimulated by them. But individuals come into relations also through their common or divergent interests in other objects. I will not here seek to classify these other interests, or to relate them, as some psychologists have sought to do, to fundamental instincts or drives. It is more important, for our purpose, to classify the types of social relationships which emerge from them. These may be summarily enumerated thus :

(a) Different individuals or groups may have a similar attitude to the same object ; for example, a common antipathy or fear or a common love. A common hatred or fear may serve to unite individuals to each other as in war. On the other hand, a love for the same object may unite or separate individuals according to the nature of the thing sought.

(b) Different individuals may have different or opposed attitudes to the same object. Thus some may love, others dislike or hate

the same things or persons ; or some may want an object, while others desire to dispose of it. This may facilitate co-operation and exchange, but may also breed rivalry and conflict.

(c) The nature of the object of endeavour may be such that its attainment involves joint action, supplementary and undifferentiated, as when a number of individuals unite to lift a heavy weight, or join in an attack on others, or complementary, as in specialized division of labour.

(d) The nature of the objects or ends also affects the character of the personal relations, according as they constitute competitive or non-competitive goods, that is to say, according as they are or are not diminished by use, and affected by scarcity of supply. Broadly, some objects are such that their attainment by some precludes or makes more difficult their attainment by others, as is often the case in the field of economic activity ; while in the sphere of knowledge or other spiritual goods, their possession by some may actually increase the chance of their being attained by others, and sharing in them does not diminish the amount available.

(e) The range or generality of the objects also affects social relations, since some objects affect all individuals alike while others have a limited or specific appeal.

It is as a result of the clash of interests in these different relations, and the efforts to their readjustment, that there arise the different forms of associations and institutions, varying in range, permanence and coherence with the purposes they embody, and the kind of relations they come to define.

(viii) *The Interrelation of Minds in Society.* So far, we have been considering social relations from the point of view of the individual. Some of his impulses serve to link him with others directly as objects required for their satisfaction, whether by way of mutual service or opposition. Other impulses require collective effort, for the achievement of their ends. The relations between the individual and society are, however, far closer than this account would suggest. In a sense, society is the condition of his having any ends at all, since social life moulds all his ideals and gives definiteness and form to all his impulses. "Man," says Fichte, "only becomes man among men"; and among the chief characteristics which distinguish man from other animals is his power of learning from others and of mutual stimulation. The influence of the social environment upon mental development is sometimes underestimated by those who stress the importance of inherited factors, but only because it is so ubiquitous and

pervasive as to escape notice. Broadly, this influence is exerted in the following ways. Firstly, the social environment acts selectively upon the inborn potentialities of individuals, eliciting some and inhibiting others. With similar native dispositions, individuals may nevertheless behave differently if brought up in different social environments. Scandinavians and Dutchmen possibly do not differ much in inborn pugnacity from Germans, but their behaviour is different owing to the absence of militarism and military habits of mind. Whether innate tendencies are repressed, sublimated, or given full play depends to a large extent upon the type of family life and the traditions of the larger society. Secondly, the manner in which the inborn tendencies express themselves is also determined by the social tradition. Thus, modesty may have an inborn basis, but the situations which evoke it and the behaviour in which it expresses itself are historically and socially conditioned. Indeed, the influence of tradition is so great that we are easily led to ascribe given forms of behaviour to inborn instincts, which may well be the product of social development. Consider, for example, the difficulty of determining whether the aversion to incestuous relationships has an instinctive basis, or of disentangling the genetic factors underlying the

various forms of sexual jealousy. The in-born tendencies, in short, have a certain plasticity, and their mode of expression, repression or sublimation is, in varying degrees, socially conditioned. Thirdly, on the side of knowledge, the influence of society upon individuals is not less profound and intimate. Durkheim believed that the fundamental categories of thought have a social origin, and that they owe their necessity and their *à priori* character to the fact that they are the basis of all intercourse between individuals in the sense that, without a minimum of logical conformity, without a common time and a common space, for example, social life would be impossible. Whether this be so or not, it is clear that the individual imbibes methods and principles from the social environment, and that thought depends on it, not only for its expression, but for its inner life. Here again, the social environment acts both as a stimulus and a selective agent, encouraging and assimilating everything which fits in with its general requirements, and resisting and repelling whatever is incompatible with its needs. This applies not only to thought on social policy, when dominant group interests often unconsciously control the stream of thought, but even in the pure sciences, which also have their social atmosphere, hostile to new or revolutionary

ideas. Finally, society provides a mechanism of transmission and accumulation which makes possible the building up of cultural systems, such as language, the sciences and arts. These come to have a life of their own, and an immanent power of growth and development, increasingly independent of any particular individuals or of changes in racial or inborn constitutions. Individuals can only contain within themselves a tiny fragment of these vast systems, and their contributions are infinitesimal. They come to the individual as it were from without, and he grows by assimilating as much of them as he can. If they facilitate his development, they also circumscribe it, and though ultimately the product of a vast interaction of minds, they are thus more and more independent of any particular minds.

It is this profound penetration of the individual by society which has given rise to the problem of the group mind. That man is a social animal has been an axiom of social science since Aristotle founded the study of politics. But it is not his sociableness which specifically distinguishes man, for there are many animals which have a complex social life. What makes his position unique is his remarkable combination of individuality and sociality, his power of pitting his will against the will of the community, and of gaining an

inner independence which enables him to react, in turn, upon the community. This profound duality is obscured when society is described as a mind, after the analogy of the individual mind. Society is a complex network of relations between minds, but the elements which enter into relation are distinct centres of conational energy, and retain a measure of autonomy. Indeed, as we have seen, society in the broadest sense has no assignable limits or distinct structure. It is only when it issues into societies that we can speak of substantive unities, and these differ greatly among themselves in respect of definiteness and cohesion. What is meant by calling a society a unity is that it tends to maintain itself as a whole, by the efforts of its parts towards mutual adjustment; and that in this self-maintenance, what counts is not so much the individual efforts, as the way they are corrected, modified, and adapted to each other in the final result. In this way slight changes in individuals may sum up to something of the greatest significance in the whole, and common actions may have consequences which are never willed or foreseen by those who took part in them. If we use the terms common mind and common will, these phrases should be taken to refer to a mass of dispositions, or tendencies to thought, feeling, and action, widely dominant in a

group. Such a set of dispositions is the product of past interactions between individuals, and their present relations. It does not constitute a unitary mind, and in so far as such latent dispositions issue in acts, they cannot, in the case of large aggregates at any rate, be described as a common or general will. Common action in large communities is generally the result of an accommodation of partial purposes to one another, an accommodation secured by methods of trial and error and rarely by reference to comprehensive or settled purposes adequate to the requirements of the whole. The process of adjustment has been metaphorically described as a new form of selection and a struggle for existence in which the competing elements are ideas and institutions. But in this struggle, success is determined not necessarily by logical coherence or harmony with the common good, but as likely as not by satisfying the needs of a powerful group or groups within the community. It would seem that the wider the group, the lower is the conational level of the impulses which can be said to be common to all members. The psychological factors involved in large-scale group action are extremely inchoate and obscure, "an impalpable congeries of hopes and fears," which certainly has not the character of voluntary decision. As has been

well said, what is general in common action is not will, and what is will is not general. To what extent integrated action on the level of will occurs in large groups, cannot of course be settled by general argument, but is a matter for particular investigation in each case.

(ix) *Social Purpose*. If society is a network of persons or wills, and is not possessed of the kind of unity which we ascribe to an individual self, the question arises whether we can regard purpose as applicable to social wholes. This has been doubted by some idealist philosophers, and by some Marxians. In history, says Engels, "only seldom does that occur which is willed. In most cases the numerous ends which are willed conflict with, or cut across one another, or they are doomed from the very outset to be unattainable, or the means to carry them out are insufficient. And so, out of the conflict of innumerable individual wills and acts there arises in the world a situation which is quite analogous to that in the unconscious natural world. The ends of actions are willed, but the results which really flow from those actions are not willed, or, so far as the results seem to agree with the willed ends, ultimately they turn out to be quite other than the desired consequences. Historical events thus appear to be ruled by chance, but wherever on

the surface chance seems to dominate, it is always itself dominated by hidden inner laws, which only remain to be discovered." From a different point of view, a somewhat similar argument is put forward by Bosanquet in a striking passage : " It is not finite consciousness that has planned the great phases of civilization, which are achieved by the linking together of the achievements of finite consciousnesses. Each separable intelligence reaches but a very little way, and relatively to the whole of a movement must count as unconscious. You may say there is intelligence in every step of the connection ; but you cannot claim as a design of finite intelligence what never presented itself in that character to any single mind. The leader of a Greek colony to Ionia in the eighth or ninth century B.C. was certainly paving the way for Christianity, but his relation to it, though much more in degree was not essentially different in kind from that of a coral insect to a coral reef. Christianity and the coral reef alike were never any design of men or insects ; they lay deeper in the roots of things. . . . Nothing is properly due to mind which never was a plan before a mind " (*The Meaning of Teleology*, p. 11).

These arguments though impressive are not convincing. To begin with we must

distinguish different levels of conation. In the individual, too, there are all degrees of clarity and articulateness in the purposes by which he is guided ; ranging from a vague disturbance of equilibrium seeking relief, to a deliberate and conscious adjustment of means to ends clearly apprehended. In the case of the individual, too, the results arrived at are often quite different from those which he foresaw or desired at the outset. This may be due partly to the fact that his will may change with changing circumstances, or better knowledge of the available means, or to occurrences over which he has no control, or to actual growth and transformation of his character. Moreover, a man's character is deeper than his consciously formulated aims, and he may in fact select from the alternatives which present themselves, in accordance with his character, though quite unable to formulate any definite principles of his conduct. In social movements we are concerned with vast and complicated interactions which are to a great extent unconscious and not apprehended in their fullness by any one mind. Here, too, there are varying degrees of clarity in the apprehension of ends. For the most part, as we have seen, large-scale movements do not reach the stage of will proper ; perhaps they do not go beyond the stage of trial and error. Yet they may well

be the expression of an underlying communal character, that is, of latent tendencies widely dominant in the community stimulated to action by changing conditions. Such communal character, especially when the term is applied to such entities as modern nations, is, however, nothing fixed or permanent. On the contrary, it is constantly re-formed by the action and interaction of innumerable forces in contact with a varying environment. We can easily exaggerate both its unity and continuity, since nations are made up of many and conflicting groups, and processes of selection are at work which give now this now that portion of it predominance. Nevertheless, human passions and motives are constantly at work, and could we but disentangle the forces involved, we should see in historical movements everywhere individuals setting up complex webs of relationships, and in turn, borne along by them. That human needs are a driving force in history is held both by idealist philosophers and the Marxians. "Nothing," says Hegel, "has been accomplished without interest on the part of the actors . . . nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion"; though he thinks that the vast congeries of interests and activities on the stage of world history are but the means and instruments of a higher purpose of which they know nothing.

Similarly Engels insists that "nothing occurs without conscious intent or willed end." Purposes then operate, though they may not be in themselves sufficient to bring about changes. But are they social purposes? Hegel's answer is not helpful, for a purpose of which nobody knows anything is not a purpose. Engels' point, I suppose, is that the laws governing the interactions of human purposes are not psychological laws. But though forces other than psychological are involved, nothing that has been said disproves the reality and importance in historical movements of finite human purposes and needs. To argue with Bosanquet that nothing is properly due to mind which was never a plan before *a* mind, is not enough to dispose of social purpose. A large movement like Christianity was, no doubt, never as a whole present to any one mind. Yet Christianity is not a mysterious unity, independent of the individuals who in interaction make it what it is. It has in fact all the characteristics of its hybrid origin in Hebrew and Greek thought, in combination with numerous strains which do not fuse into harmonious unity. The purposes, then, are always in individual minds, but minds are interrelated and the interrelation itself may become an object of conscious endeavour. At that point we may properly speak of an integrated social

will and a social purpose. To what extent this theoretical possibility has been or can be realized in fact, is a fundamental problem of sociology and the philosophy of history.

V

THE GROWTH OF SOCIETIES

FROM this brief discussion of the conditions of social life I turn to some of the basic forms of social grouping. A full treatment would involve a systematic analysis of all the types of relationship distinguished in Chapter II. Here I can only deal with the general principles of social organization, and from this point of view it is convenient to begin with the organized community. We have defined a community as a collection of human beings occupying a given territory, and held together by a system of common rules, and it will be remembered that communities in this sense need not necessarily possess differentiated organs of government. Whether primitive man lived in communities, we cannot tell: but most of the peoples whom we can actually study live in groups which, though possibly small in numbers, include more than one 'natural' family (meaning by natural, a group consisting of parents and children alone). The simplest known peoples, those who live by hunting

and gathering, consist of small groups (twenty-four to eighty persons) of closely related individuals, in contact with other similar groups with whom they intermarry. It is in some such circle of intermarrying families that the origin of the political community is to be found, and not, as is so often thought, in the family in the narrow sense. Anthropology reveals to us no communities consisting of single families, living in continuous isolation ; and the family sentiments, though based on sex and parentage, include other social interests, more particularly those connected with defence and subsistence, which point outwards beyond the narrow family. Among the simpler peoples, the conditions of food supply are clearly among the most important factors determining the size of the community ; and we find in this respect a steady increase as we move from the peoples who subsist on what nature gives them, whether by hunting or gathering, to those who practise cattle-rearing or agriculture (cf. Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, Vol. II, pp. 198 *seq.*).

The rules regulating sexual relations, which we find in all societies, exercise an important influence on the structure of the simple communities. These rules vary greatly in detail, but in general their effect is to forbid members of a particular group

to marry any other member of it. A man has to find his partner in another group or section ; and this unquestionably checks any tendency there may have been towards the isolation of families. Since the kin-group often coincides with the local horde, rules which prohibit marriage within a particular kin-group, the rules of exogamy as they are called, must have the effect of linking local hordes by the ties of intermarriage, and so of eventually widening the social structure. On the other hand, the rules of endogamy, which prohibit marriage with members of other groups, must tend, among primitive as among more advanced peoples, to group exclusiveness, and must act as a separating influence in human societies. It is hardly too much to say, with Hobhouse, that "early communities are founded on exogamy, and separated from one another by endogamy" (*Social Development*, p. 19).

The origin and significance of the rules of exogamy have given rise to much controversy, but here only the most important recent theories can be mentioned. Hobhouse has suggested that they are extensions of an in-born horror of incestuous relations, and that ultimately this feeling is due to a clash or collision between two distinct sentiments, the parental and the sexual. This clash results in an emotional stress which we describe as

a repulsion. On this repugnance between the parental and the sexual, religious ideas and social arrangements work, and they extend it to all groupings classed with the parental; with the result, that the rules of exogamy vary in accordance with the different modes of kinship that we find among primitive peoples (*Morals in Evolution*, p. 146).

Professor Malinowski and Mrs. Seligman have also stressed this incompatibility between the sexual and the parental sentiments, and have argued further, that if early man had not come to have rules defining their spheres, the family could not have maintained itself as a unit, and an essential element in the maintenance of cultural tradition would have been lost. The sexual feelings and sex behaviour, according to them, are incompatible with the sentiment of respect upon which authority rests, and both sets of sentiments could not be entertained by children toward their parents without disaster to the whole structure of the family. Professor Westermarck holds that the prohibitions are based upon the absence, as he alleges, of erotic feelings between persons living closely together from childhood, and the tendency for such sexual indifference to be accompanied by a feeling of aversion when the act is thought of. The rules embody the

sentiments thus widely felt and impose punishment on those who act in their defiance. The biological function of these sentiments, Westermarck takes to be the prevention of excessive inbreeding, and the injurious consequences, which, according to him, would result from such inbreeding.¹

No detailed examination of these explanations can here be attempted, but the following points may be noted. First, there is at present no agreement among biologists that inbreeding is, as such, injurious, irrespective of the quality of the stocks which intermarry. It is probable that on the whole outbreeding is biologically preferable, but whether the advantages are great enough to have led to the predominance of those peoples who married outside their immediate group, as against those who married within it, is, in the present state of our knowledge, difficult to say. Second, it may be taken as agreed that the rules of exogamy are extensions of the rules which forbid marriage with near kin, and that the same explanation, whatever it may be, will apply to rules relating to remote as to near relationships. Third, with regard to the psychological origins of the rules we are up against the difficulty that we

¹ For Freud's explanation of exogamy, the reader is referred to his *Totem and Taboo* and to J. C. Flugel's *The Family from a Psychoanalytic Point of View*.

always encounter when we try to penetrate to the really primitive elements in human nature. The aversion which is widely felt towards incest and its extensions may be the result of the rules prohibiting such relations instead of the rules being derived from the aversion. There can be no doubt that, in the case of other taboos, such as those pertaining to certain foods, the aversion may appear very deep-seated though it is in fact produced by the prohibition. Similarly, the notion that authority and sexual ties are incompatible may be the product of family sentiments, themselves socially and historically conditioned, and no such incompatibility might exist in forms of social life not based on the family as we know it. In short, in all these explanations we run the risk of moving in a circle, that is, of referring actual institutions to underlying conditions, or in-born elements in human nature, of whose existence we have no independent evidence, and which are in fact inferred from the very institutions to be explained. Without pursuing these considerations any further we may, however, grant that the rules prohibiting marriage with near relations have, whatever their origin may have been, in fact fulfilled the important social function of binding groups together, and so, of widening the effective social unit. It may be added

that, in the more advanced societies, the rules against marriage with near kin serve the additional function of liberating the individual from his absorbing dependence on his family, a dependence which would be still more intense if the tendencies to incest were encouraged or permitted expression.

In the lowest stages, then, the effective community consists of these small groups of intermarrying kindreds, held together by the ties of kinship and neighbourhood, strengthened by magico-religious ideas. They have very little organization. There is no differentiation of rank, and little inequality between the sexes. The eldest male has some authority, but his power is undefined, and depends on what he personally can make of it. There is contact between such groups speaking a similar dialect, and they may co-operate for purposes of common defence or religious ceremonial. Within the larger group, which may be called a tribe, there is, as a rule, no government, even of the loose kind which is found within the primary group; but there are recognized rights and duties, clearly laid down by custom. Among these peoples land is generally held in common, in the sense that all may hunt in a given area which the group as a whole will defend as against outsiders. There is private property in such things

as weapons, tools, huts. The family is in practice, though not by rigid rule, monogamous. Marriage is stable after the birth of children and sometimes (as among the Veddas) indissoluble. On the whole, the picture that they present is that of a society with the barest minimum of organization, accumulation, or differentiation, of which the members live, on the whole, on terms of friendly reciprocity.

In the further evolution of the political fabric we can trace two principles at work which we may call the principle of domination and the principle of community. The former includes all varieties of subjection, that is to say, the use of individuals as means to ends, not of their own choosing. The latter includes all forms of co-operation in which the contributing individuals are ends and means to each other. The different forms of communal organization as they appear in history are the result, if we may put it metaphorically, of a struggle between these two principles, complicated by a continuous expansion of the scale and intensity of organization. The simple communities just referred to exemplify the principle of community or reciprocity on a small scale. As we move from them to economically more differentiated communities, we find larger aggregations and new forms of social structure

subsisting side by side with the forms based on kinship and neighbourliness. For the simpler societies there appears to be a close correlation between the consolidation of government and the extension of the area of organized society and advance in the economic scale. As we move from the hunters to the pastorals and agriculturals, we find more cases of organized government, both within the small primary group, and the larger tribal groups; and occasionally, even in the primitive world, we find organizations on a scale comparable with that found under civilization (see *Simpler Peoples*, Ch. I).

The simple rules of reciprocity which seem not inadequate in conditions offering little opportunity for ambition or energy are put severely to the test in these more differentiated communities. To begin with, we find war taking increasingly more organized shape by the side, or in place of, the more primitive feuds. While the view upheld by many recent writers that primitive man lived in a state of peace is not borne out by a careful study of the facts, there is evidence of a steady increase of warfare with the advance of industry and of social organization in general. With the growth of war, society comes to be based increasingly on the principle of domination and subordination.

Military organization brings with it, or intensifies, gradations of rank and authority, both among the conquerors and the conquered, and numerous forms of subjection, whether of individuals or groups, appear. Here again we find close correlation with economic evolution. As we move from the hunters to the pastorals and the agriculturals we find the earlier rudimentary equality giving place to differences of rank; though to what extent this differentiation is due to war, as such, and to what extent to the accumulation of wealth made possible by the extension of industry, it is difficult to say.

We must now ask whether, and how far, force is a distinctive principle of social union. An initial difficulty in answering this question arises from the vagueness of the term force in this context. If it is to include all forms of pressure, whereby the will of some individuals or groups is imposed upon other individuals or groups, it is clear that no community has ever existed without some element of force. Even the simplest communities of which we have spoken, though on the whole based on ties of kinship and reciprocity, depend for the maintenance of order, to some extent at any rate, upon the fear of feuds or reprisals, and, in this respect, differences in strength between kindreds

must count. On the other hand, among the most advanced forms of the civic state the public authority has vast powers of coercion at its disposal, and though such powers are said to rest upon the will of the people, there always remains a great deal of unwilling subordination, indifference or mere acquiescence. But if it is true that all organized communal life involves force, it is equally true that, in social affairs, force rests on organization, and some measure of voluntary union. No individual can hold down large masses of men unless he can secure a certain amount of willing response, and no governing class can impose its will upon others without developing a common will among its own members, and without making some effort to transmute brute-force into authority, with a plausible title to respect, or, at least, acquiescence. In short, the problem of the rôle of force in social organization involves a balancing of intermixed elements difficult to disentangle.

The study of the part played by war in the expansion of communities illustrates this difficulty. That war has been an instrument of expansion is beyond doubt, but it is not at all clear whether permanent consolidation on a large scale has ever been achieved by conquest alone, in the absence of other factors, economic and social, making possible some measure of inward unification and cohesion.

As far as the simpler peoples are concerned, it is difficult to obtain from anthropologists any exact and comparable information of the size of different communities or of the methods whereby extension of scale has been achieved. It would seem that the defeat of rival populations has been a frequent method, but in outstanding cases, like the union achieved by Kamahamaha in the Hawaiian Islands in 1796, and in Africa by Chaka in the beginning of the nineteenth century, success was due, not only to military ability, but to far-sighted organization and some conception of a common polity (cf. Lowie, *The Origin of the State*, Ch. I). There are also a few instances among the primitive peoples of extensive organizations achieved by peaceful methods. To these belong, possibly, the case of the Iroquois League, and that of the Aruak Indians in Brazil, who appear to have developed large organizations by methods of peaceful and gradual infiltration. The large theocratic states of the ancient world were based essentially on conquest, but they tended to fall asunder, and periods of large empires were often followed by periods of small states, and unity was only regained, if at all, painfully and slowly. This later unification was achieved by alliances or dynastic inheritance, and also of course by war. In European history, the formation of

the large states has been correlated with economic and cultural development, and the precise contribution of the military factor obviously cannot be estimated. In general, force and authority are always held in check by certain incalculable factors. The masses of the governed are to some extent protected by the conflicts that arise between the different forms of power, between the monarchy and the nobility, between the church and the state, between the aristocracy of wealth and the aristocracy of birth, between the local and central authorities. Again, there are obvious limits to what can be achieved by merely superimposed authority, and often the older institutions retain their vitality while conquerors come and go. In this way, the patriarchal family, the joint family, and the self-governing village may remain vigorous centres of social life, in the midst of, and despite of, a superimposed rule. Nevertheless, it remains true that the tendency of despotic government is, on the whole, to depress the condition of the masses, and to mould, not only political life, but the whole social structure.

The principle of domination or authority is clearly discernible in the societies of the simpler peoples, as described by anthropologists, but it is widened and deepened in the ancient civilizations of the East, where

it is strongly fortified by religious sanctions. There emerge everywhere forms of the theocratic city state. The city god is the theoretical ruler, and the king his representative. All power has its source in the king, and there is no notion of self-government, or even of a share in government by a free people. As the monarchies expand, the cities do occasionally manage to obtain a measure of self-government, sometimes as in Assyria, assured by charters, relating to taxes and imposts. But such self-government is always limited and precarious. The king gives and the king takes away. Religion is here a powerful support of authority, though occasionally, as among the Hebrews, it may serve to limit kingly power; for Jahve is above all kings, who may be bitterly criticized in his name. In this way, permanent kingdoms of considerable size were formed. Occasionally, they expanded into empires of large dimensions but less cohesion and endurance, their history reflecting the age-long struggle between the forces making for centralization and the forces making for local independence. The principle of subordination cuts deep into the social structure, affecting not only the administration of justice, but the whole economic order, which now presents a series of gradations, from the noble and priest above, to the mass of the

people below. The forms taken by this principle are many, including (1) absolute monarchy, where the king rules without restraint, illustrated already in the tribal organizations of some Africans; (2) feudal monarchy, adapted to large areas, and involving a hierarchical governing class; (3) authoritarian empires, exhibiting various degrees of cohesion and local independence. To what extent it persists in what has been called the civic state is a question to which we shall return when something has been said of this form of political organization.

We have seen that the principle of reciprocity or mutuality is embodied on a small scale in the simple communities of the 'primitive' peoples. On a larger scale, and in more conscious form, it is seen in the city states of antiquity, and in modern times it emerges painfully out of the conflicts and struggles with the absolute monarchies which have in the meantime developed and welded tribes and peoples into nations. The modern state has tended to be a nation state, that is, to coincide in area with those groups who consider themselves or come to consider themselves one nation. Important experiments have also been made in what may perhaps be a distinctive form of the state, namely, federalism. Here there are considerable variations in the division of powers between

the constituent states and the federal authority. A survey of modern states suggests that the future of civilization depends upon its power to devise measures which would make it possible to combine the necessary amount of self-government with the equally necessary wider unions on a world scale.

It is worth noting, perhaps, that in the simpler societies forms of government are found which might be called democratic. Government by discussion is indeed fairly common, and as familiar as government by the 'strong man'; and often, where there is rule by chiefs, their power is neither formal nor decisive, but dependent upon personal qualities. In essentials, however, these communities differ from modern democracies. The real power lies in custom; and, though this is not as unalterable or rigid as the older anthropologists were accustomed to maintain, it is not open to change by deliberate legislation, and there is little scope for free criticism.

In estimating the rôle of consent in modern democratic governments, we come up against a difficulty which is the inverse of that discussed above, in relation to the part played by force and domination. The assertion that will and not force is the basis of the state, in so far as this is a statement of fact

and not of what is regarded as desirable, is founded on the theory that in modern communities there is a deep and comprehensive agreement underlying all the minor differences which divide portions of the nation. Such agreement, if it really exists, may, however, be largely due to the pervasive influence exerted on the character of the people by economic and political institutions, and these institutions in turn may reflect, not the character of the people taken as a whole, but that of a dominant group, which has succeeded in imposing its will upon the rest. It may also be argued that the methods of persuasion and suggestion, which are now available, are so subtle that they make possible an invasion and domination of individual personality on the part of those who control these methods, far more effective and thorough than that which can be obtained by brute-force. The problem thus remains, whether the movement from force to persuasion reflects more than a change of tactics adapted to large-scale organization, and whether in essentials the principle of domination is not still the ruling element in social relations.

Sociology is hardly in a position to answer these questions with any precision. We need, on the one hand, what Mill called an ethology, that is to say a science of the character of groups and peoples, including

especially social classes, and, on the other, an accurate analysis of the influences exerted by the different groups upon social and political institutions. Studies of this sort are only in their beginnings. Meanwhile, it will perhaps be conceded even by those who stress the element of domination in political affairs, that the change of tactics, spoken of above, from sheer compulsion to more subtle forms of persuasion implies that, on the whole in modern communities, there has been a growth or diffusion of intelligence and of the habits of self-determination, and a more widespread recognition that institutions are for men, and not men for institutions. Were this not so, the change in tactics would hardly have been necessary.

No classification of the forms of the state can here be attempted, but something must be said of the definitions which have been given of it, and its place in the scheme of social relations discussed in a previous chapter. The subject has been much obscured by a failure to distinguish between problems of sociology and of social philosophy. The state has frequently been defined not in terms of what it is, but in terms of what it ought to be. Thus, many idealist philosophers describe the state as the agency within a territorially demarcated area, whose function it is to harmonize and adjust all the interests and

purposes of social life. Such a description not only begs several questions of fact, since it is by no means clear that the state always acts as such a harmonizing agency, but is open to objection even from the point of view of what the state ought to be. For it might well be held that there are numerous social relations which ought not to come within the scope of state regulation. If this definition errs in being too inclusive, others fail in being too restrictive. Thus, the definition of the state as an association concerned with maintaining the universal external conditions of the social order would not fit theocracies, regulating, as they do, every detail of life and making no clear distinction between morals and law. From a sociological point of view, we must regard the state as a genus with many species, varying greatly in scope and function, and in its relations to other associations. As a minimum, we may say that the state exists in all communities in which the protection of the members and the enforcement of common rules are functions of a differentiated system of organs.¹ Communities in which rules are not enforced

¹ Compare the definition given by Hobhouse: "A state is a fabric in which the principal functions of government, the declaration of law, its execution, and the common defence, are differentiated and co-ordinated" (*Social Development*, p. 51).

by collective action, or in which the protection of individuals is left to the kindreds, or other groups, or perhaps even to chiefs possessed of no defined authority, are not states. The most generally recognized function of the state has been that of defence, internal and external. On the other hand, the use of the collective resources for the common well-being belongs to higher stages, and the part to be played by the state in actively promoting the common good is even now a matter of controversy. Leaving aside some of the simplest peoples, who have no differentiated governments at all, there would seem to be essential continuity of development in political organization, and the state must be regarded as a wellnigh universal institution. On the other hand, the assertion that the state is 'natural' is ambiguous, and misleading. Some form of society is an inherent need of human nature, but no particular form of state, for example, the modern nation-state, can be said to be natural, either in the sense of issuing immediately out of man's inborn impulses, or of expressing spontaneously his final end or *telos*. Here, as at so many other points in political theory, it is important not to confuse the state with society. The state is a species of society, namely, that described as an association. It is also a set of institutions, and in this sense

includes the whole organized fabric of law and government. In neither sense does it exhaust all human relations, and its functions, in the matter of controlling these relations, admit as we have seen of very wide variations.

The Forms of Social Control. We have defined the community as a group held together by a system of common rules, and we must now discuss their nature briefly. In advanced communities we can distinguish four species of social regulation, namely, moral precepts (intimately associated with the rules of religion but tending to become autonomous), legal rules, conventions and fashions. Historically, law, morals and conventions are species of the customary, but in their developed form they can be fairly clearly distinguished from each other. Moral rules, when they have achieved their distinctive form, prescribe certain acts because of their intrinsic goodness, or the intrinsic goodness of the ends which are attained through them; and forbid others because of their intrinsic evil, or the evil produced by them. The rules have their basis in respect for the good as such, and are independent of any external sanction. In practice, of course, moral rules frequently fail to correspond with this description, since they may be accepted merely on authority, and observed out of narrowly prudential

considerations. By law, in its developed form, is meant the body of social rules declared and enforced by a constituted authority. The precise definition of law has given rise to much controversy. There are numerous transitional cases in which the social authority is indefinitely localized, and others in which there may be authoritative announcement of the law, but no certainty of enforcement. Thus, among many primitive peoples, there are rules of conduct habitually followed, but no regular courts for their definition or public declaration. In other cases, there are courts for declaring and interpreting the law, but the enforcement may be left to the successful party. In international law to-day, there is machinery for the formal declaration of law, but its enforcement is uncertain; yet it must be regarded as true law.

The difficulty of defining law is not removed by restricting it to rules which are recognized, interpreted, and enforced by states, since there is equal vagueness about what constitutes a state. The problem in both cases is to fix the point at which there is sufficient differentiation of functions in the matter of maintaining order within a community to justify us in speaking of a state system or a legal system. The growth of states and the growth of law are, in fact, aspects of the same phenomenon, namely,

the establishment of a stable order. The notion of compulsion, it may be added, is very wide, and includes not only physical coercion, nullification of prohibited acts, and exclusion from the group, but a great variety of other forms of pressure wielded by public opinion. The pressure may be exerted by the society as a whole, or through its heads, or through some other institution. Whenever there are rules limiting the exercise of power over persons or things, going beyond casual or *ad hoc* interference, applied in a constant manner within a definable society, we have what are essentially legal rules, and, for purposes of comparative study, we must recognize considerable variations both in the definiteness of the authority whereby they are maintained, and in the sanctions used in their enforcement.

In a broad way, the explicitness of the sanction and the sort of compulsion employed serve to mark out usage, law and morals. In the case of morals, the sanction comes, at any rate in the higher stages of development, to be looked upon as essentially inward and dependent on the free assent of the agent. Conventions are generally upheld rather by opinion than by constituted authority. They are, moreover, limited in range to classes or groups within a community, though frequently they have a prestige value which

inspires emulation and imitation by members of other groups. They relate to modes of behaviour, considered important by particular groups, but hardly touching the fundamental and common needs of life as deeply as moral or legal rules. Fashions differ from other modes of prescribed behaviour in many ways, notably in permanency and range. Fashions are in their nature relatively transitory. They begin as innovations, and spread by imitation. As soon as a fashion is generally adopted it loses the distinction of novelty, and the prestige attaching to its innovators. Its duration depends therefore to a great extent on its rate of spread. In this respect, it differs fundamentally from other norms of behaviour, which gain additional influence and power of persistence from wide diffusion.

Custom has usually been interpreted in accordance with the psychological laws of habit. It has been regarded as a way of behaviour which has become general in the community, and has come by frequent repetition to be performed quasi-automatically. To this quasi-automatic character is ascribed the feeling of uneasiness which we experience when we ourselves or others act in defiance of custom. We find it difficult to break away from established habits, and changes meet with strong resistance. This resistance, it is to be noted, has different feeling tone

in different cases : an act contrary to custom may appear merely ridiculous, but it may also arouse resentment and active hostility. Thus, the pressure of social habits cannot be exhaustively explained in terms of the psychology of quasi-automatic responses, but involves feelings not usually present in ordinary habits. Custom, in fact, is not merely a prevailing habit, but also a rule or norm of action. The rule is supported on the emotional side by two sets of forces. There is, firstly, a sentiment or group of emotional dispositions attaching to custom as such, and condemning its breach. In this sentiment there is a rational element, the recognition, however vague, of the importance of order, and the necessity of knowing what to expect and what is expected in given situations. Round these there cluster the social feelings ; and the obedience of customary rules is one of the most elementary ways in which the individual responds to the call of social life and realizes his dependence upon the group. In addition to these feelings which attach to all custom *qua* custom, there are other feelings which are awakened by particular customs, sympathies, resentments, approvals and disapprovals which have become crystallized into rules, and are again roused when the rules are violated. The two sets of emotions are closely interwoven owing to

the fact that each particular rule has the support of the whole set or system of rules governing a society.

The primitive state of custom undergoes a process of differentiation strikingly similar in its main outlines in the different civilizations. Some of the injunctions of custom are taken over by personal morality, and given the intimate character of an individual or inward sanction. Other rules of life come to be formally declared and enforced by constituted authority, while others again are not regarded as affecting the elementary conditions of life, and, as we have seen, form conventions. In the history of civilization, there are enormous variations in the relations between these types of social control. Custom always survives as one source of law. It has, for example, always been a primary factor in English law, and is the foundation of some of the most fundamental principles of the Common Law. Existing custom is recognized as legally binding, and when called in question is still regarded as good law if proved to exist as a local variation of the ordinary law, and if not shown to contradict any essential legal principle. In other systems of law, too, custom is generally recognized as greatly influencing the development of legal institutions, and has even been regarded as the ultimate source of all law.

Nevertheless, in developed legal systems law is above custom, which can, though this does not often happen, be abrogated by the courts and declared to be no longer binding. One factor in the development of law is the extension of communal organization. This brings the ruling authorities into contact with different, possibly conflicting, customs, which have to be adapted, modified, or displaced to meet the larger common requirements. The relation of the ruling authority to communal custom differs in different stages of civilization. In authoritarian states law is not inaptly defined as the command of a superior, since in such states law is often imposed from without and does not arise out of the prevailing habits and needs of the people. It is true that no arbitrary power can long remain master without appealing to the goodwill of the subjects; but the response may be mere acquiescence or apathetic and even sullen resignation. In democratic communities law is in closer contact with the moral sense of the community, but even there the element of domination may survive in the influence exerted by powerful classes upon legislation and administration.

In general, the relation between law and moral ideas must be very different in communities where legal, moral and religious

rules are not yet clearly differentiated, from what they are in communities with advanced and highly articulate legal systems; different again, in civilizations of the theocratic kind, where religion, law and morals are still closely intertwined. It is one of the most important problems of the sociology of law to determine, on the one hand, to what extent changes in moral standards are reflected in the law, and on the other, to measure the influence of deliberate ethical thought upon legislation. It is pretty clear that, in the course of legal evolution, there has been an increase in the efficacy of conscious thought in moulding the law. In the lower societies changes are slow and unconscious. In the extended governments of the authoritarian phase, we find deliberate declaration of the law and strenuous efforts at generalization and systematization. In the self-governing communities of the civic phase the transition is made from mere declaration of the law to planned legislation. To what extent this conscious legislation is influenced by ethical thought is a problem which has not yet been sufficiently explored by students of comparative jurisprudence. It would seem that there is a sort of dialectical trend in the relations between law and morals, or, at least, that periods in which efforts are made to harmonize them alter-

nate with periods of indifference or the desire for independence. In the formative and undifferentiated stages of law, as we see it among primitive peoples and in some of the theocratic states, the sphere of law proper is restricted and social control finds fullest expression in religion and morals. In the next stage of legal development, the politically organized authority has vastly extended its power, and law is definitely distinguished from other species of social regulation. This is the stage of the strict letter of the law, with its insistence on precise rules and formalities. Here there is a tendency for law to harden and to become indifferent to moral influences, and on the theoretical side to the view that law is as such non-moral. Periods of this character have often passed into others in which the rigidity of the law is broken down, and fresh elements are introduced through contact with other legal systems or with moral ideas. In Rome, the influence of the Greek philosophers, in England the rise of the Court of Chancery and the growth of Equity, and in continental Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the influence of the conception of the law of nature illustrates this tendency. Professor Roscoe Pound goes so far as to say that "the legal right and legal duty of nineteenth-century law are but the natural

right and moral duty of philosophical jurisprudence of the two preceding centuries, taken over and given more definite content in the maturity of the law " (*Law and Morals*, p. 34). When such periods of assimilation and growth are over, the opposition tends to break out afresh, and there is often a lag between legal growth and moral development. The history of the conception of the law of nature illustrates these alternations very fully. This conception is probably exercising some influence now on international law, and, in general there has been in our time a revival of the attempt to think out the foundations of actual law in terms of the more fundamental concepts of justice and reasonableness. The solution of the problems which thus arise requires the intimate co-operation of sociology and the philosophy of law.

VI

SOCIAL CLASSES AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

SOCIAL classes may be described as portions of the community, or collections of individuals, standing to each other in the relation of equality, and marked off from other portions by accepted or sanctioned standards of inferiority and superiority. Within each class there is a fundamental equality which overrides minor differences and subgradations, but between them there is a gap which can only be bridged with difficulty. The relations of equality, superiority and inferiority can be looked at first objectively, that is, from the point of view of the external observer; and secondly, from the point of view of the psychological forces underlying them. To the outward observer class is primarily a matter of behaviour, speech, dress, education, and especially habits of social intercourse. People within the same class meet each other on equal terms, but when they are in contact with members of other classes we find them behaving in a way which implies deference or submission on the one hand, and self-

SOCIOLOGY

confidence and assertion on the other, while on the frontiers between classes we note behaviour especially calculated to maintain distance. Behind these habits of behaviour there lie more important matters. They express the values which societies attach to different modes of life, and they are the instruments whereby the privileges connected with the different modes of life are sustained and protected. Individuals belonging to particular social classes are expected to maintain certain standards of life, to have a particular kind of education and to choose their occupations within a limited range. Class thus operates as an instrument for keeping people 'in their place,' whether this be effected by legal privileges or by sanctions of an economic and social nature. The differences in behaviour are in a sense part of the machinery for maintaining social barriers, but in another they are the consequence of these barriers. Individuals acquire their habits of behaviour from the class within which they are born, and their behaviour helps maintain and perpetuate the distinctions between them.

Subjectively regarded, class differences rest upon the development of sentiments or groups of emotional dispositions. These are of three sorts. There is, first, a feeling of equality in relation to members of one's

own class, a feeling of being at ease with them, a consciousness that one's mode of behaviour will harmonize with the behaviour of the others. There is, secondly, a feeling of inferiority in relation to those above in the social hierarchy, and thirdly, a feeling of superiority to those below. Here belong especially the desire to keep up appearances, and the fear of losing caste which is characteristic of those whose position in a particular class is uncertain, and, on the other hand, the desire of upward movement or improvement in status, at least, for one's children, felt by those who are in the upper grades of their class. These sentiments of equality, inferiority and superiority are closely interwoven, owing to the number of gradations in the social hierarchy and the opportunities offered for mingled envy and condescension. The sentiments in question further permit of subtle forms of inversion and compensation, as can readily be seen in the exaggerated aggressiveness of the upstart and the arrogant and condescending humility of the upper classes when in contact with the lower.

The primary determinants of social stratification in modern communities are unquestionably economic. It is economic conditions which for the most part determine the sort of education an individual is likely to

receive, and consequently the range of occupations open to him. Occupation in turn is a fair index of a man's mode of life, and of his general social standing. Rich and poor, indeed, are not class categories, and in a sense they are relative to class. We judge a person poor if he cannot live up to the standard of his class, and rich if he can live above it. Yet income is significant, in so far as it determines choice of occupation; and groups of occupations may be marked out on the basis of the degree of independence, security of tenure, educational and social standing which they imply, which approximate closely to the line of class distinctions. The prestige attached to different kinds of work does not depend entirely on the income they yield, but also on the skill involved in them, the training and education they presuppose, their scarcity value, the amount of personal independence they bring with them, and no doubt numerous irrational factors which enter into people's valuations of the different types of work, and which appear to vary considerably in different societies and at different times. Social classes, in the sense here employed, are thus a resultant of numerous factors, especially education, mode of life generally, occupation and economic status. The question how far social classes are cohesive groups is more important for

political and economic reasons than for the definition of class as such. Classes are not actual but potential groups ; not in themselves associations, with specific functions, but they may form the material for associations, for example, political parties.

We may consider next the conditions which tend to make members of a class conscious of their membership. Of these I mention first the amount and ease of social mobility. Class consciousness consists in the realization of a similarity of attitude and behaviour with members of one's own class, and of a difference from members of other classes. It is easy to see that if movement up and down is easy and rapid, differences in mode of life must tend to disappear, or to lose in importance. On the other hand, if movement is impossible, as in caste societies, the attitude of members of different castes to each other will tend to become habitual and quasi-automatic. Finally, if movement is possible but not easy, the effect is to heighten a consciousness of the differences, especially on the frontiers between classes, since there will often be experienced the strong desire to rise, or the fear of sinking in the social hierarchy. A second condition of class consciousness is rivalry and conflict. The possession of common interests by members of a class is indeed first brought

into consciousness by the need of defence against the common enemy, imaginary or real, and, especially, by being pitted against a class already conscious of itself as such. It is at this point that classes tend to form themselves into definite cohesive groups, and to become associational in character. A third contributing factor is the growth of a common tradition, embodying common experiences and common standards of value. This factor also is naturally of greater importance in the self-conscious stage of the evolution of classes, when it may be of great assistance in the formation of a common policy for the future.

Varieties of Social Stratification. We have seen that social classes are constituted by a combination of several factors, the central element being the prestige which attaches to different modes of life. This central element seems to be present in all forms of social stratification, though it may be expressed in different ways and give rise to different modes of grading. On a broad survey we can distinguish types of social classes on a three-fold basis, namely, the rigidity of the grades, the kind of sanction by which distinctions are upheld, and the degree of cohesion and functional distinctness of the classes which thus arise. These are the criteria which appear to be implied in the

distinction usually drawn by sociologists between estates, castes and social classes in the narrower sense.

Estates (German 'Stände') are social strata whose position is defined by law or custom. They are found with variations almost everywhere in the continental Europe of the old régime, but also in the ancient world. The gradations are everywhere much the same. Above are the nobles, who are the rulers and defenders of the state, and the priests. Then the merchants, hand-workers and peasants, each with their duties and functions more or less clearly defined, and finally the varieties of the unfree. The higher classes hold numerous privileges, such as private jurisdiction, and immunities, such as freedom from taxation. Birth decides rank and position. Individuals do occasionally rise, for example, by ennoblement, and the church occasionally recruits its members from below. So, again, the unfree may be emancipated. But in the main each class is self-recruited, and movement depends on the goodwill of the higher ranks. In Europe the estate system arose, for the most part, gradually out of feudalism, and until the end of the eighteenth century retained many of its features, especially hierarchical subordination and dependence.

Caste, as we find it in modern India,

differs from the system of estates in certain important respects. A caste may be described as an endogamous group whose members follow by tradition a single occupation, or certain cognate occupations, and who are held together by definite social rules of behaviour, and by common ceremonial or ritual observances. The system is rigid, and the individual cannot raise himself out of the place in which he is born, though groups may occasionally rise or fall as a result of fissure or fusion. Castes differ from estates in their religious character, in their greater rigidity, and perhaps also in the fact that in the former, property differences are relatively unimportant. They are primarily functional or occupational groupings, intimately affected by differences in ritual or ceremonial, and they afford an outstanding example of the influence of irrational factors upon social valuations of occupations and modes of life.

Modern social classes differ from estates primarily in not being based on differences in legal status. There is, in theory, equality before the law. Occupations and other social functions are theoretically open to all men, and there are no legal restrictions upon the acquisition of property. Further, social classes have not the rigidity either of castes or of estates. There is a considerable

amount of movement up and down the social ladder, and there are so many intermediate strata between the classes that their precise limits are difficult to determine. We have seen above that modern social classes can best be approached from the point of view of manner of life, and, especially, their behaviour in relation to each other. Classes so arrived at are in broad correspondence with economic status, if this is judged not merely by amount and source of income, but also by the degree of security and personal independence, and the exercise of initiative and control. This seems to be the basis of the fundamental distinctions drawn between the working-class and the bourgeoisie. To the working-class belong all those who depend exclusively on the sale of their labour for their living, and whose income and mode of tenure is such as to make a change of status for themselves or their children difficult. In the main, this class consists of the general body of manual wage-earners, though it may include border-line cases (the so-called proletaroid) of people who are not strictly wage-earners and who work on their own account, but whose independence and security have so slight a foundation that they are always on the verge of joining the proletariat. The characteristics of this class are well marked. Its members get their living

by the sale of their labour for a wage, the amount of property they own is very small compared with that owned by other sections of the community and constitutes a relatively unimportant part of their total income, and they have as individuals little share, either in initiating or controlling economic policy.

The demarcation of the other economic classes presents greater difficulty. Between the mass of wage-earners on the one hand, and the small group of large property-owners on the other, there are numerous intermediate strata, whose boundaries are ill-defined. The term upper-class has not now any very clear connotation. It is used to denote all those who maintain a relatively high standard of life, largely on incomes from accumulated wealth, such as large land-owners and rentiers, big capitalists, higher officials and higher professional men. But it is difficult to fix the limits between this class and the middle classes, or *petite bourgeoisie*; and between these and the working-class again there are numerous marginal groups whose classification is doubtful. It is now usual to distinguish between the new and the old middle class. In the new are included small- and middle-scale entrepreneurs, small shareholders and rentiers, minor technicians, administrators and salaried officers

of various kinds, and the lower and middle levels of the professional classes. It is new in the sense that it consists, in the main, of people who have sprung up since the development of large-scale industry, and who are intimately linked with and dependent on it. The old middle class, with which the new is in process of fusion, includes the survivors of the older methods of production and trade, shopkeepers, small-scale producers and traders, and others of more recent growth, but using similar methods. The problem is whether this heterogeneous mass constitutes a single class.

The issue has been confused by political bias. Those who do not desire the disappearance of capitalism regard the middle class as a sort of buffer between the workers and the large capitalists with distinct and permanent functions of its own. Socialists, on the other hand, look upon the middle-class as essentially transitory. In both cases the wish is father to the thought. It has not yet been proved either that the middle classes have sufficient unity and identity of interest to make them into a distinctive group, or that their interests are so conflicting and divergent that they are bound to join forces with the working class, or to become subservient to the upper bourgeoisie.

SOCIOLOGY

The situation differs in different countries according to the degree of industrialism and the part played by agriculture, but nowhere do the middle classes possess a coherent policy in relation to the other groups. There is a certain amount of antagonism between the old middle class, whose position is threatened by the growth of large-scale methods of production and distribution, and the new middle-class to whom the newer developments provide ever fresh opportunities. Both new and old are divided within, in their attitude to the growing demand for the control of industry by the working classes; but though the middle classes are economically and politically divided, there is among them a certain approximation in social status, which, despite the presence of numerous gradations, marks them off from the working classes. No doubt there has been in recent times a certain tendency for contrasts in mode of life, in cultural and social amenities to diminish, but in the main society is still deeply stratified, and retains its hierarchical character. Movement from class to class is still difficult and the rise of individuals here and there leaves the mass who remain essentially unaffected, owing to the prestige of the upper grades and the tendency of those who rise to identify themselves with their new surroundings. Indeed, a

SOCIAL CLASSES

certain amount of movement from below is essential to the maintenance of the upper grades, and some authorities have even seen in this circumstance the real function of the middle classes in society. According to this view, these classes provide the machinery for social selection; for they gather within themselves the ablest, the most energetic or the most pushing of the working class, and in turn act as a reservoir of ability, from which the higher ranks are recruited. Whether this be their function or not, and it may be seriously questioned whether there is any such close correlation between social status and ability as this view seems to imply, barriers to movement remain and the higher ranks of society are still largely self-recruited.¹ The higher professions are still mostly closed to the children of the poor, and there is some evidence which suggests that there is a tendency for the leaders of big business to be derived increasingly from the well-to-do classes. This is the case even in America where a recent inquiry shows that, although the leaders of business do not constitute a strictly inbreeding class, the share contributed by the rich is increasing rapidly, and at the present rate of increase is likely to become the dominant

¹ For social mobility see my *Studies in Sociology*, Ch. IX, and D. V. Glass (ed.), *Social Mobility in Britain*.

SOCIOLOGY

element (cf. *American Business Leaders*, by Taussig and Joslyn).

It is difficult to obtain exact and comparable information regarding the proportions of the different social classes in the general population, but one or two estimates may be given by way of illustration. For England the Registrar-General distinguishes five grades, described as (I) Upper and Middle, (II) Intermediate, (III) Skilled workers, (IV) Intermediate and (V) Unskilled workers, and has given (1921) the following estimate of the proportions of the numbers for the classes per cent. of that for all occupied and retired males :

| All Classes | I | II | III | IV | V |
|-------------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 100 | 2.93 | 20.35 | 43.47 | 20.45 | 13.40 |

For Germany Dr. Geiger gives the following figures, using a different classification :

| Capitalists | Old Middle Class | New Middle Class | Proletaroid | Proletariat |
|-------------|------------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|
| 0.84 | 18.33 | 16.04 | 13.76 | 51.03 |

Sources of Class Differentiation. Various theories have been put forward regarding the origin of social stratification. Social classes have been traced to military conquest, to differences in wealth, and to functional differentiation or division of labour. All these factors appear to have played some part in class differentiation, but they have varying importance in different ages, and among different peoples. Among the simpler peoples there are numerous instances of hereditary rank due to war, as in Africa, but we also find cases in which nobility is a matter of wealth, as among some of the North American Indians (see Lowie, *The Origin of the State*, p. 39). The system of estates in continental Europe arose in various ways. Firstly, by a transformation of feudalism, connected especially with the rise of the towns; secondly, as a result of conquest, as in the case of Hungary, where the nobles and merchants were a foreign element; and thirdly, by a process of inner differentiation out of simpler class relations, not directly connected with war, as in Sweden (see Fahlbeck, *Die Klassen und die Gesellschaft*, Ch. VII). The effect of war, as Spencer noted, was often, not so much to initiate class distinctions as to render them more complex. When a group already possessing class divisions conquers another, there results a superposition of ranks and a

multiplication of divisions within the larger society founded by their fusion. In dealing with modern social classes, the economic factor becomes of primary importance. As we have seen, there is a broad correspondence between social and economic status, if under the latter is included not merely amount and source of income but also personal independence, security of tenure, the habit of directing or of being directed; and changes in industrial relations are reflected sooner or later in changes of social valuation and prestige.

Individual Differences and Social Classes. Already Spencer noted on the basis of ethnographic data that there were differences in physique between different social classes: that nobles and chiefs were, for instance, often superior in height and general physique to the peasantry. He thought, however, that these differences were due to varying conditions of life, though once established they tended to perpetuate distinctions and even to develop them further. He added that this applied not only to physical but also to mental traits. The daily exercise of power by the one class, and the daily submission to power by the other, generates, on the one side, an inherited fitness for command, and on the other side, an inherited fitness for obedience, and in time leads to the belief

that the established relations between the classes are the 'natural' ones. Spencer's view, it will be noticed, assumes the inheritance of acquired characters, a view not now widely held by biologists. Since he wrote a vast amount of data has been accumulated, both in Europe and in America, showing variations in physical characters, in the incidence of disease, and in mortality rates between different social groups; and recently the technique of mental tests has been used to ascertain whether there are differences in intelligence between occupational groups. Another method has been to estimate the contributions made by different social classes to leadership in the world of science, art and business. The evidence is extremely difficult to evaluate and it can not here be discussed in detail (cf. "The Claims of Eugenics," Ch. XVII of my *Essays in Sociology & Social Philosophy*, Vol. I), but the following points may be noted:

(a) The difficulty in all these inquiries is to disentangle the genetic from the environmental factors, and the technique which has so far been used appears to be too crude as yet for any but the most superficial analysis. In regard to intelligence tests, for example, competent authorities are now generally agreed that while the tests may succeed in measuring differences in inborn

capacity between children derived from very similar environments, there is need of caution in drawing conclusions as to genetic variations between children brought up under widely different social conditions. The differences in intelligence between different occupational groups are, in any event, small compared with the individual differences within each group ; and, when it is remembered that the intelligence quotients of children can, according to the recent evidence, be affected by a change in environment at an early age, the differences between children of different social grades, which have so far been observed, appear too slight to be taken as reliable evidence of inborn variations.

(b) In the light of the available evidence there is no reason to doubt the reality of individual differences in capacity, or to deny that such differences have a genetic basis. The problem is how far they are correlated with economic or social status. In the main, wealth and social position are still determined, not by physical but by social heredity. The superior advantages of inherited wealth must conceal or counterbalance a great deal of native inferiority in the more prosperous classes, while, on the other hand, much ability in the lower classes gets no chance to express itself owing to lack of stimulus and

opportunity. In the case of the well-to-do failure to qualify for a particular profession, for example, does not carry with it a change of social status but merely a transfer to some other occupation within the same social class. Social class, indeed, still largely determines occupation, rather than occupation class. The higher professions are still largely closed to the children of the poor, and such opportunities as are given to them to compete in this field can only affect relatively few individuals. Much has been made of the fact that a large proportion of men of distinction in different spheres of life is found to be derived from the better-off social strata; but this is surely what is to be expected in conditions of restricted social mobility, and very unequal initial opportunities for cultural development. Individual differences must count, no doubt, particularly within each social group, but they can only be of minor significance in determining the major divisions within a society; and they cannot in any event correspond with the forms of grouping in modern societies or justify the gross inequalities which are still characteristic of them.

(c) This general conclusion is confirmed when we consider the varieties in social structure and social stratification that are

found in different communities, and the changes which have occurred in this respect within the same communities. We have no reason to suppose that the transition from slavery to serfdom, from estates to social classes, or the profound modification in class relations now occurring in all industrialized and urbanized societies, is in any way definitely correlated with changes in the quality of the stock or in the proportions in which the factors determining various types of ability and character occur in the population. On the contrary, there is good reason for the view that the genetic constitution of the stock is highly stable, and not seriously affected by changes in social structure; while, on the other hand, changes in social structure frequently bring out talents hitherto unsuspected or dormant. Thus, for example, in the north of France, according to Michels, most industrial leaders before 1836 were of working-class origin, while soon after that date the possibility of rising was cut off. In England, many factory owners and inventors in the early phases of the industrial revolution came from the lower classes, but in the middle of the century the movement upwards tended to become more and more restricted. A similar statement applies to Germany. In America, as the study previously referred to shows, the self-made

man is becoming rarer and the leaders of business are derived to an increasing extent from the richer classes. Such changes in the operation of the social ladder are, in all probability, connected much more with changes in economic structure and conditions than with changes in the available inborn ability. Here as elsewhere the social factor is more fundamental than the racial or genetic factor. Similar remarks apply to the very considerable variations that we find at present in the numerical proportions of the different social classes, and especially of the middle classes in different countries. They cannot correspond in any way with the distribution of grades of ability in the different populations.

We may now sum up briefly the general trends of social differentiation revealed by comparative study. In the simpler communities we find no differences of status apart from the distinction between members of the groups and strangers, and the distinctions based on age, sex or marriage divisions. But even in the primitive world this rudimentary equality gives place to differences of rank, as the scale of organization extends. Hereditary chieftainships are established and around them there gathers a hereditary nobility, especially when communities have been formed by conquest. At the other end

of the scale, we find slaves and serfs brought into being by conquest, the slave-trade, self-commendation and birth. This differentiation, as we have already noted, is closely correlated with economic advance. If the primitive communities are classified into various economic grades, it can be shown that, as we move from the hunters to the more developed pastorals and agriculturals, the proportion in each grade of peoples with distinct classes of nobles, slaves and serfs, rises steadily (see *The Simpler Peoples*, p. 237).

The process of differentiation is intensified in the earlier civilizations and in the middle periods of the newer civilizations. The distinctions have deepened and broadened and in various forms we meet with the system of estates, with its legally defined grades. In the modern period estates pass into social classes. The transition is connected with the political struggles between the monarchy and the nobility and especially with the rise of industry in the towns, which is seriously handicapped by legal restrictions and hereditary monopolies and privileges. The diffusion of knowledge among wider classes plays an important part in breaking down the monopoly of the church, and gradually gives rise to new groups of the lay learned. The political and economic struggles result

everywhere in modern communities in the establishment of legal equality, and, on the whole, in a wider diffusion of the elementary conditions of well-being among the masses. But though hereditary ranks are abolished distinctions of status remain, upheld by economic forces, and owing to restrictions upon social mobility, and especially the institution of inheritance and bequest, they retain much of the hereditary principle. Society is still hierarchical in structure and there are great disparities in economic power and in cultural opportunities. The disparities which exist, moreover, are far greater than would appear to be necessary in the interests of efficient division of labour and specialization of function; and, themselves the result of a struggle between contending forces, they continually and increasingly furnish the material for further struggle.

Economic Organization. From social stratification we pass to a brief consideration of the economic structure of society. The subject is vast and complex, and only a few points of importance can here be dealt with. Attention will be confined to the principal forms of the institution of property, its psychological basis and its function in the life of the community.

Property may be described as the set of rights and obligations which define the rela-

tions between individuals or groups in respect of their control over material things (or persons treated as things). The essential point in the notion of property is that there is a recognized right of control over things vested in a particular person or persons, and within various limits, excluding interference by others. By saying that there is a recognized right, we mean that there are regular sanctions attached to it, that is, approved methods of dealing with infringements. The amount and nature of the control with which owners are endowed varies considerably in different legal systems, and there is not always precise correspondence between legal theory and economic usage. These variations do not lend themselves to ready classification. Here, we shall take as a basis the nature of the body in whom the control is vested. The following forms may be distinguished, though it must be remembered that the terms used are borrowed from advanced societies, and it is hardly to be supposed that they will carry the same implications when applied to societies differing widely in cultural level.

Broadly, we may distinguish common, collective and individual property. Common property is that over which several individuals have rights, but which, taken together, they hold collectively as against the rest of the

world. This would include cases where all the individual members of the group have access to the object, and others more important, where the individuals have a right of sharing defined by customary rules of distribution and supervised by the community. Of collective property, there are numerous forms, according as the collective entity is (a) a private corporation, (b) a quasi-public corporation, and (c) a public corporation. Finally, in individual or private property, the control is vested in an individual, though subject, of course, to varying limitations imposed by law or custom, for example, in respect of alienation or bequest. This scheme is not free from ambiguity owing to the difficulty of drawing clear lines of demarcation between public and individual control, but it has some utility for purposes of a broad survey.

Among primitive peoples, private property is recognized in such things as clothing, implements, and generally in huts or special divisions in a combined hut, though this is qualified by customs of sharing and a more or less obligatory exchange of gifts. With regard to land there are great variations. Among the hunters, the fundamental social unit is the group of kindred in loose relations with other groups with whom they form a tribe. Generally, land is common to the group or tribe

or both, that is to say, the members occupy or wander over a defined area, which they will defend as against outsiders. Sometimes, however, there is group exclusiveness even within the tribe. Food is obtained co-operatively, and is shared by custom though not always in equal portions. In a few instances, there is evidence of private property in land, even among the hunting peoples (e.g. the Veddas and some Australian tribes), but on balance, the communal principle prevails in the sense that there is common use and enjoyment by the group.

Among the agricultural peoples, we find considerable differences in the matter of land ownership. Thus the land may be owned by the tribe, or by a section within it, such as a clan, local group, or village. There is also tenure by families or individuals, though in many cases it is difficult to say whether the land belongs to an individual out and out, or whether it is merely held by him as steward for the family as a whole. Or different kinds of tenure may be combined. The community may retain 'eminent' right over the land, but families or individuals have 'occupational rights' over chosen pieces of land which they retain so long as they cultivate it. In other cases, some land is individually owned, while other portions are retained by the tribe for common or sacral purposes. Again,

with more settled agriculture, individual or family occupational rights may harden into permanent ownership, but the waste and perhaps the pastures may remain common. Another principle is seen at work in the many cases in which land belongs to chiefs or nobles. What this ownership implies differs from case to case. It may mean merely that the chiefs act as administrators, exercising the residual rights of the community, or it may involve the reduction of the mass of the community to various forms of servility and dependence. A comparative study of the data provided by the anthropologists (cf. *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*, Ch. IV, Sec. IV) shows that, on the whole, common ownership, whether by the tribe, clan or local group, predominated among the hunters, the early agriculturals and the pastorals. In the higher stages of agriculture the communal principle diminishes heavily. It does not, however, lose to the purely individual or 'several' form of property. The gainers are the chiefs and the nobles, and we find more and more cases in which the mass of the people become dependent cultivators: slaves, serfs, or tenants of a landed class. Private ownership tends to increase in the higher agricultural stages, but partly in association with the communal principle,

SOCIOLOGY

partly qualified by dependence on the chief or even by something like feudal tenure. The principle of private property is seen more clearly at work among the pastoral peoples where communal restrictions are probably less effective and the chances for individual accumulation of property greater. At the stage in which 'barbarism' is beginning to pass into 'civilization,' the different principles are found interwoven, and the signorial and the communal principles are still fairly balanced. Thereafter the tendency is for the preponderance of power to pass to the nobles, leaving the commoners in an increasingly dependent position.

The further development of the various forms of property and economic organization under the various civilizations is a matter which obviously does not lend itself to summary statement. Reference must be made to the works of economic historians for a study of the varieties of feudal tenure, and for an account of the breakdown of feudalism, and the rise of industry and widespread commerce, and the enormous differentiation of occupations and classes which is characteristic of modern economic systems. But something must be said of the distinctive marks of what is described as the 'capitalist system.' It is now widely recognized that

SOCIAL CLASSES

capitalism has denoted different things at different periods of history, and that, like the whole set of property-institutions, it changes in nature in accordance with historical conditions. Bearing this in mind, we may cite a few definitions of modern capitalism. Sidney Webb says it is "that particular stage in the development of industry and legal institutions, in which the bulk of the workers find themselves divorced from the ownership of the instruments of production, in such a way as to pass into the position of wage-earners whose subsistence, security and personal freedom seem dependent on a relatively small proportion of the nation ; namely, those who own, and through their ownership, control the organization of the land, the machinery and labour force of the community, and do so with the object of making for themselves individual and private gains." Hobhouse defines it as "the employment in the production of goods for sale of those who have not the means of production by some who have or can command this means" (*Social Development*, p. 290). Mr. J. A. Hobson thinks "it is the organization of business on a large scale by an employer or company of employers possessing an accumulated stock of wealth wherewith to acquire raw materials and tools and hire labour, so as to produce an increased

quantity of wealth which shall constitute profit." These definitions are, I think, fairly typical of the vast number that have been proposed. They do not quite accord. Hobson and Webb stress the motive of individual gain, but this might be objected to on the ground that it imparts a subjective test difficult to verify. Neither Hobhouse nor Webb bring out the importance of the scale of operations in the growth of capitalism. This largeness of scale would seem, however, according to most authorities, to be central in the notion of industrial capitalism, and with it is connected the fact that in capitalist enterprise the majority of the workers cannot attain independence.

Sociologically the importance of capitalism lies in the relations between those who control the means of production and the mass of the people who have not this control. In this respect there have been significant changes in recent times from the early forms of relatively free, competitive and individualistic capitalism, on the one hand, to combinations of various kinds, and, on the other, to an extension of communal control by legislative and administrative regulation, tending to mitigate gross inequalities in wealth and power. There has also been an extension of the collective types of property in the forms of the

co-operative systems and of public, chiefly municipal, ownership ; an increase in the public control of quasi-public bodies ; and perhaps also a trend to the public ownership of ' natural monopolies.' The problem of the further development of social control belongs to the bitterest controversies of to-day. The rival solutions which are emerging from the conflict may be briefly mentioned. In the first place, there are the various forms of state-controlled and state-planned capitalism, with a strongly nationalistic bias, which, though they may describe themselves as socialist, are designed to retain the system of private property in the means of production. There is, secondly, revolutionary communism, which in effect involves the seizure of power by a compact self-conscious minority, claiming to interpret the will of the working classes but, like the first group, acting autocratically. Thirdly, there is democratic socialism, which believes in the conscious co-operation between classes and nations as a method of obtaining at once economic equality within the state, and solidarity between states. Prediction is not our business here, but it seems reasonably safe to assert that the survival of modern democracies depends largely on whether means will be found for reconciling economic equality with high productivity.

In concluding this section, we may refer to some attempts which have been made to indicate the principal trends in the evolution of property. Vinogradoff appears to distinguish four principal phases: first, the formation of property in tribal and communal surroundings; second, the application to landed property of the notion of tenure; third, the growth of individual appropriation; and fourth, the restrictions which are being imposed upon such appropriation by collectivistic tendencies in modern times. Sombart detects in the history of European economy a regular alternation between democracy and aristocracy. He illustrates this rhythm by the transition from the (1) economic democracy of the primitive European economy to the aristocracy of the nomad shepherds; (2) from the village system to the manorial system; (3) from the economic democracy of the handicrafts to the economic aristocracy of capitalism. He suggests that this, in turn, is to be followed by a democratic form, as is indicated by the growing influence of the trade unions, the progress of co-operative societies, and the new conceptions of public administration and restrictive legislation. The Marxians distinguish three principal phases: the classless and undifferentiated society, passing into the various forms of class differentiation and

eventually returning to the classless society. Hobhouse, in his review of social development, notes three stages. In the first, there is very little economic differentiation, the means of production being accessible to all. This passes into a differentiated system of rich and poor, based on the principle of subordination. This is characterized by a vast extension of scale, and though it comes to be theoretically based on free contract, the conditions are so unequal that subordination remains. In the third phase, we may detect principles at work which, if they reach fruition, will result in a combination of high industrial organization with the demands of social freedom and mutuality of service. These generalizations are all of interest to the sociologist, as enabling him to seize upon certain salient features in a vast and complicated movement, and, despite differences in general outlook and method, they have a surprising amount in common. Yet they remain at best what we have called 'middle principles,' and their predictive value is slight, until we know a great deal more than we do of the underlying forces at work in economic and social development.

Psychological and Social Aspects of Property.
Whether man possesses an instinctive tendency to acquire and possess is still a matter

of dispute among psychologists (cf. Beaglehole, *Property: A Study in Social Psychology*); but in any event, the interest in ownership is very complex and has its roots in several fundamental needs. Things come to have 'value,' either because they satisfy needs directly, or through a process of 'conditioning' or assimilation. It is well known that objects originally indifferent may come to be charged or infected with interest, by being linked with a train of events culminating in satisfaction. In this way, habits of attachment may be formed in relation to objects which may have no intrinsic or *prima facie* attractiveness. In a great many cases, our interest in property consists just of such habits of attachment; in others, complicated sentiments are involved. Objects connected directly or indirectly with the satisfaction of important needs gather around them groups of emotional dispositions, including especially the prospective and retrospective emotions of desire, hope, fear, anxiety, disappointment, as well as pleasure in attainment, and joy in mastery. All the primary needs, sex, nutrition, æsthetic and cognitive interests may serve as nuclei for the sentiments of property, aided by the tendency to confuse means and ends. Constant or recurring needs are of special importance, giving the objects to which they are attached an abiding value.

These sentiments become intimately interwoven with the sentiment of self-regard, owing to the fact that control over things, extending beyond immediate enjoyment, is essential in the ordering of life and the satisfaction of one's own tastes. Property is thus rooted in the self's need for the exercise of mastery over things and the sense of freedom in enjoyment. Comparative jurisprudence teaches us that there are three original forms of acquiring property. Goods may be taken directly from nature, or they may be the product of labour or exertion, or they may be obtained by the assertion of power over other people. In all these forms of acquisition, but especially in the last, the self-assertive tendencies of man come into play. Men come to love things because they have put their energy into them, and because they are instruments of general satisfaction, but especially because they give them power over nature and other human beings. It is not so much the direct use of things, as the exercise of power, which they at once embody and facilitate, that gives to property its tremendous drive, and makes it one of the roots of ambition.

Psychologically regarded, property arises, not from a direct need to acquire and possess, but from the interweaving of other basic

SOCIOLOGY

interests with self-regard and self-assertion. Ethically, the function of property is to provide the material conditions of a free, secure, and purposeful life. In actual fact, most economic systems fail to achieve this object, save for a few. The reasons for this failure lie deep in the history and psychology of property. As a social institution, property gives power, not only over things, but through things also over persons. In particular, it has become an instrument whereby those who have it can control the life and labour of those who have it not. In the large-scale system of the modern world there has occurred a vast concentration of ownership, which has enormously increased the scope thus given to the element of power or domination. The system has also led to an over-valuation of production, and, by encouraging specialization, has tended to deprive work for most people of its value as a method of self-expression and self-fulfilment. The result is that, as far as the masses of workers are concerned, property cannot be said to have fulfilled its primary social functions of providing security and permanence, a basis of freedom and initiative, and an opportunity for the active expression of faculty. The problem here, as in so many aspects of social life, is to devise methods for curbing the elements of self-assertion and

SOCIAL CLASSES

domination in human nature, and for combining the requirements of organization on a large scale with the demands of social freedom.

VII

ASPECTS OF MENTAL DEVELOPMENT

(A) MORAL DEVELOPMENT. In discussing the relation between sociology and social philosophy a distinction was drawn, it will be remembered, between ethics proper and the sociology and psychology of morals. The former is concerned with the validity or truth of our moral judgments and its business is to discover the assumptions underlying our moral judgments and to formulate the principles which would make them self-consistent and in harmony with standards acceptable to reason. The comparative study of moral ideas and customs, on the other hand, is concerned with the forms in which these appear among various peoples or times, with the function they fulfil in the economy of life, with the psychological forces underlying them, with their historical affinities and connections. It is this latter problem alone with which we shall here deal, and, as the field is very vast, I shall confine myself to a discussion of the general nature of moral development and the question whether any

trends can be discerned in it by comparative study.

It is to be noted at the outset that when we speak of a development of morals we do not mean a development out of something non-moral, but only of a development within the field of morals. All known societies have codes of conduct, that is to say, sets of rules prescribing or forbidding defined classes of acts ; rules which are upheld by the tendency of their breach or violation to evoke disapproval. It is found, moreover, that the codes cover the principal relations of life, and that apart from limitations of range, they are strikingly similar in all known cultures. Every known code prohibits homicide and theft, and inculcates charity and generosity, mutual aid and respect for truth (cf. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, and *Ethical Relativity*, p. 197). Everywhere we find the elementary needs of mutual loyalty and co-operation provided for in the working rules of life. Indeed, recent ethnological work has shown that the most primitive peoples, those who live by gathering and hunting, have codes of morals which in some respects compare favourably with those found among otherwise more advanced peoples.

Broadly we may distinguish three principal trends, with the proviso that the develop-

ment is not continuous, but proceeds often on divergent lines, and is subjected to cross-currents of culture contacts. Firstly then, there has occurred a process of differentiation whereby a distinctively moral attitude has gradually emerged from other forms of social control, such as the legal and the religious. Secondly, there has been a growth in rationality, moral judgments have gained in detachment, impartiality and generality, and rational standards have increasingly taken the place of magical fears, blind aversions and approvals. Thirdly, there has been an extension of the range of persons or groups to whom moral judgments are held to apply, and there are the beginnings of a true moral universalism.

To understand the nature of this development, we must first briefly consider the nature of moral obligation as it is experienced by the developed conscience. Conscience appears to be a system which contains both intellectual and emotional elements. Conscience is not a specific emotion but rather a sentiment or set of sentiments containing within it numerous emotional tendencies or dispositions, such as calm joy in fulfilment, sorrow in our failures, fear, remorse, shame, anger; but also respect, reverence, honour and loyalty. These dispositions are connected with our approvals and disapprovals,

and these in their turn are not mere likes and dislikes but are compounded of feelings and judgments. The feelings register a general consonance or lack of consonance of the suggested line of behaviour with the broad and comprehensive needs of our nature. The judgment asserts the fittingness or appropriateness of the feeling and in its developed form it works in accordance with standards of consistency, impartiality and equity. It is a mistake to derive the conscience from any one impulse or feeling, such as gregariousness or sympathy. Rather is it the effect or precipitate of the entire mass of impulse feelings in so far as it has been brought into a working synthesis. It is this organized body of impulses and the judgments of approval and disapproval embedded within it, which is expressed in consciousness as the sense of obligation to moral rules, and which provides the energy needed for the control of aberrant impulse and desire.

But moral obligation has a certain duality which is of especial interest to the social psychologist. On the one hand, there is in it a feeling of constraint, as of something that is imposed upon us from without. On the other hand, there is also present an element of appeal or attractiveness, as of something freely accepted. This duality has been vari-

ously accounted for. It has been ascribed to a conflict between impulse and reason, between love and hate, between the social and other impulses, between the free intelligence and automatic habits. The explanation that I would suggest is briefly this. The problem of the moral life is essentially to introduce order into the chaos of warring impulses and turbulent desires. But the forces making for order first reveal themselves to consciousness in the respect that the individual experiences for the rules that are imposed upon him by the social group. His conscience is the repository of the moral beliefs of the community, or rather it contains so much of it as he has adopted through authority and suggestion, though later it may become personal to him and based on ideals and duties which he accepts as his own. In the main, the order that he achieves within himself depends on the larger order of society. Yet, and this is of the greatest importance, there is never any precise correspondence between the two orders. The reason for the discrepancy lies deep in the nature of social evolution.

Social institutions, including moral rules, are, in general, the result of an adjustment of human relations to the needs of life. If institutions fail to meet the pressure of needs, they crumble in the long run by a process of

attrition or even as the result of deliberate and reflective reform. But this process of adjustment is far from being automatic or perfect. Social needs are inchoate and conflicting and there is no social mind which can grasp them in their entirety, or find the lines of their harmonious fulfilment. In the main and even in advanced communities social change follows its unreflective course, and responds only in a rough and crude way to the needs of the community. Moreover, as civilization advances the community becomes increasingly stratified and differentiated, and the needs that make themselves felt may be those of a class or dominant section rather than those of the community as a whole. Thus in the development of morality there is no automatic adjustment to the needs of all individuals and there is a gap between the requirements of the order within and the order without. Hence, in part, the feeling of constraint expressing vaguely the lack of harmony between society and the individual. This may be enormously intensified with the multiplication of groups within the larger community and the resultant conflict of loyalties. Another root of the element of difficulty and constraint in obligation is to be found in the incoherence and obscurity of the conceptions which the individual uses, in the effort to harmonize

conflicting ends and purposes. The completely rational mind, like the pure will of Kant, would respond spontaneously to the demands of morality and would experience no difficulty in accepting them. Conceptions which are only half articulate, and very incompletely interwoven with our emotional and impulsive life, cannot be expected to overcome all conflict or secure complete harmony.

The development of morality does not proceed along a single line. It is closely affected by the growth of the whole social order, by economic and political factors, by religious beliefs and general intellectual advance, and like all these it is subject to deviation and retrogression. Yet on a broad view, and taking the whole of humanity into consideration, the trends we have noted above may be discerned. From one point of view, this development may be looked upon as a process whereby the conscience has come to be individualized and internalized. We can follow this process in the gradual differentiation of morality from legality and in the emergence of the notion that goodness is self-sustained and independent of external sanctions. We can see it further in the ever-recurring conflicts between traditional morality with its appeal to authority and its emphasis on the virtues of

submission and obedience, and the morality of the prophets and revolutionaries who preach an ideal remote from the standardized and conventional and who base their appeal on the inherent attractiveness of the good life. Especially noteworthy in this connection are the insistence by Hebrew teachers on the 'duties of the heart,' on the purity of conscience and personal responsibility for thought as well as deed, and the growth of the doctrines in fifth-century Greece that the human soul is the supreme arbiter in morality. These lessons have not, of course, been yet learnt by the mass of humanity. A great deal of morality remains conventional and authoritarian. There are also great variations in the relations between the legal and the moral among different peoples, and even within the same people insistence on the letter of the law may alternate with appeals to inward and individual conscience. It remains that though we cannot estimate its force or universality, the distinctively moral attitude, that, namely, which looks at acts from the point of view of their contributions to intrinsic values, has definitely emerged in the course of moral development.

This growing distinctness of morals is also to be seen in the complicated history of the relations between religion and morality. In the lower religions the notion of the sacred

is crude and undifferentiated and the moral element in it is impregnated with magical fears and revulsions. In the higher stages the gods are increasingly moralized and the divine comes to be regarded as the incarnation of the moral law. In later stages still, moral rules tend to free themselves from religious sanctions and to claim autonomy. Indeed, so far from being based on divine authority, moral and other values come to be regarded as data constituting the most important evidence for the reality of the divine. The primacy and independence of ethics in relation to religion thus comes to be insisted upon increasingly in modern thought and to some extent in practice. The emancipation of ethics from theology may be followed also in the history of Chinese life and thought, and, in another form, in Buddhism.

With the emergence of the distinctively moral attitude is connected the growing rationalization of the moral judgment. In primitive morality, magical elements predominate. The evils which follow on certain acts are referred mysteriously to the *mana* of the acts. Thus danger lurks in forbidden food, there is something uncanny in the untrue word, the curse of the stranger refused hospitality has hidden power, and all kinds of fears gather round the relations between

the sexes. Hence the primitive moral judgment looks to the act rather than the intention, though some savage peoples do distinguish between intentional and unintentional action (Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, I, p. 220). As the moral judgment becomes more reflective, it becomes more detached and impartial, directed more upon the character of the agent rather than the actual consequences of his acts, less dominated by emotional bias. Customary codes, moreover, are subjected to critical scrutiny, and the attempt is made to find a basis for the rules of behaviour by reference to ends and purposes in which reason can find intrinsic value. This deeper and more reflective morality can be seen at work in the teachings of the spiritual religions and in the movements of philosophic thought. Here again it is impossible to say to what extent the rational element counts in the working morality of the large communities of the modern world, but that on the whole morality has become more reflective will not be seriously disputed by any student of comparative morals.

The best established trend in moral development is the extension of the range of persons to whom moral judgments are held to apply. As T. H. Green has pointed out, it is not so much the sense of duty to a neighbour that has varied as the practical

answer to the question who is my neighbour. Primitive morality is group morality and moral obligations are confined to members of the group. As the group widens, the range of moral rights and duties extends, but unfortunately distinctions arise within it. There emerges a different morality for the classes within society and different loyalties on a basis of subordination replace the rudimentary equality of the earlier phases. On the whole, however, there is a widening of the sympathies and an increasing impartiality, though it is only too clear that group morality persists in the highest phases, and the sense of unity within the large groups of the modern world is maintained and heightened by hatred and fear of the stranger.

The movement towards moral universalism can be best studied in the development of the spiritual religions and in the modern humanitarian movement. The spiritual religions are universalist in intention. They discredit vengeance and even warfare. They inculcate self-sacrifice, compassion and love. When they came into contact with actual institutions they have had, however, to come to terms with the blend of love and hate, of justice and aggression, of self-surrender and self-assertion, which constitutes the working morality of ill-

organized groups engaged in a bitter struggle for existence: and the adjustments which they have secured have often been more plausible in form than genuine in spirit. Yet their deep moral insight remains an achievement of the human spirit and may yet reach fruition.

The humanitarian movement is at present under a cloud. Nevertheless its contributions cannot seriously be called in question. It has penetrated every department of practical morals—the problem of class and race divisions, the position of women, the treatment of criminals, the rights of association, religious equality, and it is not without influence even in international relations. Perhaps the most urgent problem of comparative ethics and sociology is whether the ideals of humanitarianism are capable of fulfilment on a world scale, or whether what has been happening in human history is merely the substitution of struggle between large groups for that between small ones, and the replacement of the ethics of the tribe by the ethics of the nation.

The tendencies of moral development which have here been briefly traced are, of course, not independent. The differentiation of morals involves its increasing rationalization, and this in turn carries with it logically, though I fear not necessarily in

SOCIOLOGY

practice, the application of moral rules in a spirit of equality and impartiality to all human beings of whatever race, class or creed. In actual fact, the development is incomplete in all these directions. Neither moral insight nor the power of human sympathy have so far proved equal to the solution of the moral problem on a world scale; above all, there has been a comparative failure of reason to inspire that passion without which nothing great or noble can be achieved.

(B) RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT. In the study of religion as in that of moral ideas we must distinguish between problems of origins and functions and problems of validity. The validity or truth of religious beliefs is the concern of metaphysics. Here we are interested only in the rôle played by religious beliefs and practices in social life, and in the general nature of religious development. These problems have been investigated in detail by the science of comparative religion which is now a highly developed branch of sociology; and the reader must be referred to the standard works now available for a description and classification of the principal types of religion as revealed in doctrine and cult. Here, only some aspects of the sociology of religion can be dealt with.

There have been innumerable attempts at

defining religion, but none have found general acceptance. The difficulty arises partly from the fact that religion has undergone a vast process of development, and definitions have to do justice at once to its highest and lowest forms. This difficulty can be overcome to some extent by the device of a minimum definition such as that attempted by Tylor, providing that the terms employed are sufficiently wide to cover experiences belonging to different levels. A deeper difficulty arises from the fact that religion implies a relation between the individual or group and an 'object' or being which has so far not proved susceptible of definition in conceptual terms. Hence, in defining religion, we can only deal with one side of the relation, namely, that which our attitude to this being implies. Our tendency in fact is to ascribe to this being those characteristics which our behaviour in relation to it implies and requires, and in this way to give content to our notion of the divine or the sacred. From this point of view definitions of religion should bring out the nature of the emotions or sentiments which determine the religious attitude, the overt acts of cult and ritual in which they are embodied, and the beliefs which form their conceptual framework. It must be remembered, however, that though for com-

parative purposes it is convenient to look at religion from the threefold point of view, of emotional attitude, cult and belief, yet it by no means follows that all three are necessary, and some have thought that neither dogma nor cult are indispensable to religion.

Two types of emotion appear to be involved in the religious attitude, those connected with difficulty and frustration, and those connected with exuberance and overflow of excitement. The latter to which belong all the joyous emotions have not usually been dwelt upon by psychologists of religion, but they appear to be of considerable importance. A great deal of ritual is probably due to an overflow of instinctive activity and exuberance of spirit, and on higher levels there are the joys of mystical experience. The emotions connected with difficulty and frustration are, however, more prominent. On occasions, when the normal routine of life breaks down, when confidence wanes, there arises the need of something to which one can cling or appeal. Here belong the feeling of inadequacy, of dependence, of incompleteness, and the efforts to overcome these feelings, to restore confidence by a cheerful trust in a great power or possibly by resignation or acceptance, by the faith that somehow or other the world is with us and not against us. On the philo-

sophical plane this may take the form of the ardent belief that in some sense the moral order penetrates and transfuses the cosmic order, and that the perplexities and contradictions of finite experience will be resolved in the light of a deeper insight. According as ideals of immanence or transcendence are stressed there is the notion of freedom in the world or freedom from the world. There is escape from conflict and perplexity through recognition of littleness and submissive acceptance of the mysterious powers behind the world of appearance; or the more assertive and joyous freedom of mystical union with them; and there is the intermediate stage of 'trusting in the Lord,' in which there seems to be a recognition of the inadequacy of the individual combined with the feeling that ultimately he has value. Thus religious experience moves between the poles of fear and hope, estrangement and devotion, dependence and freedom, the feeling of helplessness and the feeling of strength. Religion grows up primarily in response to these emotional needs. In cult and ritual these emotions and their attendant beliefs are canalized and concentrated in a traditional or prescribed manner and provided with an organized technique. Generally rites are connected with critical situations in the life of the individual or

community, birth, sickness, death, initiation of youths into communal life ; or again with the emergencies of economic life, such as sowing and harvesting, or again occasions for tribal intercourse or conflict are provided with ceremonial designed to relieve tension and to give confidence. In all ages and among all peoples it is the incalculable elements in the critical situations of life that constitute the focal points of ceremonial. The rites then give comfort either by direct increase or concentration of holy power, or by averting possible dangers, or in the higher phases of prayer by providing opportunity for inward concentration or communion. Rooted in emotional needs, they are methods for the discharge of emotions, but also for their enhancement, though it must be remembered that they may become so stereotyped and mechanical as to lose their original value and power.

On the cognitive side religion is concerned with those antinomies and perplexities which, when they come to be clearly defined, constitute also the subject matter of metaphysics. Such are the antitheses between reality and appearance, the permanent and the changing, the eternal and the transitory. The religions of the world meet the problems thus arising by the conception of a spiritual order lying deeper than the order of common experience.

The relations between the two orders are variously interpreted. In monotheistic religions the tendency is on the whole dualistic, God being conceived as above and outside the world of which he is the Creator and Ruler. In pantheistic religions, on the other hand, the tendency is monistic, the world of common-sense experience being regarded as illusory appearance of the deeper spiritual order. In other cases again, as in Buddhism, the search for ultimate truth may be abandoned and a solution for the discrepancies and difficulties of experience be found in a practical order of life based on an outlook tinged with melancholy and tender compassion, and aiming at the salvation of all. Thus the notion of the spiritual is given more definite content by contrast sometimes with the material, sometimes with the finite, the partial, the self-centred. In the higher religions the ethical aspect becomes increasingly important, and the divine is regarded as the incorporation of the highest values. They all inculcate an ideal life and a conception of the world as a whole which is the possible scene of such an ideal life. This ideal may be reached by abnegation, by the subdual of the senses and all that makes for self-assertion. Hence the ascetic trend in the spiritual religions. But the social side of the spiritual may be emphasized in some

cases as in modern Humanitarianism, or in Confucianism which regards the social order as good in itself and its service as intrinsically and inherently desirable.

In all the higher religions there seems to be involved a faith in the possibility of complete and abiding satisfaction. Myth, doctrine and cult provide symbolic prefigurations of this ultimate reality or possibility. These vary in form and substance with the level of culture and with changes in our standards of value and their expression, and especially with changes in the knowledge of and control over natural forces. In the earlier phases of religion the primary needs of mankind, those concerned with the necessities of life, naturally played a dominant part. As our knowledge of natural forces grows, we learn to control them by natural methods, that is, by a detailed scrutiny of their causes and conditions. Hence the conception of God as power loses in importance, and the stress comes to be laid on the conception of God as the source of values, or as the being in whom all values are conserved, or perhaps through whom they are progressively realized.

Religion has here been interpreted as arising out of human needs and as supplying a method or methods for their satisfaction. But it is very important to remember that

this view of religion does not in itself involve any estimate of the success or failure of religion or the religions in attaining this end. Like all social institutions, religion has served to satisfy needs, but it has also reflected conflict between different needs, and, above all, between the needs of different groups. Thus religion has been a valuable instrument in fostering and maintaining a sense of tribal or national unity. But in doing so, it has also given divine sanction to a morbid group-egoism which has been one of the greatest obstacles in the way of a larger unity. Again, the ethics of selflessness which the spiritual religions have emphasized may have been very important as a protest against violence and brutality, but has often had the effect of paralysing human energy, while the teaching of universal benevolence served to hide the failure of elementary justice. In asserting the supremacy of the spiritual, religions have often either cut themselves off from contact with the actual world, or else have lent their authority to the temporal powers and thus were led to make concessions incompatible with the fundamentals of their own teaching. Witness the attitude of the churches to war, slavery and serfdom. Again, the claim made by religion to an insight above the ordinary has often been used in the past to hinder rational inquiry,

and has provoked a counter-claim to all-sufficiency on the part of scientific thought, which is perhaps equally unreasonable. Finally, if religion has been a source of peace and noble endeavour, it has also inspired abject fears and horrible cruelties ; if it has enabled many to obtain a deeper insight, it has also encouraged an arrogant assumption of spiritual monopoly and a militant fanaticism hardly equalled in any other field of human activity.

(C) INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT.¹ The part played by intellectual development in the growth of society early attracted the attention of sociologists. Buckle saw in the increase of our knowledge of nature the main source of progress. Comte regarded his law of mental development as the fundamental law of sociology. Mill thought that history and what we know of human nature combine to show that the predominant or paramount agent of progress is the 'state of the speculative faculties of mankind,' that is to say, the beliefs which they have arrived at concerning themselves and the world around them.

¹ The problems here touched upon now form part of a special branch of sociology which the German writers call Wissenssoziologie or the Sociology of Knowledge. See the article on this subject by Professor Karl Mannheim in the *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie* (ed. Vierkandt), later included as Part V of *Ideology and Utopia*, 1936.

With this problem of the relation between intellectual and social development I propose to deal in the concluding chapter of this book. We have first to ask what, in general, this process of intellectual growth has consisted in, and whether any regular tendency or trend can be discerned in it.

The growth of knowledge can be followed most easily perhaps in the increasing control obtained by man over the forces of nature. Advance in this direction has certainly been more continuous and widespread than in any other and in modern civilization has increased enormously in rate. In essentials it has consisted in the power of utilizing natural resources, whether overt or hidden, for human purposes. The most primitive men of whom we have any knowledge use the gifts of nature with a minimum of transformation. Above the level of the food-gatherers, men make use not only of the products of nature but of the productive powers of nature, for example, in the breeding of animals and in agriculture. This phase passes, in the early civilizations, into a phase in which the overt forces of nature are deliberately employed so as to transform natural resources, as, for example, in intensive agriculture, in the use of metals and of elementary machines such as the wheel, the pulley, the lever and the screw. Equally,

or perhaps more important is the invention of writing which facilitated government on a large scale and also made it possible to build up the first elements of systematic knowledge. Finally, in the modern world, efforts are made to go behind the surface properties of the physical world and to acquire increasing control of the underlying energies. This development has been most marked in the physical sciences and in the industrial arts which depend on them, but some advance has also been made in the sciences dealing with life and mind and society.

The control of the environment is, however, not the only manifestation of mental development, or the only direction in which it comes into relation with social development. We have already followed it in the field of ethico-religious thought and conduct, and it is also reflected in the growth of the pure sciences which may come to be carried on independently and for long have little relation to the industrial arts, and in the development of the philosophical disciplines. In this vast movement Comte thought he could discern a regular order of sequence which he formulated in the famous law of the three stages, and though in its original form it would now not be upheld by many sociologists, yet most would recognize that

it does express at least certain salient features in the general movement of thought, and some discussion of it is necessary and helpful in an appreciation of the present position. Briefly put, the law asserts that each branch of knowledge passes through three stages, the theological or fictive, the metaphysical or abstract, and the scientific or positive. In the first, men concern themselves with problems of the origin and purpose of things and their tendency is to find a solution in the action of supernatural agents greater or less in number, and eventually culminating in the various forms of monotheism. In the metaphysical stage men are still engaged in the pursuit of absolute knowledge. They still think they can arrive at the ultimate nature of things and their final purposes, but the supernatural agents are now replaced by entities or essences, reified abstractions. Here again there are many stages culminating in the conception of a single supreme entity of Nature. Finally, in the positive stage, the search for ultimate and final causes is abandoned, and attention is confined to detailed and painstaking observation of facts and the establishment of laws, that is to say, invariable relations of resemblance and succession. Positive knowledge is frankly relative, conditioned by the instruments at our disposal and especially by the stage of social evolution,

and its object is not the discovery of ultimate truth, but the furtherance of human welfare.

There are different groups of phenomena and accordingly different groups of sciences. These reach the positive stage at different times, and in all probability the laws of the different sciences are not reducible. Yet there is a unity of method in all the positive sciences which makes it a suitable foundation for the unity of the whole of mankind, and it is worthy of note that while in all else there is wide divergence of opinion, there is increasing agreement in all matters which have reached the positive stage.

This scheme calls for criticism at various points. In the first place, the earlier phases of knowledge are hardly to be accounted for in their entirety in animistic terms or by reference to a supposed inherent tendency to personify natural objects. On the one hand, there is much in the magical beliefs and practices of the simpler societies which involves an appeal to occult impersonal forces, and, on the other hand, it is by no means clearly established that all the gods were derived from human spirits. Further, the tendency to personify is far from being an irreducible element in the human mind. It is merely one instance of what is done in all

explanation, the linking up of the various parts of experience. In animistic explanation we merely use the experience which we have of our own states of mind in order to render intelligible other parts of our experience. Its deficiencies arise from an indulgence in facile generalization and a lack of caution in establishing connections. In various degrees these are characteristic of all stages of thought. But though animism does not appear to be a specific and irreducible tendency of the human mind, it does not follow that its importance in the history of thought has not been great. No one doubts its significance in religious thought and it by no means disappears with the growth of science. It is found, in one form or another, among some of the greatest modern scientists and philosophers. Both Kepler and Descartes based their belief in the regularity of the laws of nature on the perfection of God. According to Newton, the order of the solar system is due to the divine intervention; and infinite space is the sensorial organ of God, the organ of his omnipresence. Kant found in the notion of God the only way of reconciling the requirements of the moral life with the course of nature; and many modern thinkers regard God as the sustainer, if not the creator of values.

Comte's view of metaphysics as a transitory phase of human thought, valuable no doubt as a solvent, but destined to yield increasingly to positive knowledge, is also exposed to grave objections. Indeed, as has frequently been pointed out, he himself was a metaphysician *malgré lui*, and his conception of the nature of the positive method itself rests upon metaphysical distinctions which he does not further examine. Such are the distinction between appearance and reality, the rejection of teleology and the assumption that the ultimate causes of phenomena are unknowable ; or again, that the whole structure of experience can be resolved into relations of similitude and succession. How far modern forms of positivism can dispense with metaphysics is very difficult to say. There remains, at any rate, one important function of metaphysics, namely, to inquire whether ontological assumptions have to be made to validate scientific inquiry itself and to bring out the hidden and often unconscious assumptions made by the different sciences. There is no reason why this task should not be accomplished in the positivist spirit, that is, the spirit which refers back all concepts to the test of experience. It may be added that it is being increasingly recognized that science is not justified in denying or minimizing the importance of elements of

experience which have not so far come within its domain or lent themselves to investigation by its special methods. Some have even thought that certain experiences such as the æsthetic and the religious afford a more direct or profound insight into the real world than is afforded by the natural sciences. Whether these experiences are to be dealt with by science or metaphysics is partly a matter of the way these terms are defined, but to neglect them is certainly not in harmony with positivism properly interpreted.

Since Comte several other attempts have been made to trace the main trends of intellectual development. Of these the nearest to Comte's scheme is that outlined by Höffding, who distinguishes three principal stages which he names Animism, Platonism and Positivism. Worked out in much greater detail and with special reference to its sociological implications is the scheme of mental development suggested by Hobhouse. He notes four stages or phases: "(a) an incipient phase in which the rudiments of articulate thought are still in process of formation; (b) a second in which what may be called the common-sense or empirical order is built up; (c) a phase of conceptual criticism and reconstruction in which thought systems are elaborated, largely on a dialectical basis;

and (d) a phase of experiential reconstruction in which efforts are made to relate the thought structure itself to its conditions in a developing experience" (cf. *L. T. Hobhouse*, by J. A. Hobson and M. Ginsberg, p. 159 *seq.*).

Without following these schemes in detail I will attempt to bring out clearly what I conceive to be the principal characteristics of primitive mentality and of the mentality of ancient and modern thought.

(i) In essentials, there appears to be no difference between the mental structure of primitive and civilized man. In other words, a psychological and logical analysis of the processes involved in the thought and behaviour of primitive man as he is described by modern anthropologists reveals no gaps or peculiarities in form or structure. The differences in their achievements are due to differences in the range of experience, in the degree of systematization, in the power of logical self-criticism, and, above all, in the degree in which the flow of thought is dominated by subjective factors. There appears to be no real ground for the view that in primitive mentality the categories of thought are actually confused, that is, that savages do not distinguish between part and whole, similarity and identity and the like. In their dealings with natural objects in

every-day life they clearly make no such confusions or they could not get on at all. In fact, even such primitive peoples as the Bangala Pygmies have a great number of words dealing with canoeing, names for the various parts, for beaching, launching, steering, turning round sharp corners and the like ; and numerous instances can be given of primitive peoples who have elaborate classifications of animals and trees and grasses, names for most of the bones of the skeleton, and so forth. Similarly, though the savage has no idea of the principle of causation as such, its chief characteristics are implied in his behaviour, since he clearly looks for antecedents, varies his behaviour and the energy he puts forth in proportion to the results he wants to get, and uses the methods which a logician, looking at his actions, would describe as methods of induction, that is to say, agreement and difference. He sees the world pervaded by forces acting on the whole uniformly, and it is when ordinary connections fail that he appeals to capricious powers, as in animism, or mystical powers, as in magic. The element of mystery in magic is in fact due just to its distinction from the normal ; a connection is strongly believed in whose mode of operation is yet obscure and inscrutable. It seems that mystical qualities are not integrated with the qualities

that we call natural, and that savages distinguish perfectly well between the effects of magic and the effects of ordinary human activities. Further, in resorting to mystical causes the savage does not neglect ordinary secondary causes, but regards these as inadequate to account for certain phenomena and adds the others to make sure or to strengthen his confidence, or to relieve his anxiety. He arrives at these forces, whether animistic or magical, by ordinary processes of thought. They are, in fact, generalizations based on observed connections, but the connections are established under the stress of his anxiety to get a result, and there is no technique at hand for eliminating these emotional factors or for checking the natural tendency to generalize. Whatever acts relieve tension, such as the spell or the rite, are credited with the results which would normally be required to relieve it. In animism there is the further motive that in dealing with spiritual beings the savage is dealing with beings like himself, who can be coaxed or threatened, and not with immovable natural forces. Connections established in this way are soon solidified into accepted beliefs, and traditions are built up which give them prestige. People then act in accordance with them, even when there is no emotional strain such as that which originally motivated

the belief. They become just accepted modes of behaviour. The chief difference between savage mentality and civilized mentality is in the relative range of the natural and the supernatural. As the sphere of the former expands, that of the latter contracts. In the main, this process depends upon the development of a technique which makes possible the critical sifting of loose generalizations, and upon the growth of the capacity to free belief and disbelief from the dominance of impulse and emotion.

It would be interesting to inquire into the relation between the various forms of magic and animism and the forms of social and economic organization among the simpler peoples and in the early civilizations. But this task of correlation has never, so far as I know, been attempted on the scale which would be necessary to justify any general statement here. It is, however, a probable hypothesis that the systematization of animistic beliefs is connected with the growth of political organizations. Each type of political organization has its duplicate in heaven, and as organization increases in scale and unity, animism increases and grows more systematic, reaching its height in the barbaric civilizations of the ancient world, where it is upheld by dynastic interests and provided with quasi-philosophical justifications. Magic, too, it

seems, reaches its highest point not in primitive society, but much later, when there are men of great wealth but insecure power who turn to the magicians for confidence, and recrudescences of magical practices have been noted frequently in still later periods, in times of trouble and uncertainty.

The relation between science and magic and animism has been much discussed (cf. especially Carveth Read, *Man and his Superstitions*). Some have held that science is derived from magic, but it is much truer to say that both have differentiated from common sense, but in opposite directions. Science slowly corrects, defines, and systematizes the data of common sense, and builds up a methodology whereby it becomes possible at once to obtain finer and richer data, and to handle them with greater precision. Magic thrives on mystery; incoherence, uncritical reliance on coincidence; and the uniform connections with which it operates are not subjected to, and do not permit of, verification. From the first opposed in method and spirit, magic and science grow further apart in the course of their evolution. The nearest approach that can be made to the view that science is derived from magic is to say, with Carveth Read, that the scientist is derived from the wizard (or wizard-priest) in so far as the latter were often people

ASPECTS OF MENTAL DEVELOPMENT

who managed to acquire some fragments of positive knowledge, useful to them in their magical practices, but obtained by methods which have nothing to do with magic. In later times, some of them became more interested in the positive side of their profession than in the magical and became scientists while others adhered to the mystical.

Animistic and religious beliefs, in general, helped science indirectly in early stages by setting problems and instigating investigation. In this way the building of temples and the regulation of seasonal festivals encouraged the study of arithmetic, geometry and astronomy. The growth of a class of priests was also of great importance in this connection ; and for thousands of years they had the monopoly of learning and were the chief patrons of the fine arts.

(ii) *Ancient and modern thought.* The beginnings of science have been traced to the ancient oriental civilizations. Babylonia, Egypt and ancient China built up the first elements of systematic knowledge in arithmetic, geometry and astronomy, and they brought many of the arts to a relatively high level of development. A higher phase of intellectual activity, though not in the realms of science, appears in the ancient civilizations from the eighth to the fifth centuries B.C.

SOCIOLOGY

We have the growth of ethical monotheism among the Hebrews, speculations on ethics and government in China, and on ultimate metaphysical problems in India. Finally, among the Greeks, thought becomes systematic, deliberate and critical, and a regular method of inquiry and proof is worked out for different branches of knowledge. Through Arab channels Greek thought reached mediæval Europe, and it was the impact of Arab culture on the West which stimulated interest, on the one hand in mathematics, and, on the other, in experimentation, and thus provided the basic elements upon which modern science was to be built up.

The distinctive character of modern scientific thought is the union of elaborate abstract reasoning with controlled observation and experiment. Of this union, we can see the beginnings in Greek science. Relatively to the instruments available, the observations made by the Greeks are now recognized as searching and valuable, and in astronomy they knew how to combine mathematical reasoning with exact observation. Yet, on the experimental side, their achievements do not rank so high as in their contribution to logic and mathematics, ethics and metaphysics. Their theory of science was indeed highly formal, modelled on logic and mathe-

matics. Science dealt only with the necessary and universal, the typical, the unvarying. Its business was to discover the essential types and to deduce the properties that followed from them. The changing, the particular, fell within the sphere of opinion and could not be reached by science. Hence in theory ancient science was static, morphological, classificatory, and ill-adapted to the study of variation and change. The great achievements of modern science have been due to the elaboration of methods which made possible the discovery of order and continuity in the midst of change and qualitative diversity. This advance has been greatest in the physical sciences, but in the sciences dealing with life and mind the study of order in variation has made notable progress in modern times, guided by the hypothesis of evolution and its instrument, the comparative method.

Some authorities have insisted on the essential unity of ancient with modern science. The difference is, according to them, that while the Greeks were in search of universal concepts, modern science seeks for universal laws. Bergson has held that this amounts to no more than a difference of degree, ideas being general concepts of things, and laws general concepts of changes. In both cases, however, the ultimate object is

to reach the general and abstract, and not the individual or particular. This raises the important question of the relations between conceptual schemes and experience. Are the conceptual schemes of science generalized statements of observable relations of facts, to be tested by their power to interpret these relations, or are they self-consistent schemes which happen to agree with observed facts but stand in no necessary relation to them? (Cf. E. W. Hobson, "When the scientific theory is employed for the purpose of describing a complex of physical phenomena, there is no justification for a transference of the logical necessity from the conceptual theory to the perceptual phenomena."—*Domain of Natural Science*, p. 80.) There seem to be important differences of opinion among modern scientists in regard to this question. We are not here concerned with the logic of this question. But it is important to note that science has been most successful in formulating laws when it has been concerned with abstract entities very remote from concrete experience; and that the nearer it gets to the concrete, the more it has to be satisfied with description or classification. As we move from biology to psychology and sociology, laws become increasingly difficult to establish. The mental and social sciences are accordingly still in a very elementary stage. This back-

wardness of the social sciences and the enormous specialization which has occurred in the more advanced branches of knowledge combine to make the grasp of broad generic truths increasingly difficult, and constitute the principal obstacles in the way of utilizing the methods and results of science in the reorganization of social life.

VIII

CONCLUSION

HAVING now come to the end of our brief survey of the main trends of social and cultural development, it will be well to say something, in conclusion, of the relations between them. It is important to remember, at the outset, that when we speak of trends of development we must not think of them as occurring inevitably or automatically. We can point to no order of ideas or social institution whose growth can be traced through a regular sequence of stages repeated in the same order among different peoples. The most that we can hope to do is to indicate a movement in humanity as a whole, which, despite actions and reactions, reveals some persistent direction. In this sense, development has been most regular in the sphere of thought, and in the resulting control over physical conditions. There has not been the same regularity in the sphere of ethics or of art. Tradition seems to operate in a different way in these three spheres of life. In the case of knowledge, as we have seen,

growth is cumulative since results can be effectively handed on from generation to generation. In ethical thought this is not so easy, because the grasp of fundamental principles would seem here to depend not only upon an improved methodology but upon a deeper moral experience, which does not recur in any uniform order. In ethical practice, the further development by each new generation of the lessons of the past is handicapped by the growing intensity and complexity of life. This sets ever new problems, which require for their solution, not only a re-statement of principles, but also the acquisition of new habits of behaviour, and in such acquisition tradition may be, not a help, but a hindrance. The brokenness of the history of art has been explained by some as due to the fact that art is a process of creation rather than of discovery, and each achievement is, therefore, unique and, strictly speaking, unrepeatable. In this there is some exaggeration, but in all probability the different elements in art have not the same systematic connectedness as scientific knowledge, and development in one direction does not, as frequently happens in science, lead by an inherent logic to development in another.

In discussing the relation between religion and morals, we noted the tendency of morals

to become autonomous. The association between morals and religion seems to be closest in the spiritual religions and in the 'middle' civilizations where religion provides sanctions both for moral and legal injunctions. Professor Westermarck thinks that "the moral ideas of uncivilized men are more affected by magic than by religion, and that the religious influence has reached its greatest extension at certain stages of culture which, though comparatively advanced, do not include the highest stage" (*Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, Vol. II, p. 746). To some extent, the relations here asserted depend upon the definition of religion. It is arguable that what has happened in the higher stages has not been so much a lessening of the influence of religion, as a change in the character of that influence. In modern times, both religion and morals rest their case to an increasing extent on direct and widely pervasive experiences of mankind, and this means that historical forms and creeds become secondary, and authority ceases to be the final arbiter. In this way, religions may well provide a body of moral convictions at the very time when their abstract doctrines lose in importance.¹ This

¹ To give one instance: Hobhouse thought that the moral influence of Christianity was probably never so great as in the nineteenth century, which was the time

CONCLUSION

would accord well with the increasing stress laid by religion on values and the tendency away from all forms of supernaturalism. Perhaps, however, some reference to the supernatural or mysterious is essential to religion. In that event, there is a stronger case to be made for the view that the influence of religion on morals is on the decline.

It has been held by some authorities that the changes which have occurred in the contents of morals have not been due to distinctively moral sources, but to the operation of new political and economic conditions, and to the growth of science. Thus, for example, it is suggested that the extension of the range of moral judgments has been due to the widening of the area of human intercourse and the multiplication of contacts, and that scientific criticism has refined and enlarged the content of moral ideas by freeing them from dependence upon particular religious beliefs. This view seems to imply also that, in essentials, moral relationships and ideals are constant, and that the differences are to be traced rather to differences in the general level of social organization and culture, that is to say, in the situations to which they have to be applied. I think it

of the most serious intellectual attack on its foundations. Cf. Art. on "Comparative Ethics," in *Encycl. Brit.*, 14th edition.

is true that the acceptance or wide popularity, of moral, as of other ideals, has generally been due to particular social conditions, but this is not to say that there has been no distinctively moral development. The increasing complexity of social relations continually alters the character of the moral problem, and its solution demands constant reconstruction of ethical theory. The notion that no discoveries have ever been made in the ethical field has been emphatically disproved by Hobhouse. He points to at least four discoveries of capital importance. "The first is the establishment of the impartial rule, the foundation of common-sense morality. The second is the establishment of the principle of universalism, the foundation of religious idealism. The third is the social personality (if we may use a modern phrase to express the real centre of the Greek doctrine), which governs the first stage of philosophic ethics. The fourth is the idea of freedom, as the basis alike of personal development and social co-operation, which emerges in the modern reconstruction of ethico-religious idealism" (*Development and Purpose*, p. 186). Whether in the course of social development there has also taken place an evolution of morals in the sense of an increasing approximation of moral practice to moral teaching, is another and more

CONCLUSION

difficult question. It may be the case that the distance between theory and practice increases instead of diminishing with the multiplications of opportunities for conflict and disharmony, and the weakening of the bonds of custom and authority in modern civilizations. In recent times, at any rate, there has been a recrudescence of violence which runs counter to the main trends of ethical development, and which raises in a new and intensified form the old problem of the relations between order and freedom, between society and the individual.

We come now to the fundamental question of the relation between mental development in the various spheres we have distinguished, and social and economic factors. Some of the earlier sociologists, as we have seen, regarded increase in knowledge as the primary condition of social change. On the other hand, historical materialism, now exerting so wide an influence, regards not only legal and political institutions but ethico-religious beliefs and even scientific thought as ultimately dependent upon the necessities of the economic order. This theory, as now commonly interpreted, does not assert that economic factors are the sole cause of everything that happens in society. On the contrary, it is admitted that the various social and cultural factors react upon one another,

and upon the economic base. "There is a reciprocal interaction," says Engels, "within a fundamental economic necessity which, in the last instance, always asserts itself. . . . Men make their own history, but in a given, conditioning *milieu*, upon the basis of existing relations, among which the economic relations, no matter how much they are influenced by relations of a political and ideological order, are ultimately decisive." But what is the nature of this economic necessity, and in what sense are economic factors ultimately decisive? If by economic necessity is meant the urgency of satisfying the basic needs of the masses of men, in contrast with the less urgent and, at any rate, less widely felt needs of æsthetic appreciation, or contemplative curiosity, or other long-range interests, it is clear that economic facts constitute a governing force in social development. But at what point do the basic or minimal needs of the masses make themselves felt with sufficient strength to bring about a change in social relations? Do not these needs require to be crystallized in the form of some ideal end, and are not these needs, as thus directed and made articulate by ideals, the important driving force?

But thought is not an independent agent, controlling social changes, itself unaffected

CONCLUSION

by them. It is not driven onward by any immanent dialectic. Things self-evident may, nevertheless, for long remain unrecognized, and neither individuals nor communities are so sensitive to the requirements of logic that they cannot leave contradictions unresolved. When we look back on the movement of thought, we are inclined to regard the solution of contradictions as the motive agent, but, in actual fact, people quite frequently accept contradictions, both in their beliefs and their outward behaviour. For this reason we can never assert of any particular movement of thought, that it was determined entirely from within, and out of relation to other factors in the social and psychological setting.

But this way of formulating the problem is somewhat unreal. Thought does not operate in a vacuum. It arises within the field of impulse, and in response to fundamental needs. It is driven onward by hopes and checked or silenced by fears. It is affected by the material on which it works, and is conditioned in form and direction by social forces. In its application to social life, thought is hampered by the difficulty that it can make no progress without subduing passion—yet must remain ineffective unless it can arouse passion. It is another form of the same difficulty that, in order to

be fruitful, thought requires a certain detachment, a certain power to rise above the conventional outlook, while this very detachment breeds an aloofness, which often makes it impossible for the thinker to exercise any real influence over the masses of men. Thus thought in human problems is either too far removed from the ordinary emotions to stir the imaginations of men, or, if vivid and moving, is wrecked by the very passion which has inspired it, or which it has served to evoke.

Another and deeper reason which accounts for the comparative weakness of thought in social affairs is to be found in the nature of group mentality. Social life is a mental product in the sense that it expresses relations between individuals regarded not merely as physical beings but as beings capable of feeling, willing and thinking. Conversely, mental development in man is a social process. It is not, in essentials, the result of changes in individual faculty, but depends upon co-operation, mutual stimulus, and the cumulative power of tradition. Yet society is not a mind but a network of innumerable minds, now in conflict, now co-operating. Particular communities or societies may achieve a measure of unity, but the larger they are in scale, the lower appears to be the mental level of the group taken as a whole.

CONCLUSION

Clear-sighted purpose no doubt occasionally plays its part, and its power of control may have increased in the course of social evolution. But such clear purpose is not common in large communities, and it has to contend with the inertia and indifference of the masses. Generally large groups are sustained by habits, established by trial and error or imposed by authority, and embodied in tradition. Over long periods of time, they come to possess a common character, which responds selectively to suggested policies, and this gives their behaviour a certain steadiness. But they have no true common will, and when shaken out of their routine, the mentality of the masses is fluid, credulous, disunited, short-sighted. Such unity as is then attained is not likely to be based upon a comprehensive understanding of social needs, but upon an appeal to passion, and especially to the hatred of a common enemy, imaginary or real. How to create a sustained interest in public affairs, and an effective common will, not liable to be led astray by gusts of passion, or to be confused by contending groups, is the essential problem of modern communities.

The history of humanity is the story of an increasing conflict between the rational and irrational elements in human nature. Factors making for unity and co-operation

SOCIOLOGY

are blended with others making for rivalry and exclusiveness, fears and jealousies. As the scale of operation expands, the conflict is embittered by the growing complexity of life, and the multiplication of opportunities for discord. The notion that this vast process can, and ought, to be consciously controlled or directed, has emerged in theory. But the conception of a self-directed humanity is new, and as yet vague in the extreme. To work out its full theoretical implications, and, with the aid of other sciences, to inquire into the possibilities of its realization, may be said to be the ultimate object of sociology.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY
AND INDEX**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

GENERAL

- BRANFORD, V. V.: "The Origin and Use of the Word Sociology" in *Sociological Papers*, Vol. I
- MILL, J. S.: *Logic*, Book VI
Auguste Comte and Positivism, 1865
- SPENCER, H.: *The Study of Society*. London, 1873
- HOBHOUSE, L. T.: *Social Evolution and Political Theory*.
New York, 1911
Social Development. London, 1924
- MACIVER, R. M.: *Community*. London, 1920
Society: its Structure and Changes. New York, 1931
- DURKHEIM, E.: *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*.
Paris, 1912. *The Rules of Sociological Method*
(Trans. S. A. Solovay and J. H. Mueller, 1938)
- GIDDINGS, F. H.: *Principles of Sociology*. New York,
1898
- WARD, L. F.: *Outlines of Sociology*. New York, 1898
- WEBER, MAX: *Essays in Sociology* (Trans. H. H. Gerth
and C. W. Mills, 1946)
- SIMMEL, G.: *Soziologie*. Leipzig, 1922
- BARTH, P.: *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie*.
Leipzig, 1922
- VIERKANDT, A.: *Gesellschaftslehre*. Stuttgart, 1928
- SOROKIN, P.: *Contemporary Sociological Theories*.
New York and London, 1928
- GINSBERG, M.: *Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy*
(3 Vols. 1956-61).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

RACE AND ENVIRONMENT

- HADDON, A. C.: *The Races of Man*. Cambridge, 1924
 RIPLEY, W. Z.: *The Races of Europe*. London, 1899
 DENIKER, J.: *Les races et les peuples de la terre*. Paris, 1926
 BOAS, F.: *Anthropology and Modern Life*. London, 1929
 PITTARD, E.: *Race and History*. London
 BRUNHES, J.: *Human Geography*. New York, 1931
 GARTH, T. R.: *Race Psychology*. New York, 1931
 CARR-SAUNDERS, A. M.: *The Population Problem*. Oxford, 1922
 HERTZ, F.: *Race and Civilisation*. London, 1928
 HOGBEN, L.: *Genetic Principles in Medicine and Social Science*. London, 1931
 KLINEBERG, O.: *Race Differences*. London, 1935

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

- MCDougALL, W.: *An Introduction to Social Psychology*. London, 1931
 WALLAS, GRAHAM: *Human Nature in Politics*. London, 1910
The Great Society, London, 1914
 HOBHOUSE, L. T.: *Mind in Evolution*. London, 1926
Development and Purpose. London, 1927
Social Development, 1924
 SHAND, A. F.: *The Foundations of Character*. 1920
 THOULESS, R. H.: *Social Psychology*. London, 1925
 GINSBERG, M.: *Psychology of Society*. London, 1921
 SPROTT, W. J. H.: *Social Psychology*, 1952
 DEWEY, J.: *Human Nature and Conduct*. London, 1922
 FREUD, S.: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. London, 1922
New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (Trans. W. J. H. Sprott, 1933)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- BARTLETT, F. C. (ed.): *The Study of Society*. London, 1939
 FLUGEL, J. C.: *Man, Morals and Society*. London, 1945

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

- SPENCER, H.: *Principles of Sociology*. London, 1897
 HOBHOUSE, L. T.: *Morals in Evolution*. London, 1915;
 7th Edition with a new introduction by M. Ginsberg, 1951
 HOBHOUSE, L. T., Wheeler, G. C., Ginsberg, M.: *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*. London, 1915
 WESTERMARCK, E.: *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*. London, 1906
History of Human Marriage. London, 1921
 LOWIE, R. H.: *Social Organisation*. 1950
 MACIVER, R. M.: *The Modern State*. Oxford, 1926
 VINOGRADOFF, P.: *Historical Jurisprudence*. Oxford, 1920
 FAHLBECK, P. E.: *Die Klassen und die Gesellschaft*. Jena, 1922
 LANDTMAN, G.: *The Origin of the Inequality of the Social Classes*. 1938
 COLE, G. D. H.: *Studies in Class Structure*. 1955
 GLASS, D. V. (ed.): *Social Mobility in Britain*. 1954
 LIPSET, S. M. and Bendix, R.: *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*
 TAWNEY, R. H.: *The Acquisitive Society*. London, 1921
Equality. London, 1931
Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. London, 1926
 HOBSON, J. A.: *Wealth and Life*. London, 1929
The Evolution of Modern Capitalism, 1906

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- WEBER, MAX : *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Tübingen, 1922
The Theory of Economic and Social Organisation
 (Trans. Henderson, A. M., Parsons, T., 1947)
Property : its Duties and Rights. Essays by various
 authors. London, 1915

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT

- TYLOR, E. B. : *Primitive Culture*. London, 1903
 FRAZER, J. : *The Golden Bough*. London, 1911-15
 SUTHERLAND, A. : *The Origin and Growth of the Moral
 Instinct*. London, 1898
 HOBHOUSE, L. T. : *Morals in Evolution*. London, 1915
 WESTERMARCK, E. : *Origin and Development of Moral
 Ideas*. London, 1906
Ethical Relativity. London, 1932
 READ, CARVETH : *Man and His Superstitions*. Cam-
 bridge, 1925
 MARETT, R. R. : *The Threshold of Religion*. 1909
Faith, Hope and Charity. Oxford, 1932
 MOORE, G. F. : *History of Religions*. Edinburgh, 1914
 BERGSON, H. : *Les deux sources de la morale et la religion*.
 Paris, 1933
 LOWIE, R. H. : *Primitive Religion*. London, 1925
 DURKHEIM, E. : *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*.
 London, 1915
 WEBER, MAX : *Religionssoziologie*
 TROELTSCH, E. : *The Social Teaching of the Christian
 Churches* (Trans. Wyon. London, 1931)
 MANNHEIM, K. : *Ideology and Utopia*. London, 1936
 GINSBERG, M. : *Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy*,
 Vol. III, Evolution and Progress. 1961

INDEX

- Aggression, 103, 111
 Alexander, S., 28 *seq.*
 Ancient Civilizations, 88, 89
 — — decline of, 84 *seq.*
 Animism, 220
 Aristotle, on Northern races,
 74
 Arnold, Matthew, 45
 Association, 42
 Authority, 140 *seq.*
- Barker, E., 77, 79
 Beaglehole, E., 192
 Bergson, H., 231
 Bosanquet, B., 124
 Brigham, C. C., 68
 Brunhes, J., 97
 Buckle, H. T., 216
 Buddhism, 213
 Butler, Joseph, 113
- Capitalism, 187 *seq.*
 Civilization, 44 *seq.*
 Class, and caste, 165
 — and economic status, 161
 — and estates, 165
 — and individual differences,
 173 *seq.*
 — and social mobility, 171
 — psychology of, 160 *seq.*
 — sources of differentiation,
 173 *seq.*
 Community, 41, 129 *seq.*
 Comte, A., 10, 19, 20, 216,
 218
 Confucianism, 214
- Conscience, 198 *seq.*
 Consent, 144 *seq.*
 Conventions, 151
 Culture, 43 *seq.*
 — contact, 94
 Custom, 152 *seq.*
- Darwin, Charles, 101, 102
 Democracy, 140
 Deniker, 57-9, 66
 Durkheim, E., 14, 15, 28, 119
- Ellis, Havelock, 73
 Engels, F., 123, 127, 240
 Environment, control of, 217
 seq.
 — physical, 96 *seq.*
 — social, 117 *seq.*
 Ethics and sociology, 28 *seq.*
 Exogamy, 130 *seq.*
- Fahlbeck, P., 173
 Family, the, 103, 107, 130 *seq.*
 Fashions, 152
 Fischer, Eugen, 59
 Force, 138 *seq.*
 Fouillée, A., 77
 Freud, S., 103 *seq.*, 133
- Garth, T. R., 69, 70
 Giles, P., 87, 88
 Green, T. H., 205
 Groups, 40
- Haddon, A. C., 60
 Hankins, F. H., 74

INDEX

- Hegel, 126
 Heitland, W. E., 85
 Herd-instinct, 99 *seq.*
 Hobhouse, L. T., 14, 15, 36, 51, 85, 97, 131, 147, 187, 223, 236, 238
 Hobson, E. W., 232
 Hobson, J. A., 187
 Höffding, H., 223
 Hrdlička, Ales, 73
 Humanitarianism, 207, 214
 Hume, David, 78
 Huxley, T. H., 57

 Institutions, 42
 Intelligence Tests, 68 *seq.*, 175 *seq.*
 Isaacs, Susan, 101, 112
 James, William, 111
 Kant, 44, 98, 202
 Kretschmer, E., 75
 Law, nature of, 149 *seq.*
 — and custom, 154
 — and moral ideas, 155
 — and the state, 150
 Law of the three stages, 218
 Libido, 104
 Lowie, R. H., 140, 173
 MacIver, R. M., 45, 50
 McDougall, W., 78, 101
 Magic, 204, 225, 227
 Malinowski, B., 132
 Mannheim, K., 216
 Martin, R., 59, 65
 Materialism, historical, 239 *seq.*
 Mediterranean race, contributions to civilization, 89
 Mill, J. S., 19, 23, 24, 145, 216
 Mind, social, 121 *seq.*
 Moral development, 198 *seq.*
 Moral judgment, 198
 Moral obligation, 199
 Moral universalism, 206
 Morals and religion, 203, 235

 National character, 77 *seq.*
 Negro, cultural status of, 83
 Nordic race and civilization, 87 *seq.*

 Parental impulses, 101
 Positivism, 219
 Pound, Roscoe, 157
 Power, desire for, 112
 Primitive mentality, 224
 Property, 181 *seq.*
 — evolution of, 190
 — forms of, 182
 — psychology of, 191 *seq.*
 Purpose, social, 115, 123 *seq.*

 Race, 54 *seq.*
 — and civilization, 83 *seq.*
 — and national character, 80 *seq.*
 — and prehistory, 86
 — definition of, 56 *seq.*
 — differences in brain weights, 66
 — — in cranial capacity, 65
 — — in intelligence, 64 *seq.*, 68
 — — in temperament and character, 80 *seq.*
 Read, Carveth, 228
 Reciprocity, 108, 137
 Religion, definition of, 209
 — development of, 208 *seq.*
 — psychology of, 210 *seq.*
 Ribot, Th., 110
 Ripley, W. Z., 58, 60, 75
 Ritual, 211
 Robertson, J. M., 94
 Rostovtseff, M., 85

 Scheidt, W., 86, 87
 Scientific thought, 229


INDEX

- Self assertion, 112
- display, 110
- interest, 110 *seq.*
- love, 113
- Seligman, Brenda, 132
- Seligman, C. G., 76
- Simmel, G., 8
- Simpler Peoples*, 22, 137, 180, 185
- Smith, Adam, 132
- Social control, forms of, 149 *seq.*
- dynamics, 20
- impulses, 108 *seq.*
- philosophy, aims of, 26
- statics, 20
- Society, 39 *seq.*
- Sociology and biology, 23, 54 *seq.*, 174 *seq.*
- and ethics, 28 *seq.*
- and psychology, 52, 98 *seq.*, 175 *seq.*
- and social philosophy, 24 *seq.*
- as a specialism, 9 *seq.*
- as a synthesis of social studies, 13 *seq.*
- chief functions of, 17
- methods of, 18 *seq.*
- Sombart, W., 190
- Spencer, H., 96, 173, 174
- Spengler, O., 45
- State and law, 150
- definition, 146 *seq.*
- primitive, 135 *seq.*
- Tradition, 235
- Tylor, E. B., 21, 44
- Value and fact, 26 *seq.*
- Vierkandt, A., 9, 10
- Vinogradoff, P., 190
- War and economic evolution, 138
- and political expansion, 139 *seq.*
- and primitive man, 137
- and social differentiation, 138
- Webb, Sidney, 187
- Weber, Alfred, 46
- Weber, Max, 10-12
- Wells, H. G., 84
- Westermarck, E., 51, 100, 130, 197, 205, 236
- Whitehead, A. N., 48
- Wundt, W., 51

*Printed by
Butler & Tanner Ltd,
Frome and London*









THE HOME UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

also includes the following volumes
on aspects of Government, Politics,
and Public Affairs :

PARLIAMENT

Sir Courtenay Ilbert

*Revised and with
additional matter by*

Sir Cecil Carr

Third Edition. No. 1

TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING

Sir Patrick Abercrombie

Third Edition. No. 163

EDUCATION IN GREAT BRITAIN

W. O. Lester Smith

No. 210

INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Edited by C. S. Myers

No. 148

TRADE UNIONS

Eric L. Wigham

No. 229

PROPAGANDA

Lindley Fraser

No. 230

INSURANCE

Harold E. Raynes

No. 244

OR/XP3634

The Home University Library was founded in 1911 to place at the disposal of students, wherever they might be, the fruits of sound learning in all the important branches of present-day knowledge. That aim has been preserved throughout the series of more than 200 titles, and since the Oxford imprint first appeared on the volumes in 1941 fuller resources of scholarship have become open to the Editors, who are now able to seek suitable writers on both sides of the Atlantic. Though all H.U.L. authors are experts in their subjects, they are not selected for their academic distinction alone ; they are also skilled in the art of presenting their material and able to unite learning with lucidity. While each book is complete and independent in itself, the series is carefully planned as a whole to cover a wide range under the headings :

ENGLISH
THE ARTS CLASSICAL
ECONOMICS & COMMERCE
EUROPEAN LITERATURE
GOVERNMENT & LAW
HISTORY PHILOSOPHY
RELIGION SCIENCE

New volumes are added at frequent intervals and books already in the series undergo careful revision as need and opportunity arise. A detailed list will be sent on request.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS